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This thesis analyses the political economy of the financial regulation of US 
investment banking, which is an under-researched topic within the IPE of finance. 
Various academics claim investment banks – or “Wall Street” – have significant 
influence on regulatory decision-making as well as policy making more generally so 
that they can shape the outcomes to suit their preferences. As this thesis will show, the 
vast majority of these claims are not rooted in empirics. The dissertation examines the 
factors and circumstances that led to a de-regulatory outcome in the area of financial 
regulation of investment banking. Five case studies are analysed in this regard: the 
repeal of the Glass Steagall Act, which is split into three case studies given the length 
of the period of observation and complexity involved, the Commodity Futures 
Modernisation Act, which legalised the non-regulation of OTC derivatives markets in 
the USA, and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s alternative net capital rule 
regime and Consolidated Supervised Entities Programme. The author tests to what 
extent interest group based explanation, the role of ideas, the judiciary as well as 
regulators’ statutory authority played a role in arriving at deregulation. The thesis’s 
case studies span a period of fourty years.  
 When analysing the cases, the thesis finds that investment banks’ interest 
groups were important in providing regulators with information, however the role of 
the judiciary in interpreting existing laws and thereby given them a different meaning 
carried as much weight in deregulatory policy outcomes as the aspect of regulators’ 
own regulatory amendments. Generally speaking, absent legislative change, 
regulators were successful in achieving their policy outcomes if they were largely 
aligned with the ideational consensus of the regulatory and market community and 
acted within their statutory authority. Regulators failed when they acted within their 
authority, but went against the ideational consensus of the entire regulatory and 
market community. The thesis shows that these episodes of de-regulation were in fact 
not driven by “Wall Street” and its lobbyists, but the result of complex chains of 
causalities in which the judiciary and regulators played major roles. 
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Chapter 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
Claims about the power of ‘Wall Street’ in academia as well as the media range from 
there being a ‘Wall Street Treasury Complex’  - that can somehow by virtue of a 
‘revolving door’ between the US Treasury and Wall Street exert influence and shape 
policy decisions (Bhagwati, 1998) – to investment banks ‘requesting’ their regulators, 
in this case the SEC, to use their own internal model for capital adequacies purposes 
(Johnson & Kwak, 2010). On the subject of the repeal of Glass Steagall, scholars 
argue that ‘Wall Street’ lobbied for its repeal (Underhill & Zhang, 2008). The overall 
message about the ‘Wall Street’ is clear in all three cases: Wall Street is a powerful 
lobby whose requests get granted and which enjoys privileged access to the world’s 
key decision-makers. Moreover, claims are made, as in the cases above, that Wall 
Street lobbied successfully for de-regulation, be this the repeal of Glass Steagall or the 
Securities Exchange Commission alternative net capital rule regime (Helleiner, 2011). 
 
When one tries to examine the empirical backup for these relatively big claims about 
the power of Wall Street, one is confronted with the fact that in the vast majority of 
cases, the authors fail to present an empirical fact base upon which they developed 
their arguments. Worse, as the literature review of this thesis shows, a great deal of 
prominent literature in the international political economy (IPE) of finance has 
become a self referencing body of work whose ultimate empirical foundations rest on 
here-say and sometimes lack any empirics.  
 
The author, who has been a former practitioner in investment banking, has 
been puzzled by these claims and lack of data. Overall, no research programme about 
the workings and influence of investment banking exists today in IPE. This is in 
contrast to the IPE of commercial banking literature which spans a great many books, 
journal articles and lively academic as well as public debates. Commercial banking, 
however, is a very different industry from investment banking: commercial banks are 
deposit taking organisation that create money via the so-called maturity 
transformation i.e. investing short-term customer deposits into longer-term loans and 
Hans Trees 
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mortgages. Because commercial banks do not have to hold one unit of capital for each 
unit they loan out, they can also create money via this leverage process. Commercial 
banks technically solvent under the Basel II capital accord if their total capital ratio is 
no lower than 8% of risk-weighted assets. Without going into great detail about Basel 
II in this chapter, commercial banks could thus give out $12 worth of loans with only 
$1 of capital. As such, commercial banks never hold enough reserves to pay out all its 
depositors in case these wanted all their money back at once – a scenario that is 
defined as a bank-run and typically triggered by a significant deterioration of trust in 
the commercial bank’s solvency. A commercial bank’s solvency is thus the single 
most important criterion to ensure its operation and it is the ratio sine qua non that 
banking regulators monitor. 
Investment banks, by contrast, are very different businesses. They do not take 
customer deposits and transform their maturity in order to give out loans and create 
money. In US legal terms, investment banks are referred to as “inter-broker dealers”, 
which highlights what it is that investment banks actually are: they are brokers which 
use customer funds to invest or deal on their behalf and not on behalf of the 
investment bank. Absent any maturity transformation and money creation, investment 
banking regulators are not focussed on solvency ratios, but liquidity. In case of 
trouble, investment banks need to be in a position to pay their customers’ funds back 
– which separate from the banks’ funds and were thus not used for re-investing into 
longer term loans or mortgages.  
As the literature review shows, the IPE literature on investment banking is 
extremely limited and the vast majority of IPE research has been done on commercial 
banking and the Basel Capital Accords, which is a body of academic work that does 
not apply to investment banks. The thesis seeks fill this gap and to build up a more 
coherent, empirically backed understanding of the political economy of financial 
regulation of US investment banking. In doing so, the research puzzle was to 
understand which factors and circumstances led to specific cases of de-regulatory 
outcomes. De-regulation can be taken to mean a number of different things: for 
example, a regulatory decision that led to a reduction in the net capital investment 
banks have to hold, a legislative Act of US Congress that repeals the separation of 
investment banking from commercial banking (USA Congress, 1999) or the 
intentional non-regulation of over the counter (OTC) derivatives markets in the US 
(USA Congress, 2000). 
Hans Trees 
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The thesis follows a qualitative small N case study design and selected three 
instances of significant de-regulation: the repeal of Glass Steagall, the SEC’s 
Consolidated Supervised Entities Programme and the Commodity Futures 
Modernisation Act. The thesis examines these three major de-regulatory instances in 
five distinct case studies. The repeal of the Glass Steagall Act from 1933 that 
culminated with the passing of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act in 1999 was divided into 
three chronological parts, each of which has a distinct story to tell.  
 
With the help of the process tracing method, each case study is being analysed 
to fully unearth the chain of causalities that caused the de-regulatory decision. The 
author analysed a vast number of primary sources, such as court orders, testimonies in 
Congress, acts of legislation as well as comment pieces from market participants 
during the consultation period for proposed rules. In addition, the author conducted 
nearly forty semi-structured elite interviews covering the world’s top regulators, 
investment bankers, lobbyists and lawyers. As the research design chapter shows, six 
hypotheses were developed and have been applied in each case study so as to test 
which explanatory variable is linked to the dependent variable: a reduction in 
regulation.  
   
The complexities behind each of the case studies deregulatory outcomes does 
not fit the picture of Wall Street being a powerful actor that can successfully lobby for 
these outcomes. To the contrary, each of the case studies shows that it is actually not 
US investment banks who brought about or asked for regulatory change.  
 
The thesis hopes to make important contributions to the IPE scholarship in 
general and the IPE of investment banking in particular. The concept that you can 
have significant regulatory change without corresponding legislative change is one of 
the dissertation’s novel contributions. The thesis’s case studies on the repeal of Glass 
Steagall found one actor that has largely been ignored in the IPE of finance: the 
judiciary. A ruling by the US Supreme Court provided a re-interpretation of the 
legislative intent of the Glass Steagall Act that considerably changed the separating 
line between investment and commercial banking and subsequently allowed the 
Hans Trees 
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Federal Reserve to gradually authorise Bank Holding Companies’ re-entry into 
investment banking (Supreme Court of the United States, 1981).  
A second novel contribution is the concept of regulators’ statutory authority. 
As the case studies on the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the 
SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity (CSE) Programme highlight is the importance 
of regulators statutory authority in connection with a broad ideational consensus 
amongst key policymakers and market participants. Whilst the CFTC had statutory 
authority to exempt OTC derivatives market from CFTC regulation, it nevertheless 
ended up losing its Chairperson Brooksley Born and being completely isolated 
amongst key decision-makers. To the contrary, the SEC lacked statutory authority to 
enforce the CSE Programme for US investment banks, but nevertheless succeeded in 
establishing it on a voluntary basis as it could build on broad ideational consensus.  
 
Overall, the case studies seek to paint a nuanced picture of the complexities 
behind deregulatory decision-making, which in all instances – despite the commonly 
held beliefs about Wall Street in academia – were not driven by investment banks and 
in some instances were actually to the detriment of investment banks.  
 
The thesis chose these three major de-regulatory events as they build a 
chronological picture of the political economy of the financial regulation of US 
investment banking starting in the early 1970s and ending in 2004.  
  
The thesis is outlined as follows:  
 
Chapter 2 provides an extensive literature review that spans from the core writings in 
the IPE of finance, including the Basel Capital Accords, provides a critical review of 
pieces focussing on ‘Wall Street’ and discusses the central weaknesses and gaps in the 
current research horizon. 
 
Chapter 3 is the thesis’s research design and theory chapter. It introduces the thesis 
research design, namely the qualitative case study method, and research puzzle and 
discusses the hypotheses and dependent as well as explanatory variables. 
 
Hans Trees 
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Chapters 4 to 6 examine the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act. Chapter 4 traces the 
beginning of the Act’s repeal to a US court decision in the 1960s and highlights how 
the US Supreme Court set the ball rolling with its landmark interpretative ruling on 
the Glass Steagall Act in 1981. Chapter 5 analyses the Fed’s application of this 
interpretative ruling under the Chairmanship of Paul Volcker and highlights how the 
Fed is using its statutory authority to bring about regulatory change without legislative 
change. Chapter 6 concludes the analysis of Glass Steagall’s repeal. It analyses how 
Alan Greenspan put his mark on the Fed and aggressively pursued regulatory change 
by way of its statutory authority so that by 1996, entire investment banks could have 
been acquired by Bank Holding Companies despite Glass Steagall still being in place. 
 
Chapter 7 examines the reasons behind the US Commodities Futures Modernisation 
Act which legally excluded large parts of US over-the-counter (OTC) derivative 
markets from regulation. The Act was a direct response to the US Commodity and 
Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) concept release under Chairperson Brooksely 
Born which threatened to classify billions of US dollars worth of OTC instruments as 
on-exchange futures thus rendering them illegal. 
 
Chapter 8 provides a detailed analysis of the reasons behind the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission's (SEC) alternative net capital rule and Consolidated 
Supervised Entity Programme (CSE). Because of the establishment of a single 
European capital market as envisaged by the European Commissions’s Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP), all financial conglomerates active in the EU had to be 
subject to consolidated supervision – a regime that the SEC did not offer and which 
subsequently led to the establishment of the alternative net capital rule and the CSE 
Programme. 
 
Chapter 9 provides conclusions and a high level case study comparison and identifies 
common elements that brought about similar regulatory outcomes. 
  
Hans Trees 
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Chapter 2 
THEORIES OF REGULATORY DECISION-MAKING IN 
THE IPE OF FINANCE LITERATURE 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter (i) sets out the current scholarly debate and theories in the international 
political economy (IPE) of finance, (ii) highlights how the debate links up with the 
political economy of investment banking and (iii) examines the literature’s 
shortcomings. The chapter’s first section introduces the main theories of regulatory 
decision-making in political science and economics relevant to IPE. Section two 
analyses how these theories of regulation translate into writings in the field of the 
political economy of finance, especially financial regulation, banking and financial 
crises. Here, the section focuses on how these IPE texts relate to the IPE of 
investment banking and where these current writings bear shortcomings.  
 
 
2.2 THEORIES OF REGULATION AND THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FINANCE  
 
A whole spectrum of theories explaining regulatory decision-making in the context of 
IPE exists, but, oddly, claims made about the influence and/or ‘power’ of interest 
groups representing financial institutions have not sufficiently – sometimes at all – 
been supported with empirical data.
1
 Moreover, only a limited amount of works 
                                                        
1
 For example, Wade and Veneroso (Wade, R. H. and F. Veneroso (1998). "The Asian Crisis: The High 
Debt Model versus the Wall Street-Treasury IMF complex." New Left Review 228(228).) claim that a 
‘Wall Street-Treasury Complex’ exists through which Wall Street exerts considerable power over US 
policymaking including, but not limited to, the IMF response to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997/98. 
Wade and Veneroso fail, however, to provide any empirical support for their claims. The authors take 
the notion of a ‘Wall Street-Treasury Complex’ from an article by Bhagwati in Foreign Affairs 
(Bhagwati, J. (1998). "The Capital Myth." Foreign Affairs 77(3): 7-12.). Bhagwati, too, fails to back up 
his arguments with data. Helleiner and Clapp (Clapp, J. and E. Helleiner (2010). "Troubled futures? 
The global food crisis and the politics of agricultural derivatives regulation." Review of International 
Political Economy.) built on the concept of the Wall Street Treasury Complex idea without providing 
any empirical evidence besides two articles from the online source Huffington Post (Grim, R. (2009). 
Truckers, Farmers, Airlines Battle Wall Street. The Huffington Post. and Grim, R. (2010). Wall Street 
Reform: Traditional Foes Join Forces to Take on Bankers. The Huffington Post .) Furthermore, it is 
striking that Helleiner includes the book 13 Bankers (Johnson, S. and J. Kwak (2010). 13 bankers : the 
Hans Trees 
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assesses the role and importance of investment banking, even though the power and 
influence of investment banks or ‘Wall Street’ on regulatory decision-making and in 
the financial community has been a hotly debated topic for more than a century.
2
 The 
introductory chapter highlighted the stark differences between commercial banks and 
investment banks. The vast body of IPE research and literature on commercial 
banking and the Basel capital accords is thus not applicable to the IPE of investment 
banking. As a result, the claims and arguments that are made about investment 
banking within the commercial banking literature often stand without practical 
application and empirical backup.  
 
This thesis thus makes an important contribution in establishing the IPE of 
investment banking as a distinct body of research from the wider IPE of commercial 
banking literature. The starting point for framing such an analysis of the political 
economy of investment banking is the IPE of finance literature. Here, two large 
streams of inquiry emerge:  
Firstly, works on the IPE of banking and the Basel accords, which in turn 
build upon theories of financial regulation; 
Secondly, IPE literature about financial crises and capital account 
liberalisation, which covers the influence of ‘Wall Street’. 
It may seem strange to take this diversion, i.e. analysing the political economy of 
investment banking through situating it in the wider political economy of finance 
literature rather than directly focusing on investment banking. However, the thesis 
shows that it is necessary to do so for two major reasons:  
Firstly, many IPE researchers incorrectly regard investment banking as part of 
commercial banking, even though these two businesses are in fact totally distinct 
activities. Classical investment banking is a non-deposit taking financial activity, 
                                                                                                                                                              
Wall Street takeover and the next financial meltdown. New York, Random House.) as a scholarly text 
in IPE in his review article about the global financial crisis (Helleiner, E. (2011). "Understanding the 
2007-2008 Global Financial Crisis: Lessons for Scholars of International Political Economy." Annual 
Review of Political Science 14(1): 67-87.). 13 Bankers makes sweeping statements about the power 
and influence of Wall Street, but provides little empirical backup other than public media sources. 
2
 For a detailed academic discussion on the history of US investment banking covering the public 
sentiment against the industry in the early 20
th
 century, including the allegation of John Pierpont 
Morgan running a ‘money trust’, see Vincent Carosso’s definitive account Investment Banking in 
America: a history (Carosso, V. P., M. V. Sears and I. Katz (1970). Investment banking in America : a 
history. Cambridge (Mass.) 
London, Harvard U.P.. ) 
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whereby the investment banks – the agents – act on behalf of their clients – the 
principals – to trade in equity and debt capital markets. In other words, they are inter-
broker dealers of their principals’ money. Investment banks finance and re-finance 
their liquidity through tapping banking wholesale markets, often on an overnight basis 
via repurchase agreements. Other investment banking operations such as corporate 
finance advisory and equity and debt research require little capital and also take no 
customer deposits. In the absence of any maturity transformation that commercial and 
retail banks do on a daily basis with customer funds – such as using short-term 
customer savings to make long-term mortgages – and investment banks can be, and 
indeed were, liquidated within days.
3
 The literature on the IPE of banking and the 
Basel accords touches upon security market activities and investment banking, as the 
chapter will discuss below. Nonetheless, most IPE texts either fail to address the big 
questions, e.g. why do we not have an international capital accord for investment 
banking, have factual inaccuracies or simply ignore investment banking altogether. 
Secondly, and possibly as a result of the first point, the IPE of finance literature has 
currently no works exclusively on the IPE of investment banking
4
. The overwhelming 
majority of scholarly pieces focus on the role of commercial banking and the Basel 
capital accords. A second strand, the IPE of financial crises literature, discusses ‘Wall 
Street’ - a term used synonymously as investment banking, yet often mixed up to also 
refer to commercial banking - but often fails to provide empirical validation for the 
arguments made. The paragraphs that follow review the various IPE scholars that 
claim lobby group pressure played a significant part in Washington, especially during 
financial crises, yet give little detail as to how this pressure was exerted, when and if 
at all. Often, the mere fact that an investment banker left Wall Street to serve the 
public instead is taken as the proof of Wall Street’s influence on Capitol Hill. Worse, 
even the ‘biggest’ names in IPE appear to have little knowledge about how 
investment banks work and what regulation is imposed on them. The IPE of 
investment banking is an area that is both distinct from the IPE of commercial 
banking and as such in need of a detailed and empirically sound and independent 
body of literature and research programmes. 
                                                        
3
 The US investment bank Drexel Lambert Burnham filed for bankruptcy in February 1992 and was 
liquidated without causing market disturbance. 
4
 Last checked September 2016 
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2.2.1 The Concept Of Regulation And Regulatory Theories 
Financial regulation is a complex topic encompassing political, financial, social and 
legal dimensions. When thinking about the concept of regulation more generally, 
different definitions emerge depending on the academic discipline. The Penguin 
Dictionary of Economics defines regulation as “the supervision and control of the 
economic activities of private enterprise by government in the interest of economic 
efficiency, fairness, health and safety” (Bannock, Davis et al. 1998, p.353). By 
contrast, the Oxford Concise Dictionary of Politics states that regulation is defined “in 
its specialised political sense, the control of privately owned monopoly by 
government rules […] ‘Regulation’ is also used more broadly to cover any publicly 
imposed rules governing a firm or industry” (McLean and McMillan 2003, p.459). 
Scholars of finance define the regulators’ tasks as “first, to ensure that markets work 
efficiently by managing systemic risk and by preventing market abuse and economic 
crime; second, protecting the consumer” (Eatwell and Taylor 2000, p.19). Baldwin 
and Cave differentiate between ‘different senses’ of the meaning of regulation 
(Baldwin and Cave 1999). They have a threefold understanding:  
First, “as a specific set of commands – where regulation involves the promulgation of 
a binding set of rules to be applied by a body devoted to this purpose” (ibid, p.2); 
Second, “as deliberate state influence – where regulation has a more broad sense and 
covers all state actions designed to influence industrial or social behaviour” (ibid, 
p.2); 
Lastly, “as all forms of social control or influence – where all mechanisms affecting 
behaviour  - whether these be state-derived or from other sources (e.g. markets) – are 
deemed regulatory” (ibid, p.2). 
 
Looking more specifically at financial regulation, academics and policy-makers 
distinguish between regulation (i.e. setting rules of behaviour or prudential standards), 
monitoring (observing whether these rules are obeyed / conduct of business), and 
Hans Trees 
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supervision (more general observation of actors’ behaviour). Financial regulation by 
itself covers a wide array of areas ranging from bank capital requirements, insider 
dealing legislation, controls on money laundering, rules on investor protection to 
setting accounting standards (Llewellyn 1999). The basic economic rationale for 
financial regulation is to manage the externalities that financial market activity 
generates which private sector actors cannot easily address. These externalities 
include, inter alia, systemic risks (which private actors either do not price in or 
calculate incorrectly in the case of sub-prime mortgages) and information 
asymmetries (which is a core principle and motif in the markets for making money). 
Regulatory intervention becomes necessary if regulation is seen as a free good that 
changes the behaviour of the regulated entities (in this case financial institutions) so 
as to strike a balance between the effective operation of free markets (and the creative 
powers of risk-taking) whilst maintaining the system’s overall soundness and 
correcting potential market imperfections (Davies and Green 2008). Different 
regulators hold varying ideas as to what the ‘optimal’ balance of regulation is, as it 
imposes costs on its regulated entities (which are often passed on to consumers). 
Generally speaking, regulation can only be justified if the benefits exceed the costs 
imposed. However, such cost benefit evaluations remain premature up until today 
(Davies and Green 2008). The costs associated with the current or latest financial 
crisis of 2007 – 2009 (some might argue that parts of Europe are still in crisis today, 
nearly ten years later) can be measured in direct and indirect terms. Depending on 
what source and data is used, these costs vary between more than $4 trillion in 
expected write-downs by the end of 2011 (IMF 2009) to more moderate calculations 
of direct fiscal costs of less than 1% of GDP in most developed countries (Deutsche 
Bank 2010).  Given these various definitions of regulation, the thesis takes regulation 
to mean the publicly exercised control of market activity - either directly or indirectly 
– by means of laws, statutes and supervision. 
As regards the main theories of regulation, we can roughly divide these as follows: 
public interest models, private interest theories, (historical) institutionalist theories, 
ideas-based approaches and mixed models incorporating elements of all of the above.  
Public interest theories assert that regulation identifies and successfully corrects 
market failures so that publicly desirable outcomes are achieved (Landis 1938). 
Hans Trees 
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Regulators are depicted as disinterested, experienced professionals concerned with 
efficiency and the public good (Cushman 1972). The tradition of ‘welfare economics’ 
broadly falls into this category. Critics purport that it is not clear what the public 
interest actually is, and they question whether regulators are in fact disinterested, 
efficient and well-trained individuals (Francis 1993). Motives of personal gain, critics 
argue, may interfere with the public interest, and legislators as well as private interest 
groups may influence regulatory decision-making and thus ‘capture’ the regulators. 
In line with this criticism, private interest theories assert that regulation is the 
reflection of private interests made up of rational actors. Stigler (Stigler 1971) and 
Peltzman (Peltzman 1976) established the ‘Chicago Theory of Regulation’ which sees 
regulation as a supply and demand side model. They demonstrate how regulation is 
not simply supplied to markets, but show why and how the industry demands 
regulation as a way to extract rents, erect barriers to market entry and fix prices. In 
return for state supplied regulation, the industry “which seeks regulation must be 
prepared to pay with the two things a party needs: votes and resources” (Stigler 1971, 
p.12). According to this model, the regulation would thus be favourable to well 
organised, compact industry interest groups who are better organised and not as 
diffused as the mass of consumers (Peltzman 1976). Individuals are defined as 
rational income maximisers. The Chicago School has been criticised for 
underestimating the role of ideas, problems associated with determining people’s 
regulatory preferences, the ability to act altruistically or irrationally and the theory’s 
failure to provide a more detailed account of the design and adaptability of regulatory 
institutions.  
 
Historical institutional approaches emphasise the role of institutions (Thatcher 2007), 
their historical stability and highlight that cross-national differences continue to exist 
despite common external pressures.
5
 Instead of focusing on individuals’ preferences, 
these theories analyse what impact institutional settings and administrative procedures 
                                                        
5
 For an overview of works: Streek and Thelen (eds.) Beyond continuity: institutional change in 
advanced political economies Streeck, W. and K. A. Thelen (2005). Beyond continuity : institutional 
change in advanced political economies. Oxford, Oxford University Press.; Hall and Soskice (eds.) 
Varieties of Capitalism Hall, P. A. and D. W. Soskice (2001). Varieties of capitalism : the institutional 
foundations of comparative advantage. Oxford, Oxford University Press.. 
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have on individuals’ preferences and how they can shape them. Research ranges from 
(neo) institutional economics to sociological theories of regulatory capture. Hancké 
and Herrmann analyse how the rules pertaining to the European Monetary Union have 
influenced wage bargaining in Euro member countries (Hancké and Herrmann in 
Hancke, Rhodes et al. 2007). In the same volume of this book, Thatcher examines the 
reforms of national regulatory institutions for network industries in Europe. He argues 
that “regulatory institutions offer a powerful means to coordinate firms, governments 
and public policy-makers, and hence create institutional advantages” (Thatcher in 
Hancke, Rhodes et al. 2007). 
 
Ideational or constructivist accounts examine the influence of economic paradigms, 
such as the Efficient Market Hypothesis, on regulatory decision-making. Blyth shows 
how economic ideas “provided the Swedish state […] with the means to construct the 
institutions of the Swedish model” in the 1930s and 1940s whilst Swedish businesses 
used a new set of ideas in the 1980s “to contest and thus delegitimise existing 
institutions and the patterns of distribution that they made possible, beginning the 
process of overturning the Swedish model long before capital mobility or domestic 
inflation was ever a problem” (Blyth 2001, p.2). Other constructivist works look at 
links between IMF employees’ education and IMF policies (Chwieroth 2007), the 
influence of ideas on American trade policy (Goldstein 1993) or the relationship 
between policy paradigms and social learning (Hall 1993).   
 
A whole range of mixed models employ elements of all these theories of regulation. 
An example would be Levi-Faur’s work on the global diffusion of regulatory 
capitalism (Levi-Faur 2005) in which he looks at a whole variety of factors giving rise 
to the diffusion of regulatory capitalism, such as the relationship between the state and 
society, the proliferation of new technologies and the importance of epistemic 
communities amongst others. Even though it can be argued that regulating financial 
institutions is more difficult than regulating businesses of the real economy – because 
of the unique and systemically important role financial institutions occupy in any real 
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economy – theories of financial regulation essentially derive from the general theories 
of regulation examined above.   
 
2.3 THE IPE OF FINANCE LITERATURE 
 
This section outlines the current research horizon in the international political 
economy of finance. The vast majority of research concentrates on two large areas: 
firstly, the politics of financial regulatory harmonisation – with an overwhelming 
focus on the Basel accords – and, secondly, on the politics of financial crises and 
capital account liberalisation. The literature on regulatory harmonisation has little to 
say about investment banking. The body of works on financial crises and financial 
liberalisation refers more often to ‘Wall Street’, but whether the use of this term is 
justified is doubtful.  
2.3.1 Literature On The Basel I Capital Accord 
The Basel Capital Accord of 1988, widely known as Basel I, marked a sea change for 
transnational financial regulatory cooperation. The backdrop to Basel I can ultimately 
be seen in the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System in 1973 and the years of 
financial turbulence and stagflation that followed. The rise of modern communication 
equipment and the increase in capital mobility translated into a renaissance of 
‘globalisation’ in finance. The failure of Cologne-based Bankhaus Herstatt in 1974, 
probably one of the best-known examples of settlement risk in banking, and the 
collapse of Franklin National bank in the US caused considerable shock waves in 
financial markets and amongst politicians. Kapstein asserts that these events were the 
catalyst for central bankers and governments to start cooperating transnationally in the 
area of financial regulation. This took the form of policy coordination in supervising 
internationally active banks and information sharing on bank practices (Kapstein 
2006) (Kapstein 1989).  
The immediate policy outcome was the Basel Concordat (Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practises 1975) in which it states that the Basel 
Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practises “agreed that the basic 
aim of international cooperation in this field should be to ensure that no foreign 
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banking establishment escapes supervision”, that “each country has a duty to ensure 
that foreign banking establishments in its territory are supervised” and that for 
liquidity management and supply both the host country authority “can carry out the 
continuous supervision of liquidity which may from time to time be required” as well 
as the home country since “the parent authority, in controlling the liquidity of the 
parent bank, must take account of calls that its foreign branches might make on its 
liquid resources” so that “the liquidity of foreign branches is a matter of concern to 
parent authorities also” (Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory 
Practises 1975, p.1-5).  Whilst the Basel Concordat was a first significant step for 
international regulatory cooperation, its vagueness and non-binding character 
prevented it from being considerably more than lip service. Basel I changed this. 
Basel I set minimum levels of capital for internationally active banks and “the 
framework […] is mainly directed towards assessing capital in relation to credit risk 
(the risk of counterparty failure) but other risks, notably interest rate risk and the 
investment risk on securities, need to be taken into account by supervisors in 
assessing overall capital adequacy” (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1988, 
p.2). For the first time, Basel I defined what could count as banks’ equity, it set 
minimum “core” capital standards and established a framework for weighing the 
riskiness of assets. Each of these weighting and ratios carries potentially enormous 
regulatory costs and are thus highly political. The target standard ratio (nowadays 
commonly known as Tier One Capital ratio
6) is calculated on the basis of a bank’s 
risk weighted assets, the weighing of which carried huge implications for banks and 
their customers. These calculations carried enormous re-distributive consequences, 
i.e. costs, within the banking systems and thus its customers.  To illustrate this point 
further, banks had to set aside considerably less capital on loans to OECD 
governments (0% risk weighting) than for loans to a private sector company (100% 
risk weighting).
7
 Based on this simple example, it is evident that considerable 
amounts of capital and ultimately the availability of credit to domestic economies 
                                                        
6
 The Tier One capital ratio is the ratio of a bank’s equity over its risk-weighted assets. Importantly, 
Basel I defined what counts as ‘equity’ and how to weigh up the bank’s assets according to risk 
metrics. The Tier One Capital ratio was set at 8% whilst the Core Tier One Ratio, i.e. the equity part of 
a bank that was only made up of shareholders’ equity and no subordinated debt, was set at 4%. 
7
 To illustrate the financial impact of the risk weighting, a $100m loan to an OECD government did not 
require any capital charge since it was weighed as 0%. By contrast, a $100m loan to a private company 
resulted in a capital charge of $4m given a 100% weighting of the asset and a minimum requirement to 
hold 4% as equity on the bank’s books. 
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were at stake during the Basel negotiations. Risk weightings and capital charges 
directly fed through into credit availability and pricing.  In addition, the structure of 
banking systems varied considerably between the G10 countries. When applying 
Basel I to national banking systems, some banking systems were significantly 
undercapitalised, such as Japan. The benefit of enhanced international financial 
stability thus came at a cost. The big IPE question is this: why did the G10 
governments agree and who had to adjust?  
Kaplan argues that “the successful negotiation of a common standard for adequacy of 
capital by the G-10 countries was due to the development of consensual knowledge 
regarding systemic risks, combined with decisive leadership on the part of the United 
States and Great Britain” (Kapstein 1989, p.324). He asserts that this consensual 
knowledge was a necessary, but not sufficient condition for international regulation. 
Rather, the pre-Basel I UK-US bilateral agreement on common bank capital adequacy 
of January 1987 established an ‘economic exclusion zone’ and was thus a “tacit threat 
of preventing foreign banks from expanding operations or establishing new ones” 
(Kapstein 1989, p.344). Kapstein changed the emphasis of his argument in a second 
paper three years later. He still saw structural power aspects behind the Anglo-
American bilateral agreement allowing the Americans to pressurise the Japanese 
whilst giving the British an instrument to fend off European Commission led 
regulatory efforts (Kapstein 1992). However, he argues “the decision to pursue the 
idea of a single capital adequacy standard was not so much the product of collective 
technical knowledge as it was the reflection of what the British and American central 
bankers considered to be the ‘art of the possible’ given the international and domestic 
politics in which the debt crisis was embedded” (Kapstein 1992). Oatley and Nabors 
stylise Kapstein’s work as representative of international cooperation scholars for 
whom the establishment of international institutions is a functional expression to 
realise joint gains (Oatley and Nabors 1998). They challenge the functional argument 
and suggest that Basel I is an expression of rent-seeking, or as they call it “an instance 
of redistributive cooperation: the creation of an international institution that 
intentionally reduces at least one other government’s welfare compared to the status 
quo” (Oatley and Nabors 1998, p.36). American policymakers, Oatley and Nabors 
argue, were especially concerned with the continuing substantial deterioration in 
earnings power and market share of the US commercial banking industry, which was 
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primarily a result of considerable domestic (via capital markets) as well as foreign 
competition (Japanese and continental European universal banks). In response, 
American policy-makers established the Anglo-American bilateral agreement in 
January 1987 and used their ‘market share’ in global finance to alter significantly the 
choice-set for the remaining G10 governments during the Basel negotiations: the 
Japanese were the primary targets of this campaign as Japanese banks had low capital 
adequacy rates by international comparison. Because of Japan’s dependence on the 
US military, and as a result of the Anglo-American threat to close off capital markets 
to banks not applying their capital standards, Japan joined the bilateral capital 
adequacy agreement in June 1987. Japan’s acceptance laid the path for the 
multilateral agreement of Basel I (Oatley and Nabors 1998).    
 
2.3.1.1 The Limitations of the Literature on Basel I 
The literature on Basel I contributed significantly to our understanding of the reasons 
behind international cooperation in financial regulation generally, and is an important 
cornerstone for the development of the IPE of Finance. In particular, Kapstein made 
several extremely thoughtful points on ‘new financial trends’ which continue to be of 
utmost relevance to date: the growing interdependence of banking systems, the rise of 
financial engineering such as securitisation, the practice of off-balance sheet 
obligations and the rise in financial speculation. Kapstein presents these trends as the 
backdrop for the Basel I negotiations.  
However, Kapstein’s and Oatley and Nabors’ accounts, different as they are, 
focus on American commercial banks and the competitive threat from their Japanese 
counterparts. Neither of them shed any light on investment banking and the Glass-
Steagall Act. Kapstein refers to a statement from the American Bankers Association 
(ABA) in which the ABA expresses its concerns that the new capital adequacy 
measures would further undermine US commercial banks’ competitiveness vis-à-vis 
US investment banks.
8
 Surprisingly though, he only presents this statement as another 
reason for Basel I rather than a major industry development in its own right. As is set 
                                                        
8
 Statement from the American Bankers Association sent to the Federal Reserve Board on 23 May 
1986 and referenced on page 280 in Kapstein 1992.  
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out in the chapter on the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, the American banking 
industry was deeply dissatisfied with the continuing separation of commercial and 
investment banking. US banks kept losing significant market shares at home to non-
banks in both retail and corporate sectors and investment banks abroad, which caused 
a significant decline in overall bank profitability. At the time, the deterioration of 
banks’ profitability alarmed regulators – the OCC, the FDIC and the Fed. They, too, 
argued for a change in legislation that would allow banks to conduct certain insurance 
and securities activities. In fact, as early as November 1987, the Chairman of the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System Alan Greenspan testified before 
the Subcommittee on Financial Institution Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of 
the United States House of Representatives: 
…it would be appropriate at this time to concentrate on the specific 
suggestion to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act. It is our view that this 
action would respond effectively to the marked changes that have 
taken place in the financial marketplace here and abroad, and would 
permit banks to operate in areas where they already have considerable 
experience and expertise. Moreover, repeal of Glass-Steagall would 
provide significant public benefits consistent with a manageable 
increase in risk (Greenspan 1987). 
It is striking that Kapstein and Oatley and Nabors did not focus on this significant 
mood-swing amongst US regulators. Academics covered how the Latin America Debt 
crisis as well as the Basel I Accord fundamentally altered the course of events in 
finance for the decades to follow. However, the progressive unravelling of the 
separation between investment banking from commercial (and retail) banking has not 
been covered despite the fact that it was probably one of the key events, if not the key 
factor, to change the political economy of financial regulation of the investment 
banking industry.  
 
2.4 BASEL 1+ LITERATURE 
A whole range of authors analyse the Basel I accord alongside other financial 
regulatory agreements, such as capital markets regulation. Since investment banks are 
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significant, if not the most significant, players on capital markets at the time, one 
would expect that they naturally play a leading role in any academic analysis of 
capital market regulation. 
 
2.4.1 Beth Simmons 
Beth Simmons examines the mechanisms and processes that drive regulatory 
harmonisation in global finance. She focuses on Basel I, anti-money laundering, 
accounting standards for IPOs and information sharing among securities regulators 
(Simmons 2001). Assuming that only one dominant (or “hegemonic”) financial centre 
exists (i.e. the US and/or the UK
9
), Simmons investigates whether the policies of the 
dominant financial centre cause negative externalities for all other centres so that 
these are incentivised to emulate the policies of the dominant centre. As such, if 
negative externalities are significant and incentives for emulation high, regulatory 
harmonisation along the lines of the dominant centre’s policies follows. Simmons 
argues that the Basel accords are an example for this. By contrast, information sharing 
amongst security regulators is a case of insignificant negative externalities and low 
incentives to emulate. Furthermore, she maintains that the absence of a multilateral 
solution in this instance is because “bilateral agreements are easier to negotiate than 
multilateral accords and minimise defection through specific reciprocity” (Simmons 
2001, p.612).  
 
2.4.1.1 Simmons’s shortcomings 
Interestingly, Simmons highlights that there are systemic risks involved in not 
sharing information, as the collapse of Barings Bank demonstrated. She also concedes 
that this actually raises doubts as to whether information sharing has low negative 
externalities and low incentives. It is thus odd that Simmons chose this case; it does 
not fit her matrix, as the absence of information sharing carries enormous negative 
                                                        
9
 After a long discussion of financial markets statistics, Simmons concludes that “regulators in the 
United States and the United Kingdom exercise jurisdiction over financial institutions and networks 
that are strategically important to the global financial system as a whole” (Simmons, 2001, p.594) 
Simmons, B. A. (2001). "The international politics of harmonisation: the case of capital market 
regulation." International Organization 55(3): 589-620. 
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externalities. Moreover, it constitutes a very specific case within security regulation 
that fails to address the bigger question: why is there no international capital adequacy 
standard for investment banks? Her paper displays many analytical weaknesses, not 
least her uncritical celebration of Anglo-American ‘best practices’ in supervision and 
regulation (ibid, p.594). She argues that the Pound Sterling has a special role in 
international trade and FDI even though the UK lags far behind the export 
powerhouses of Japan and Germany. Simmons’s analysis of the matrix and her 
chosen issue areas have proven problematic in all quadrants. To give just one 
example, Simmons assumes that US accounting standards for IPOs carry high 
incentives for emulation without having significant negative externalities. The 
opposite happened after the Enron and Worldcom scandals and the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act that Congress passed thereafter. The tightening of accounting and corporate 
governance standards in the US led to a significant shift of IPOs away from the US 
towards Europe, especially London and Amsterdam. 
Drezner criticises Simmons’s study for incorrectly assuming that the US is a 
hegemonic power in finance (Drezner 2007). He contends that both the EU and the 
US dominate global finance and provide financial regulation via international 
government organisations, such as the Basel Committee and the Financial Action 
Task Force, as club goods. He emphasises that “the great powers, as developed 
economies, derived significant benefits from coordination at a stringent level of 
regulation” and that “the distributional implications among these states are small” 
(Drezner 2007, p.122) . The power differential is therefore not within the developed 
country world, but between developing and developed countries.  
 
 
 
2.4.2 David Singer 
Probably by now one of the core texts in the politics of financial regulation, Singer 
focuses on the domestic politics of capital regulation and regulatory agencies as the 
main actors rather than legislatures (Singer 2004). He asserts that regulators seek to 
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avoid legislative intervention at home, and thus push for international regulatory 
harmonisation as a way of levelling the playing field in times of increased foreign 
competition and as a means of providing stability when confidence in financial 
institutions is declining (Singer 2007). His research attempts to explain the “varying 
preferences of regulators toward international regulatory harmonisation” and whilst 
his analytical framework combines aspects of Oatley and Nabors’ and Kapstein’s 
work, he believes it “offers a more compelling and analytically useful explanation of 
regulator preferences” (Singer 2004, p.534). Singer’s framework essentially consists 
of overlaying two chart functions: the first is the relationship between regulators’ 
stringency and confidence in the financial system, the second the function of financial 
stability and competitiveness of the domestic financial institutions. The point at which 
legislators threaten to intervene when either competitiveness or confidence falls below 
a certain level determines the actual win-set between regulators stringency, 
confidence and competitiveness that regulators have. When exogenous shocks cause a 
fall in either competitiveness and/or confidence in domestic financial markets, 
regulatory win-sets shrink or disappear, in which case regulators seek international 
regulatory harmonisation by way of re-establishing the status quo ante. The Basel 
accords, Singer argues, are exemplary of this.   
Singer is one of the first IPE scholars to consider seriously why a comparable capital 
accord for investment banking under the auspices of IOSCO failed. He reconstructs 
the events leading up the SEC’s outright refusal to establish an international 
agreement in October 1992. According to Singer, the UK’s Securities and Investment 
Board (SIB) was eager to establish an international regulatory standard as London’s 
merchant banks faced unprecedented competition following Thatcher’s deregulation 
movement (known as the ‘big bang’) in 1986 and unprecedented financial volatility 
during the ‘Black Monday’ weeks in 1987.10 Singer argues that the “SIB’s advocacy 
of harmonisation was driven by competitive pressures in derivatives markets from US 
firms, combined with a heightened sense of vulnerability of asset prices to shocks 
                                                        
10
 The ‘Big Bang’ refers to a set of reforms that ultimately liberalised the London Stock Exchange and 
the United Kingdom’s financial sector. The UK Parliament passed the Financial Services Act of 1986 
that liberalised financial markets, but simultaneously established the SIB in a move to re-regulate 
finance. The SIB was charged to oversee the industry and act as regulator. As a result of the 
liberalisation, US and continental European investment banks and universal banks acquired nearly all 
British merchant banks and brokers within the years to follow. Black Monday is the commonly 
accepted name for 19
th
 October 1987 when stock markets around the world crashed and stocks lost 
around 20% of their value.  
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from abroad and the precariousness of British securities firms in the wake of the 1987 
stock market crash” (Singer 2007, p.69). He maintains that the public offer of the 
British government’s remaining stake in BP (31%) just days after Black Monday was 
“bungled” almost completely unsubscribed and therefore left underwriters with 
tremendous losses, most of which were British and only a “small number from the 
United States and continental Europe”. Despite the fact that the Bank of England set a 
floor for which it would purchase BP shares in order to alleviate the flow-back and 
financial loss, “underwriters were nonetheless left with losses totalling some £700m” 
(ibid, p.78). Singer highlights that no British merchant banks failed, but the SIB was 
nevertheless very nervous about the possibility of this happening and was thus 
pushing for regulatory harmonisation thereafter. 
 
2.4.2.1 A critique of Singer 
At first sight, Singer’s argument about the problematic BP offering and the 
vulnerability of the British merchant banking system seems plausible. He references 
his claims about the SIB and the BP offering to the book The Confidence Game: How 
Unelected Central Bankers Are Governing the Changed World Economy (Solomon 
1995). When Singer’s arguments are checked against this book and then the book’s 
data is referenced back to historical archives, such as the one from the Financial 
Times, several discrepancies come to shore. It is correct that N.M. Rothschild was the 
lead manager of BP’s public offering, and Rothschild did ask to halt the issue after a 
majority vote of all 17 underwriters had voted in favour. The underwriters tried to 
invoke the “adverse change” clause in the underwriting agreement with the UK 
Treasury. However, the clause gave the Treasury the final say as to whether or not to 
proceed with the offering. In the end, Prime Minster Thatcher and the Treasury under 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Lawson decided to go ahead despite the fact that 
underwriters could face significant paper losses of more than £1bn. Singer’s and 
Solomon’s account is correct until this point. What both do not represent accurately 
are two key facts about the BP underwriting:  
Firstly, whilst UK merchant banks did take up the largest proportion of the offering, 
they had 400 sub-underwriters in place that essentially dispersed the risk amongst this 
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group, leaving no one severely exposed financially.   
Secondly, the US banks underwrote some 23% of the total (480m shares), but none of 
them had any sub-underwriting (as this was illegal under US law) leaving them fully 
exposed to losses.  
In actual fact then, the BP offering became a litmus test for the American and not the 
British merchant banks. As the Financial Times notes “the UK underwriters – led by 
N.M. Rothschild, the merchant bank – are carrying a relatively small part of this risk 
because 40 per cent of the issue has been underwritten overseas and the UK portion 
has been sub-underwritten with more than 400 institutional investors” (Tomkins 
1987). Not only did the British merchant not have to worry about significant paper 
losses, but the American underwriters also faced tremendous financial pain. A day 
later, the FT reporters Anatole Kaletksy and Richard Tomkins went further and 
highlighted the fact that  
 
it is unclear just where the pressure for a withdrawal of the issue is 
coming from. Although the UK underwriters face by far the largest 
exposure to the issue, they have passed down most of the risk to well 
over 400 sub-writers. The exposure of these sub-underwriters is 
therefore limited, and they seem to be accepting their fate with good 
grace (Kaletksy 1987). 
 
Kaletsky and Tomkins point out that of all the different countries, “probably the 
biggest losers would be the US underwriters – Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, 
Solomon Brothers and Shearson Lehman” since sub-underwriting is not allowed in 
the US “because the price of a stock offering is not normally fixed until the actual day 
of the issue” (ibid.). The facts surrounding the underwriting and sub-underwriting of 
the BP issue directly contradict Singer’s argument that “investors in London were less 
confident in the stability of their securities firms” with regard to the public offering. 
To the contrary, the Association of British Insurers stated publicly that “it resented 
any suggestions that its members might be trying to shirk their responsibilities” (ibid.) 
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and this despite them constituting a considerable portion of the sub-underwriters. It is 
thus factually incorrect to link the BP offering to a loss in confidence. It was the 
American underwriters who faced significant financial upheaval with this public 
offering and not the British merchant banks. Whilst these inaccuracies do not disprove 
Singer’s argument and framework as such, they do cast significant doubts about the 
validity of his research in the area of securities and investment banking. In particular, 
it raises eyebrows with regard to whom he identifies as the protagonists in pushing for 
harmonising investment banking capital standards, and why.  
 
Overall, the literature on Basel I set the scene for thinking about financial regulation 
in an IPE context. It is the scholarship on Basel II, however, that has fine-tuned this 
analysis, yet also introduced arguments about regulatory capture without empirical 
basis. 
 
2.5 BASEL II 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released the International 
Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards – A Revised 
Framework, known as Basel II, in June 2004. After a lengthy consultation process and 
the circulation of three major draft proposals (1999, 2001 and 2003), the Committee 
was finally able to establish a revision to the Basel I framework that all BCBS 
members and the heads of central banks and banking supervisors of the G-10 
countries agreed on. Basel II’s core objective is to “further strengthen the soundness 
and stability of the international banking system while maintaining sufficient 
consistency that capital adequacy regulation will not be a significant source of 
competitive inequality among internationally active banks” (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision 2006, p.2). Basel II was seen as bringing capital requirements 
more in line with best practices in the risk management industry. The mechanics and 
details of Basel II have been analysed and discussed at length, and the thesis will thus 
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only provide an overview of Basel II’s details that are relevant for understanding the 
political economy of investment banking regulation.
11
   
Essentially, Basel II’s framework rests on three pillars:  
 Pillar I – Minimum Capital Requirements. This pillar provides the actual 
toolkits for calculating minimum capital requirements and what counts as 
capital; 
 
 Pillar II – Supervisory Review Process. It sets out the compliance with 
minimum standards and the core principles of the review process; 
 
 Pillar III – Market Discipline. This pillar aims to ensure that banks operate 
transparently and disclose to the markets essential details of their capital 
adequacy and risk management so that investors, “the market”, can judge for 
themselves. 
 
                                                        
11
 An enormous amount of literature has been published in law and finance. For an overview, the thesis 
refers to Hal Scott’s book Capital Adequacy beyond Basel (Scott, H. S. (2005). Capital adequacy 
beyond Basel : banking, securities, and insurance. New York, Oxford University Press.) 
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Above all, Basel II’s new framework intends to ensure that banks calculate the value 
for the probability of default (PD), the loss given default (LPD), the exposure at 
default (EAD) and the effective maturity (M) of assets more precisely. As such, Basel 
II establishes a new and more differentiated set of risk weights. Irrespective of the 
size and sophistication of financial institutions, banks have to adhere to and apply 
these risk weights. Basel II does not allow banks to run their own risk models and 
create their own risk weights. This aspect is widely misunderstood. Basel II permits 
banks, subject to regulatory approval, to calculate their own values of PD, LPD and 
EAD and then use these when allocating appropriate risk weights as determined by 
the standard Basel II regulatory model.  
Because not every bank has the capacity to calculate and analyse the PD, LPD and 
EAD values, Basel II offers banks three different risk weighting methodologies:  
 The Standardised Approach – defines the risk weights for all asset classes. 
Banks identify these via ratings from external credit rating agencies or via the 
Basel II definitions in case external credit ratings are not available.  
 
 The Foundation Approach, also known as the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) 
Approach – allows  
banks that have received supervisory approval to use the IRB 
approach may rely on their own internal estimates of risk 
components in determining the capital requirement for a given 
exposure (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2006, 
p.52). 
 The Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach – based on the Foundation 
Approach, the Advanced IRB permits banks to use more internal estimates 
than is the case under the Foundation Approach. 
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It is fair to say that the IPE literature on Basel II is one of two cornerstones for the 
IPE of finance. Kapstein’s assessment of the new capital accord is that it represents 
not merely a shared concern with financial stability and an ongoing balancing act of 
finding a more level and more stable playing field, but also a relief for the US to be 
the structural backdrop for stability in the global financial system (Kapstein 2006). He 
was one of the few economists who argued prior to the financial crisis of 2007 that 
Basel II and the shift towards securitisation and an originate to distribute model “has 
certainly freed bank capital and thus allowed greater lending activity to take place, 
[but] has not necessarily reduced systemic risk” (ibid, p.12).   
Equally critical, Tarullo argues that Basel II is a ‘milestone’ since it 
significantly changed minimum capital requirements and was “unprecedented as an 
exercise in international regulatory coordination and harmonization” (Tarullo 2008, 
p.1), but “Basel II’s detailed rules for capital regulation are not an appropriate basis 
for an international arrangement among banking supervisors” (Tarullo 2008). Tarullo 
dismisses Basel II on three principal grounds: firstly, IRB is a questionable and not 
yet tested method to calculate regulatory capital; secondly, he questions whether the 
gains received from cooperation actually outweigh the compliance costs; and lastly, 
with regard to the first two criticisms, Tarullo believes that given the uncertainty in 
applying Basel II in practice as well as its net benefits, a simpler and ‘more eclectic’ 
international arrangement would be better than Basel II. Focusing specifically on the 
implementation of Basel II in the United States, Herring highlights that the Fed 
initially wanted to move away from a leverage ratio and only require the Basel IRB 
approach for America’s core banks, only to completely change course after the 
Quantitative Impact Study (QIS) 4 resulted in enormous differences in risk weights 
(ranging from 74% to less than 1%) for the same residential mortgage portfolio 
(Herring 2007). Interestingly, Herring refers to the efforts made by four large US 
banks – Citigroup, JPMorgan, Wachovia and Washington Mutual – which argued that 
they should not have to adhere to leverage ratio and Basel II since the largest US 
investment banks – those subject to the SEC Consolidated Supervised Entity 
Programme – could switch to an alternative net capital rule that incorporated many 
elements of Basel II. Herring’s account is interesting in that he focuses on the 
implementation phase of Basel II, the industry’s feedback and the QIS results and sets 
them in context with US investment banking, which none of the other authors did. He 
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is also one of the few scholars to appreciate that Basel II does not allow banks to run 
their own risk models.  
 
2.5.1 Regulatory Capture 
Referring to Stigler’s and Peltzman’s theory of regulatory capture, several IPE authors 
assert that Basel II is a prime example of regulatory capture, yet give little more than 
anecdotal evidence to support these claims.  Steil and Litan contend that the Basel 
accords are seriously flawed and de facto irrelevant, and only adhered to “if for no 
other reason than not to offend their regulators” (Steil and Litan 2006, p.25). They 
assert that the US follows their own regime of financial regulation, which is seen as 
more stringent than Basel. Moreover, Steil and Litan emphasise that the Basel accords 
were not drafted in consultation with banks, but rather that banks shaped regulatory 
policies (ibid., p.27). The authors make these considerable claims without any 
empirical backup. 
A noteworthy exception in the Basel II IPE and regulatory capture literature is 
the research from Kevin Young. Young’s work provides an empirical analysis of the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s journey towards Basel II and the 
involvement of private sector interests. Building upon a comprehensive body of 
empirics as well as a wide range of interviews, Young demonstrates that private sector 
lobbyists had access to [what?] within the regulatory decision-making process, but 
that this did not always translate into influence and, surprisingly, sometimes led to 
even more stringent regulation (Young 2012).  
 
2.5.1.1 Underhill and Zhang’s analysis of Investment Banking 
Underhill and Zhang argue that “the long-institutionalised relationship between 
regulators and the regulated in financial supervision […] approximates conditions of 
capture” (Underhill and Zhang 2008, p.546). They assert that “national capacities to 
provide such collective goods as market regulation or crisis management have been 
dramatically weakened” and that the “prevalence of private interests in rule-making 
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processes undermines the establishment of an accountable and legitimate financial 
order” (ibid, p.536). Leaving aside the vast amount of literature that shows that 
delegating regulatory functions to independent regulatory agencies does not 
necessarily undermine legitimacy
12
, the authors argue that financial globalisation is 
largely driven by private interests who have captured their regulators and can thus 
exert power without any accountability.  
Underhill and Zhang build up a chain of causalities either without providing empirical 
backup or by skewing reality. For example, they claim that “financial firms and their 
associations have close and relatively exclusive relationships with regulatory 
agencies” and that “these symbiotic relations, prevalent across the leading economies 
of the G7, provide private interests with not only the opportunity to influence the 
nature of financial governance, but also the potential to capture regulatory processes” 
(Underhill and Zhang 2008, p.541). The first statement is not only uncontroversial, 
but also trivial, as it simply states the obvious fact that financial institutions have 
close relationships with regulatory agencies. It would be surprising, dangerous and 
nonsensical if regulators were not in a constant and close dialogue with the entities 
they regulate. In fact, central banks, such as the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
are a regulator and a market counterparty. This dialogue ensures an ongoing flow of 
information and market signals that allow financial institutions to flag up any 
potential dangers, and it gives supervisors an ongoing inside view of financial markets 
which they would otherwise not have.  
It is the author’s second claim, their deduction that because of this ‘symbiotic 
relationship’ between financial institutions and regulators that they have the potential 
to capture regulators. Clearly, a ‘symbiotic relationship’ is a necessary, but not 
sufficient condition to logically deduct that financial institutions capture their 
regulators. Furthermore, the authors provide no empirical backup for their claim of 
capture. They mix anecdotal hearsay with claims that are either not scientifically 
referenced at all or refer to works of their own. Underhill and Zhang use two case 
studies to underpin their theoretical claims: the governance of global banking and the 
governance of securities markets. As regards the first case, the authors continue 
making claims about regulatory capture without providing any information as to 
                                                        
12
 For an overview of the literature, see Thatcher, M. and A. S. Sweet (2002). "Theory and Practice of 
Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions." West European Politics 25(1): 1-22. 
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whether private interests were at all successful, and if so, how they were able to exert 
their power on regulators and the BCBS. As before, the authors draw direct 
deductions between documents published by lobby groups, such as the International 
Institute of Finance (IIF)
13
, outlining the preferences of financial institutions and the 
consultative documents released by the BCBS claiming that in case there were 
overlaps “the pressure had worked” (ibid, p.544). Preferences expressed by a lobby 
group do not constitute a necessary condition to support the claim that the pressure 
had worked. Moreover, the authors fail to give any insights, let alone proof, as to how 
a lobby group, such as the IIF, can and does exert influence.  
Underhill and Zhang’s second case study ‘IOSCO and transnational securities 
regulation’ displays the same shortcomings. They argue  
IOSCO member regulators, whose relationship to government may 
be characterised as ‘arm’s length’, have been more accountable to 
self-regulatory organisations (SROs) and private market participants 
than to traditional government oversight mechanisms, yielding a 
poorly defined sense of broader public interest and community in 
international regulatory developments (ibid, p.548).  
This argument is factually wrong: the US Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) is directly accountable to US Congress not only on ad-hoc basis through 
hearings and testimonies in front of House and Senate committees, but also on an 
annual basis via the Commission's annual budget request for the year ahead and the 
statements of accounts of the year gone by (called “Full Year Congressional 
Justification and Performance Plans”). In addition, the SEC is also accountable to the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD). Underhill and Zhang fail to 
provide counter-evidence to these facts. 
The authors go on to argue that “saturated US markets led investment bankers and 
institutional investors to seek overseas expansion to markets where they might also 
have a competitive edge, including Europe and the fast-growing East Asian 
economies. Regulatory convergence to establish international (largely American) 
                                                        
13
 The International Institute of Finance sees itself as the ‘world’s only global association of financial 
institutions’ and is based in Washington. Its membership encompasses financial institutions from 
around the world and different financial sectors, such as investment banking and commercial banking.  
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standards within the IOSCO policy community would accomplish this goal” (ibid, 
p.550). The argument is spurious at best, leaving aside the counter-movement of 
European bankers and investors acquiring American investment banks
14
 and financial 
market platforms, and also references sources that do not make this claim: neither 
Simmons (Simmons 2001) nor Zaring (Zaring 1998) discuss it in their respective 
papers. The Underhill and Zhang piece is a good illustration for IPE scholarship on 
investment banking that relies upon simplistic logic and limited empirics to make 
claims that cannot be substantiated. 
 
2.5.1.2 The ‘Wall Street – Treasury Complex’ and the SEC’s net capital rule 
Wall Street Treasury Complex & Financial Crises 
The IPE literature on financial crises is more established and varied than on banking, 
security markets and finance. Within this body of scholarly work, several accounts 
link an analysis of financial crises with an examination of financial regulation and the 
role of ‘Wall Street’. One of the first and most widely referenced texts to discuss 
‘Wall Street’ and its influence on the US executive and financial regulation is Jagdish 
Bhagwati’s article The Capital Myth which Foreign Affairs published in the aftermath 
of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1998 (Bhagwati 1998). This article is built around an 
argument Bhagwati made in an interview with the Times of India. There, he stated 
that  “Wall Street has become a very powerful influence in terms of seeking markets 
everywhere […] just like in the old days there was this ‘military-industrial complex’, 
nowadays there is a ‘Wall-Street-Treasury complex’ because Secretaries of State like 
Rubin come from Wall Street. […] So today Wall Street views are very dominant in 
terms of the kind of world you want to see” (Times of India 1997).  
In Foreign Affairs, he asserts that the “Wall-Street -Treasury Complex” 
created the myth that capital account liberalisation would bring enormous benefits 
without causing any major crises, hence the article’s name “The Capital Myth” 
                                                        
14
 Examples of European banks acquiring American investment banks are:  
Credit Suisse acquiring a majority stake in First Boston (1990), today’s UBS (Swiss Bank Corporation) 
acquiring Dillon Read (1997), Deutsche Bank acquiring Bankers Trust (1998), today’s Commerzbank 
(Dresdner Bank) acquiring Wasserstein Perella (2000), UBS acquiring PaineWebber (2000), Credit 
Suisse acquiring Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette (2000) 
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(Bhagwati 1998). He argues that “Wall Street has exceptional clout with Washington 
for the simple reason that there is […] a definite net-working of like-minded 
luminaries among the powerful institutions - Wall Street, the Treasury Department, 
the State Department, the IMF and the World Bank most prominent among them” 
(ibid, p.11). Whilst he does not give any empirical support to prove that there is a 
‘definite net-working of like- minded luminaries’, he argues that because of the 
rotating door between Wall Street and these institutions,  
this powerful network, which may aptly, if loosely, be called the Wall- 
Street-Treasury complex, is unable to look much beyond the interest of 
Wall Street, which it equates with the good of the world (ibid, p.12). 
Bhagwati’s – somewhat polemical – justification for his concept of the Wall-Street-
Treasury complex rests on the idea that because top executives from Wall Street had a 
second career in Washington, they must therefore capture Capitol Hill, the IMF and 
the World Bank, and must be able to mould these institutions according to Wall 
Street’s preferences. This is a very spurious argument and stands without empirical 
grounds. Despite this lack of proof and its anecdotal nature, Bhagwati’s article in 
Foreign Affairs has become one of the reference points for academics working in the 
field of IPE.  
In this context, Wade and Veneroso assert that this ‘Wall-Street-Treasury 
complex’ helped “to push the process of amending the IMF’s articles of agreement to 
require member government to remove capital controls and adopt full capital account 
convertibility” (Wade and Veneroso 1998, p.19) and influenced the WTO in 
‘hammering out’ an agreement on liberalising financial services (Wade and Veneroso 
1998). Wade and Veneroso’s focus rests on the concept of capital mobility, the rise of 
Asia and the IMF policies. Wall Street, however, is seen as an important, if not the 
variable in bringing about capital account opening and pushing through its agenda in 
the international financial institutions. The problem with the argument rests on the 
role of ‘Wall Street’. As discussed above, Bhagwati himself did not present any 
empirical evidence other than highlighting the fact that senior public officials joined 
Wall Street banks during their careers and vice versa. With regard to Wade and 
Veneroso, no empirical evidence is presented other than Bhagwati’s interview with 
the Times of India. More importantly, the authors appear to use ‘Wall Street’ as a 
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placeholder for finance at large. For example, they cite an article by the Financial 
Times reporter De Jonquieres’s which states that “executives of groups including 
Barclays, Germany’s Dresdner Bank, Societe Generale of France and Chubb 
Insurance […] agreed discreetly to impress on finance ministers around the world the 
benefits of a WTO deal” (ibid, p.19). At the time, Société Générale and Chubb 
Insurance had little to do with the likes of ‘Wall Street’, such as Goldman, Sachs or 
Lehman Brothers.  
To be clear, the purpose of reviewing scholarly pieces like this one is not to 
critique the authors’ arguments as such. Rather, the thesis critically examines these 
pieces to build up its case that academics make assertions about investment banking 
and its actors without understanding what this industry actually does, and whether it 
actually yields the influence over politics so many believe it enjoys. After all, Wade 
and Veneroso examine the impact of financial liberalisation on Asia, the Asian 
Financial Crisis and the IMF’s structural conditionalities. It is the latter aspect where 
the authors make assertions about ‘Wall Street’ or ‘investment banking’ and their 
alleged power in politics without providing empirical backup, and/or identify 
financial institutions as ‘Wall Street’ actors, even though not all of the actors they 
identified are investment banks.  
Besides the concept of the ‘Wall-Street-Treasury Complex’, many scholars 
claim that Wall Street ‘captures’ its regulators (Underhill and Zhang 2008) and/or that 
‘Wall Street’ successfully lobbied for the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act (Helleiner 
2011). The argument of regulatory capture is often insufficiently supported, or 
presented as an evident truth that needs no further explanation. Bello’s article about 
over-accumulation and financial crises caused by capitalism is a good example (Bello 
2006). He asserts that the Clinton administration was closely tied to Wall Street via 
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin (ibid, p.1361). Like Bhagwati, Bello simply assumes 
that by virtue of having a top public official who had previously worked in investment 
banking, Wall Street has direct links with the US government. This line of reasoning 
is simplistic and without further support.  
Andrew Baker goes one step further, emphasising “financial regulatory 
capture was most pronounced in the Anglo-American heartland of the global financial 
system, in the heavily ‘financialised’ societies of the United States and the United 
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Kingdom […] indeed, financial regulatory capture was a key defining feature of the 
political economy of these countries, often alluded to in the evocative phrase ‘Wall-
Street-Treasury complex’” (Baker 2010, p.648). Indeed, we learn from him that  
at some point in the early 2000s regulatory capture become so extreme 
that it breached a crucial threshold and became dangerously 
pathological, facilitating the excessive risk-taking that led to the 
bailouts of 2008 (ibid, p.649).  
What scale Baker uses to assess this threshold remains unclear, but he goes on to 
argue that “the general trajectory of reform […] was entirely congruent with the 
banking industry’s wishes” to which he lists the repeal of Glass Steagall as well as the 
SEC’s CSE programme (ibid, p.652).  
The problem with this argument is that Baker confuses investment banks with 
commercial banks. Glass Steagall was revoked in large parts long before the passing 
of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act. In fact, as the dissertation will show, this was made 
possible because of a Fed decision, which the US courts confirmed in the face of 
fierce contestation from the investment banks. Moreover, the SEC’s decision to allow 
the most highly capitalised US investment banks to move from the SEC’s traditional 
net capital rule to a new capital standard for investment banks (and not commercial 
banks) that was more in line with Basel requirements was seen as best practice at the 
time, rather than regulatory capture. This move was not driven by the US investment 
banks, but by the European process of establishing integrated single markets in 
finance. We will discuss the net capital rule issue in more detail below.  
Baker’s concept of ‘intellectual and cognitive capture’ is an interesting one, though he 
gives little evidence for it other than referring to Alan Greenspan’s aura as a free-
marketer. His notion about a ‘Wall Street - Washington corridor’ and an especially 
strong link between Goldman Sachs and the US Treasury and the Fed suggest that 
something untoward could be going on, since he notes just a sentence beforehand that 
some of the literature on regulatory capture has highlighted how regulators are 
encouraged to become compliant with industry wishes through implicit promises of 
lucrative future careers in the regulated industry” (ibid, p.652). Again, simply stating 
“Robert Rubin, Henry Paulson and William C. Dudley are among the better known 
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individuals marking that journey, while Gerald Corrigan left the New York Federal 
Reserve and became CEO of Goldman’s” (ibid, p.652) highlights that there is a 
revolving door, but it is not a sufficient condition to infer that this causes regulatory 
capture, let alone that these people sought to benefit from their public service.  
Helleiner and Porter also regard the door between Wall Street and regulators as 
approximating situations of capture. They argue  
this problem of capture [referring to the capture of the Basel 
Committee] at the transnational level is amplified by the propensity 
for a similar problem between regulators and the industry at the 
domestic level […] there are many who perceive that the circular door 
between Goldman Sachs and other leading firms and government has 
led to ineffective regulation and privileged treatment for financial 
firms (Helleiner and Porter 2009, p.22).  
Helleiner and Porter’s article focuses on the alleged lack of transparency of 
transnational networks for financial regulation and the susceptibility of capture. This 
is despite the authors’ emphasis that “powerful states can also manipulate informal 
settings where there are no clear rules or procedures to protect the weak" (ibid, p.18) 
which makes their argument seem somewhat inconsistent. If powerful states can 
‘manipulate’ informal settings, such as Basel, then surely these governments will be 
powerful enough to fend off regulatory capture as well as being well informed.  
In another piece, Helleiner displays a lack of knowledge about investment banking 
when he asserts that  
although common international capital standards were developed for 
banks, those standards did not apply to the institutions that were 
becoming more and more systemically important because of 
securitisation trends, such as investment banks, insurance companies 
and hedge funds (Helleiner 2011, p.72).  
The opposite is true for investment banks where Helleiner’s arguments are wrong. 
The SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) Programme is in large part 
aligned with the Basel accords, and it was because it applied many elements of the 
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Basel Accord capital adequacy, such as bank internal Value at Risk models for 
purposes, that investment banks’ net capital decreased. Helleiner goes on to asset that 
“in 1999, the U.S. Congress largely repealed the separation of investment and 
commercial banking that had been established after the Great Depression” (ibid, 
p.73).  
As the dissertation shows in its case studies, this separation was eroded in all 
but name decades before the passing of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act in 1999. 
Helleiner also analyses regulatory trends and pays special attention to capture. Here, 
he cites the Underill & Zhang piece discussed earlier. It is disconcerting, however, 
that Helleiner also includes a rather pop-science book as IPE scholarship, called 13 
Bankers – the Wall Street Takeover and the Next Financial Meltdown and written by 
Johnson and Kwak (Johnson and Kwak 2010).  
Johnson and Kwak, too, discuss the ‘Wall Street – Washington Corridor’, and 
note that the “constant flow of people from Wall Street to Washington and back 
ensured that important decisions were made by officials who had absorbed the 
financial sector’s view of the world and its perspective on government policy, and 
who often saw their future careers on Wall Street, not in Washington” (ibid, p.93), 
insinuating that the “prospect of landing prestigious or high-paying jobs in the 
financial sector may also have influenced the decision of regulators and 
administration officials, who may have had an incentive not to make enemies among 
their potential future employers” (ibid, p.96). Neither of these two claims is 
empirically backed up. Later on in the same chapter, the authors cite Bhagwati’s 
Wall-Street-Treasury Complex, arguing that “the power of Wall Street reached deep 
into Washington” (ibid, p.118). Whilst the authors are amongst the very few to pick 
up the Federal Reserve’s decision on allowing commercial banks to provisionally re-
enter some investment banking activities via a so-called section 20 subsidiary in 1987, 
they, bizarrely fail to understand its importance as they claim later on in their book  
the passage of Gramm-Leach-Bliley freed not only Citigroup but also 
Bank of America, J.P. Morgan, Chase, First Union, Wells Fargo, and 
the other commercial megabanks created by the ongoing merger wave 
to plunge headlong into the business of buying, securitising, selling 
and trading mortgages and mortgage backed securities (ibid, p 134).  
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With the Fed’s decision to lift the limit for revenues from investment banking 
activities of Bank Holding Companies to 25% (Federal Reserve 1997), Bank Holding 
Companies, such as Wells Fargo were already able, pre Gramm-Leach-Bliley, to 
acquire some of Wall Street’s most iconic investment banks such as Merrill Lynch. 
Both authors fail to give a detailed analysis of what the Fed’s section 20 decision 
meant for the development of the US investment banking industry, and fail to 
understand that Gramm-Leach-Bliley had no significant bearing on commercial 
banks’ ability to undertake investment banking. 
 
2.5.1.3 The SEC net capital rule 
A lot has been written in academic as well as journalistic circles about the SEC’s 
decision to allegedly change broker dealers’ net capital requirement back in 2004. It is 
this decision that many scholars and journalists take to be the root cause of the 
explosion of leverage in investment banks. Helleiner notes that “in 2004, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission lifted a 12:1 leverage ratio for investment 
banks, a move that enabled them to engage in greater risk taking” (Helleiner 2011, 
p.73). Similarly, Johnson and Kwak state that  
on April, 28, 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission agreed 
to a request [emphasis added] by the five large investment banks – 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, 
and Bear Stearns – to use their own internal models, based on 
historical data to calculate “net capital” in their broker-dealer 
operations (Johnson and Kwak 2010, p.140).  
Blundell-Wignall, Deputy Director of the OECD Directorate for Financial and 
Enterprise Affairs, argued in a joint publication with Paul Atkinson and Se Hoon Lee, 
that “US banks and or investment banks supported and lobbied the US authorities first 
to remove Glass Steagall in 1999, move to new SEC rules in 2004: and to adopt Basel 
II as soon as possible” (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson et al. 2008).  The list of famous 
academics goes on; Reinhart and Rogoff assert in their otherwise well-researched 
book, ‘This time is different’  
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what could in retrospect be recognised as huge regulatory mistakes, 
including the deregulation of the subprime mortgage market and the 
2004 decision of the Securities and Exchange Commission to allow 
investment banks to triple their leverage ratios (that is, the ratio 
measuring the amount of risk to capital), appeared benign at the time 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009).  
In journalistic circles, it is astonishing that the famous New York Times has been a 
forum for publicising similar arguments about the SEC’s net capital rule decision in 
2004. The paper’s senior correspondent Steve Labaton wrote  
the decision, changing what was known as the net capital rule, was 
completed and published in The Federal Register a few months later. 
With that, the five big independent investment firms were unleashed. 
In loosening the capital rules, which are supposed to provide a buffer 
in turbulent times, the agency also decided to rely on the firms’ own 
computer models for determining the riskiness of investments, 
essentially outsourcing the job of monitoring risk to the banks 
themselves. Over the following months and years, each of the firms 
would take advantage of the looser rules. At Bear Stearns, the 
leverage ratio — a measurement of how much the firm was borrowing 
compared to its total assets — rose sharply, to 33 to 1. In other words, 
for every dollar in equity, it had $33 of debt. The ratios at the other 
firms also rose significantly (Labaton 2008). 
A few months later in January 2009, Princeton Professor of Economics Alan Binder 
published his ‘economic view’ titled ‘Six Errors on the Path to the Financial Crisis” in 
the Times (Blinder 2009). He asserted that  
the second error came in 2004, when the S.E.C. let securities firms 
raise their leverage sharply. Before then, leverage of 12 to 1 was 
typical; afterward, it shot up to more like 33 to 1. What were the 
S.E.C. and the heads of the firms thinking? Remember, under 33-to-1 
leverage, a mere 3 percent decline in asset values wipes out a 
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company. Had leverage stayed at 12 to 1, these firms wouldn’t have 
grown as big or been as fragile (Blinder 2009). 
 
The SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity Programme is one of the most 
misunderstood and poorly researched topics in academia.  The SEC’s establishment of 
the CSE programme in 2004 was in reaction to the European Union’s Financial 
Conglomerates Directive (European Financial Conglomerates Committee 2004) 
which required all third country financial conglomerates active in the EU to be 
supervised on a consolidated basis or else be required to establish a separately 
capitalised holding company in the European Union. As the SEC’s investment 
banking supervision was not on a consolidated basis, the Commission had to establish 
the CSE programme to offer all US investment bank consolidated supervision. The 
SEC changed the net capital rule to bring it in line with Basel requirements – 
something the US investment banks would have been subject to if they had moved 
their holding to the EU. The investment banks certainly did not seek to be supervised 
on a consolidated basis – neither in the EU nor in the US.   
As the dissertation highlights in its case study on the net capital rule, not only 
did leverage not go up significantly for most US investment banks, it had also been 
much higher in the past under the so-called old net capital rule. Moreover, British 
merchant banks have been subject to Basel rules ever since and the SEC believed – as 
did the entire policy community – that the CSE Programme followed so- called ‘state 
of the art’ risk management techniques (such as Value at Risk models) and required 
those who participated to essentially have $5bn in liquid equity at all times.  
The SEC actually invited them to join their CSE programme – so as to 
establish equivalence in regulation as required by EU regulation – part of which 
meant that they would apply Basel II capital standards rather than the US net capital 
rule. The invitation to join the CSE was only partly a voluntary one, as the European 
Union’s Capital Directive required all investment banks with operations within the 
EU, which at that point included London, to be subject to consolidated supervision. 
All US investment banks thus had a choice between being regulated by the UK’s 
Financial Services Authority or else ensuring that their home country regulator in the 
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United States introduced a regulatory regime that the EU could pass as ‘equivalent’ to 
the EU’s. In short, the CSE was not a Wall Street lobbying effort; it was a regulatory 
necessity courtesy of the EU. It is striking how many senior economists, journalists 
and academics did not properly understand the SEC CSE programme and produced 
factually incorrect publications.   
 
2.6 THE NON-IPE LITERATURE ON INVESTMENT BANKING 
A small range of works exclusively focusing on investment banks exists so far only in 
the non-political science field. Probably one of the most cited accounts is Investment 
Banking: Institutions, Politics, and Law by Morrison & Wilhelm (Morrison and 
Wilhelm 2007) and Carosso’s Investment Banking in America (Carosso, Sears et al. 
1970).  Contrary to the title, Morrison and Wilhelm neither analyse investment 
banking from a political science perspective nor provide insights into the politics of 
investment banking vis-à-vis governments. This is not surprising, since Morrison and 
Wilhelm have finance and IT backgrounds: Morrison is currently professor of finance 
at Oxford’s Said Business School, while Wilhelm is Professor of Finance at the 
University of Virginia. Carosso was an economic historian and his scholarship is in 
history, not political science.  
The eminent economic historian Cassis provides an impressive overview of 
the history of banking and regulation, yet falls foul of the so-called ‘repeal’ of Glass 
Steagall too. He argues that “in 1999 the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was abolished 
with the arrival of Financial Modernisation Act […] it had been de facto emptied of 
its substance after the American cartel authorities had in 1998 ratified the marge, 
under the name of Citigroup, of Citicorp and Travelers” (Cassis 2006). Knowing the 
history of Glass-Steagall, this argument is incorrect.  
Other scholars examine investment banks through the lenses of a historian, 
such as Morton (Keller 1963), Michie (Michie 1986), Redlich (Redlich 1968), Scott 
(Scott 2005), Shultz & Caine (Shultz and Caine 1937), Sylla (Sylla, Tilly et al. 1999) 
and White (White 1986) or through the lenses of finance scholars, such as the famous 
book Corporate Finance (Brealey, Marcus et al. 1995) and McKinsey’s core book 
Valuation (Koller, Goedhart et al. 2010).  
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2.7 RELEVANT LITERATURE ON THE IPE OF INVESTMENT BANKING 
Having conducted various and extensive literature searches on the topic of 
financial regulation and investment banking over many years, there are currently only 
two works which stand out because they are empirically sound. Firstly, Abdelal’s 
book Capital Rules analyses the causes as well as the consequences of liberal rules for 
global finance (Abdelal 2007). Rather than simply relying on secondary sources, 
Abdelal conducted extensive archival research and elite interviews. His findings 
contradict academia’s mainstream ideas about financial globalisation, especially the 
concept of the Wall-Street Treasury complex. He argues that  
there is, remarkably, almost no evidence to support this conventional 
wisdom […] instead Treasury policymakers were at best indifferent to 
the capital liberalisation amendment, and some senior officials even 
opposed its progress [whilst] Wall Street was unambiguously against 
the amendment (ibid).  
Rather, after Mitterrand’s failed attempt to revive socialism in 1982, the French left 
changed track and supported the process of ‘managed globalisation’ that ultimately 
made the European Union’s and later the OECD’s rules for capital account 
convertibility the most liberal in the world. Abdelal’s detailed process tracing exercise 
combined with his collation of primary data allows him to reconstruct the decision-
making processes behind financial liberalisation. His scholarship contrasts with 
Helleiner’s and Underhill’s, who have a tendency to rely upon a body of work that is 
(and becomes through doing so) self-referencing.  
The second noteworthy piece is the recent journal article Paving the Road to 
“Too big to Fail”: Business Interests and the Politics of Financial Deregulation in 
the United States” by Suarez and Kolodny. It is one of the first, if not the first, work 
in IPE to sketch out some of the complex history of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act 
(Suarez and Kolodny 2011). The authors analyse the interests and alignments of the 
financial sector’s various lobby groups, in particular the American banking, 
investment banking and insurance industry. Whilst not relying upon primary data, 
they assert that Glass Steagall was ultimately only repealed when all three financial 
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lobby groups joined forces and pushed together for legislative change. However, the 
piece is not without faults. The authors cannot explain – which is the actual crux of 
the matter – why the Fed decided to allow some commercial banks to re-enter 
investment banking activities in 1987. This somewhat undermines their argument. 
They state “in a puzzling decision, the Fed – which was still under the chairmanship 
of Paul Volcker – granted the banks’ [commercial banks] request as long as the 
securities activities did not exceed 5% of the subsidiary’s total revenue” (ibid). At the 
same time, the authors do not pay attention to the role of the courts. Irrespective of 
any legislative stalemate (as was the case) or change, litigation brought up regulatory 
change.  
 
2.8 CENTRAL WEAKNESSES OF THE LITERATURE 
The literature on the politics of finance is a relatively young discipline within 
IPE. Most accounts about the IPE of financial regulation were written in the last 
twenty years or so. However, the central weaknesses of the IPE of finance literature 
can be separated into three categories: focus, accuracy and empirics.  
The literature review has demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of 
pieces focus on commercial banking and the Basel Accords. One of the central 
weaknesses is thus a simple lack of analysis on the IPE of investment banking. A gap 
exists between what has been written about ‘Wall Street’ / investment banking and 
“reality”. One of the literature’s key weaknesses is thus content-related. Wall Street 
often features as one of the factors in IPE texts, such as the accounts on financial 
crises or the Basel Accords, but a comprehensive examination focusing on investment 
banking is missing so far.  This matters because investment banks can be or become 
systemically relevant for countries’ economies as the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
in September 2008 has shown. Only with a thorough understanding of the investment 
banking industry and its actors can policymakers pass and review regulation that is 
advantageous for societies, allows for innovation and entrepreneurship whilst 
appropriately managing and containing down-side risks. Academics can only produce 
relevant and empirically sound research if they fully comprehend the subject they are  
studying.  
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A second shortcoming can be summarised with the term ‘accuracy’, which 
refers to common misunderstandings amongst many IPE scholars about the nature, 
regulation and thus political economy of investment banking. IPE texts that do cover 
aspects of investment banking often contain significant inaccuracies. As discussed 
earlier, these errors range from regulatory matters, in the case of Helleiner (Helleiner 
2011), to confusing investment banks with commercial banks or getting some facts 
simply wrong as shown with the BP offering in Singer’s book (Singer 2007).  
Finally, the thesis makes a distinction between inaccurate texts and those accounts 
whose claims either cannot be verified with data, or lack data. This last category 
applies to the majority of pieces on the Wall-Street–Treasury complex and regulatory 
capture at large. It is scientifically questionable simply to deduct that Wall Street 
captures Washington by virtue of people’s careers. Incorrect assumptions about the 
nature of the business and thus its power in politics often feed into research like this. 
Bhagwati (Bhagwati 1998), Baker (Baker 2010), Helleiner and Porter (Helleiner and 
Porter 2009) and Underhill (Underhill and Zhang 2008) fall into this category.  
 Currently, most books and journal articles about investment banking have 
been published outside the social sciences, let alone the IPE of finance. These 
publications review investment banks from a finance and economics or legal studies 
angle. This thesis not only provides one of the first accounts of the political economy 
of investment banking, but also highlights the importance of the role of ideas role  and 
the role of the courts as part of the IPE of investment banking discourse. The latter 
aspects, the role of the courts, is a completely new subject area in the IPE of finance.  
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Chapter 3  
RESEARCH DESIGN AND THEORY CHAPTER: OF 
VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
 
3.1 THE RESEARCH PUZZLE 
 
As the literature review has shown, there are central weaknesses and gaps in 
the current IPE scholarship on finance. It has been said that Wall Street is extremely 
powerful in politics largely by virtue of lobbying and the revolving door, yet the 
empirical support for these claims has remained meagre. Indeed, examining Wall 
Street’s campaign contributions paints a different picture. The securities and 
investment industry is ranked outside the top ten industry (ranked 12
th
) for total 
campaign contributions between 1998 and 2012 (Opensecrets.org 2012). The industry 
also donated a roughly equal amount to Democrats and Republicans alike over a time 
period spanning more than two decades, which makes claims about partisanship 
difficult to maintain (Opensecrets.org 2012). Even though much emphasis is given to 
the financial power of Wall Street and campaign contributions, the facts portray a 
reality which makes it very hard to use campaign contributions as a major factor in 
determining legislative outcomes. The thesis has thus not examined them further and 
seeks to show that other factors are at play that are powerful determinants in how 
financial regulation and its change are brought about. 
The dissertation’s research objective is to uncover the political economy of 
investment banking regulation in the US, starting with the end of Bretton Woods in 
the 1970s and culminating at the peak before the financial crisis of 2007/8. In doing 
so, the dissertation identified a range of case studies that are interconnected and tell 
the story of how regulators and legislators took decisions that shaped US investment 
banks’ developments.  The cases have been selected by virtue of their impact on Wall 
Street and on a measurable ‘reduction in regulation’: sometimes in favour of 
investment banks, sometimes against them and sometimes done with unintentional 
consequences.  Because of the significant empirical gaps in the current literature, it is 
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not clear how - if at all - the investment banking industry uses mechanisms such as the 
‘revolving door’ to exert influence on regulators, other executive branches or the 
legislative. This comes against the backdrop of the logical tautology of the ‘lobbying 
thesis’, that is, if investment banks were such powerful institutions moulding 
Washington and Westminster to their liking, why would they then need to lobby in 
the first place if the status quo allegedly reflects their preferences?   
Likewise, we know little about what role institutions play in investment 
banking regulation. Many IPE publications have focussed on banking regulators - 
overwhelmingly researching Basel I / II / II.5 - not investment banking regulators 
such as the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). As the literature review 
highlighted, journalists and researchers alike mix up commercial with investment 
banking, at times using both indiscriminately. This carries serious consequences for 
their analysis and arguments: commercial banks and investment banks are completely 
different legal entities that follow distinct business models. Commercial banks are 
deposit-taking financial institutions, whilst investment banks are inter-broker dealers, 
i.e. non-deposit-taking. As a result, commercial banks and investment banks are 
subject to different regulatory regimes and ultimately have different, at times 
opposing, business interests and lobbying incentives.  
Institutions matter, but maybe not always according to conventional academic 
wisdom. It is said that financial regulators, being mandated by and accountable to 
legislatives, uphold the ‘rules of the game’. However, as this thesis shows, in various 
instances regulators established new rules of the game that were or were not within 
their statutory authority. Typically, it is the mandate of the legislature to create new 
rules.  
The case study on the SEC’s Consolidated Supervision Entity Programme 
(CSE) will show that the SEC established the CSE as a voluntary regime as it lacked 
the statutory authority to create an obligatory other. It nevertheless succeeded in doing 
so with the five largest US investment banks signing up and no court cases 
threatening it.  
By contrast, the US Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) issued 
a concept release (Commodity Futures Trading Commission 1998) on over-the- 
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counter (OTC) derivatives markets seeking the public’s and industry’s view on the 
future of OTC derivatives market regulation. The CFTC was fully within its statutory 
remit to amend the then existing regulation and exemption from regulation for certain 
swap OTC derivatives, and certainly to issue a concept release. The release caused an 
enormous uproar amongst other US regulators, legislators and market participants 
alike, so much so that despite its statutory authority, the CFTC failed in even 
contemplating any revisions to OTC derivatives regulation and its Chair was 
essentially forced to resign.  
In a third case, the US Federal Reserve used the Courts to ‘test’ and re-define 
the boundaries of its statutory authority so much so that it completely undermined the 
Glass Steagall Act’s division between investment banking and commercial banking in 
practice, though not de jure (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 1933). The three 
Glass Steagall case studies analyse how a completely overlooked institution, namely 
the courts, changed the course of US financial regulation by way of its interpretative 
rulings. The role of a nation’s courts is enormously important for interpreting, 
upholding, but also changing the financial regulatory regime. The case studies on the 
repeal of Glass Steagall tell a story of how the Federal Reserve pushed its statutory 
authority in interpreting and thus amending existing laws to the very limit so that it 
could cause significant regulatory change without any legislative input. The Federal 
Reserve’s actions followed a landmark judgement from the US Supreme Court whose 
ruling provided a radically different reading of Congress’s intent of the Glass Steagall 
Act. 
Finally, we need to know more whether people’s ideas or pre-conceptions 
about regulation are a factor in influencing regulatory outcomes. Without wanting to 
enter philosophical debates about ‘what comes first – a person’s idea or a person’s 
interest?’ ideas clearly matter in people’s lives. Here, the dissertation follows – as 
illustrated in the literature review – in the footsteps of constructivism. The very fact, 
to refer to philosopher Raymond Geuss (Geuss 2001), that we are born into a world 
occupied, dominated and ordered by a vast amount of artificial constructs, probably 
the most powerful of which is the nation-state, reflects that ideas are omnipresent and 
actually steer mankind’s history. The real question for the dissertation is then is not 
whether ideas matter, but how they matter?  
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Many academics, especially (political) economists, dismiss the role of ideas 
outright – largely on the basis that they are not measurable, which might be true in the 
most direct sense. However, the thesis is not about ‘measuring’ ideas, but about 
identifying which ideas and ideologies influenced regulatory policy elites, such as 
Federal Reserve Board Members and SEC Commissioners. The irony being that as a 
profession, economics appears to be inseparable from political ideology. As a social 
science, economics has its birth cradle in political science, however much some 
economists wished for it to be classified as mathematics. As much as political thought 
follows ideological lines, so does economics. So-called schools of thought build upon 
ideas as their guiding principles. Examples of these are the Chicago School 
(associated with the likes of Milton Friedman and Gary Becker), Keynesianism and 
ordo-liberalism (which emanated from and is still powerful in German academia and 
politics). Ideas have not only influenced economists, but clearly play a significant role 
in the day-to-day lives of humans. One of the most obvious examples is party politics. 
Many US voters have traditionally identified themselves with one of the two 
dominating political parties – Democrats and Republicans. In fact, citizens even vote 
for party manifestos that may actually leave them financially worse off. In the case of 
voting behaviour and patterns, one cannot assume that voters behave rationally (Frank 
2005).  
 It is surprising that there appears to be a complete disconnect in large parts of 
economics and the IPE between accepting that ideas shape their academic schools of 
thought, yet when it comes to researching real-world phenomena, ideas - as an 
explanatory variable - often fall by the wayside since they are not ‘measurable’ in a 
conventional manner. Scholars that do include ideas as a variable, often attribute the 
white noise in their statistical calculation to ideas, only very few take them seriously, 
such as Mark Blyth (Blyth 2002). 
Equally important is the fact that not a single research programme on the 
international political economy of investment banking exists. Whilst this thesis hopes 
to be a stepping-stone in theory building for future scholars in the IPE of investment 
banking, it likewise sits within the wider IPE of finance realm. Here, the dissertation 
aims to probe the plausibility of one of the core theoretical approaches in IPE, namely 
interest, ideas and institutions, which often are a mixture of all three. Applying 
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appropriate explanatory variables from these three approaches will guide the 
dissertation in unlocking the puzzle as to why officials made conscious decision not to 
regulate key areas of finance, especially investment banking. 
Given this background, we are left with several paradoxes: firstly, claims 
made about investment banking often actually refer to commercial banking, including, 
but not limited to, its regulatory institutions. This leads to the second paradox, namely 
that a large body of work exists in the political economy of commercial banking and 
its regulation, such as the literature on the Basel accords. However, we know very 
little about the political economy of the regulatory institutions behind investment 
banking, which is completely separate from the Basel accords. Investment banks do 
not have recourse to a lender of last resort; in fact, their regulators principally focus 
on liquidity so that in a crisis, investors receive all their money back whilst the 
investment bank is – in the literal meaning of the word – liquidated without causing 
market upheavals. Drexel Lambert Burnham was liquidated within months. Lehman 
Brothers caused shock waves, not because it was systemically relevant, but because 
entire market segments became illiquid, so much so that the failure of Lehman 
Brothers was simply the tip of the iceberg or the straw that broke the camel’s back. 
Finally, the rare IPE publications that do examine investment banking correctly, i.e. as 
investment banks and not as commercial banks, are backed up with hearsay rather 
than hard data.  
 
3.2 A HOTLY CONTESTED FIELD: RESEARCH DESIGN  
Qualitative research is fundamentally different in its causal analysis from quantitative 
research. Both strands of scientific inquiry are equally important without one being 
superior over the other. It is relatively easy to legitimately and legally use quantitative 
methods either to make insignificant facts look important or play down 
financial/operational problems. Financial engineering, which is standard practice in 
the business world, should be a warning for all those economists who place near 
dogmatic faith in statistics. As much as statistics can be a powerful analytical tool, it 
has severe limitations and is open to easy manipulation.   
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The same can be said for qualitative research methods. Here, one can rarely 
make generalisations from focussed (some would call it narrow) case studies, and 
theory-building is challenging. Qualitative case study design is small N and its case 
selection is, by default, manipulated from the start. This statement will surely come to 
the great dismay of many qualitative researchers, yet it is simply not feasible to select 
case studies at random for researching, and then analyse one’s research topic whilst 
hoping that the randomly chosen cases will somehow magically fit. In other words, 
the qualitative case study selection has to be biased, as the small N group out of 
infinite number of large Ns has to correspond to the researcher’s question. 
Consequently, there are fundamental strengths and weaknesses inherent in both 
research designs, and the author could hardly imagine something less appealing than 
joining the discussions, often led with evangelical zeal, as to the flaws and 
weaknesses of specific research designs and methodologies. Academics should 
recognise that different research methods correspond to different research goals and 
learn from each other. This chapter is thus not a discussion about the merits and 
shortcomings of research designs. Instead, it examines and explains why certain 
research designs are the best fit for the dissertation’s research aim, which is to 
uncover why the US authorities decided not to regulate investment banking. 
 
3.2.1 The Logic Of Research Design And The Case Study Method 
As Mahoney and Goertz highlight, qualitative analysts use a “causes-of-effects” 
approach, as opposed to quantitative researchers who follow the “effects-of-causes” 
logic (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). The former start with selecting a small number of 
cases, often on their outcomes, and then seek to uncover the necessary causes that led 
to the specific outcomes. By contrast, quantitative scholars calculate estimates of 
average effects on causes across a large N of cases. The dissertation’s research design 
is qualitative and as such based on two methodologies: comparative case study 
research and within case analysis.  
The dissertation follows George and Bennet’s definition of a case as  
an instance of a class of events [whereby] the term ‘class of events’ 
refers […] to a phenomenon of scientific interest, such as 
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revolutions, types of governmental regimes, kind of economic 
systems, or personality types that the investigator chooses to study 
with the aim of developing theory or generic knowledge regarding 
the causes of similarities or differences among instances (cases) of 
that class of events (George and Bennett 2005).   
The thesis is interested in understanding the ‘causes of effects’ and unearthing the 
conception of causation in terms of necessity. It is impossible to find sufficient 
conditions in qualitative research (Dion 1998). For example, research claiming that 
cloudy skies are a sufficient condition to explain Vitamin D deficiency can easily be 
falsified by just finding one person from a sunny region that also suffers from Vitamin 
D shortage. Using the same logic, but now within qualitative research, imagine an 
academic claiming that capital account liberalisation is a sufficient condition for 
economic growth – a claim he/she proves by examining five different countries (i.e. 
the US, France, Germany, the UK and Sweden). One would only have to analyse 
China - which has enjoyed rapid economic development, yet has had strict capital 
controls in place - to prove this claim wrong. Likewise, in the case of IPE, I am 
looking at necessary conditions for an absence of financial regulation of investment 
banking.  
Despite the absence of relevant research programmes on investment banking 
regulation, let alone quantitative data-sets, there is an abundance of empirical data on 
investment banking. The majority of this data consists of thousands of legal 
documents, regulatory filings, speeches and testimonies and articles from newspapers 
and magazines. The thesis examined the vast majority of this corpus of data and also 
conducted nearly 40 semi-structured elite interviews with the world’s top regulators, 
bankers and lawyers. The elite interviews were an absolutely essential part of this 
research, and the author was fortunate to have gained access to the most senior private 
and public actors relevant to financial regulation in the UK, the US and officials from 
international organisations, such as the Bank for International Settlements and the 
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO). The interviews 
provided an opportunity for a deep-dive on the key regulatory changes, business 
decisions, legal changes and laws that they were involved with, questions their 
motives for the decision-making and understand the rationale behind those motives. 
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The interview data was crucial to filling any gaps in the publicly available data and, 
vitally, interpreting the causality of events. All interviews were all non-attributable, 
mostly digitally recorded (some in part, some in full, others were not recorded at all), 
but filed and its output presented so as to prevent anyone from ever identifying who is 
behind the statements made. The interviews partners were or still are in the highest 
ranks of government, central banks, financial regulatory bodies, investment and 
universal banks, law-firms, and lobby groups. The author would like to highlight that 
the data gathered this way contains highly sensitive information that could cause 
reputational, legal and financial damage to several institutions and individuals in 
question. The fact that all the interviews are non-attributable is thus a small price to 
pay in return for the interviewees’ time and candid responses. The author would like 
to thank them again. 
The dissertation attempts to examine the causal mechanisms and to capture the 
complexity of regulatory decision-making. Small-N studies are particularly useful in 
the absence of a strong theory, which is currently the case in the IPE of investment 
banking. Quantitative research tools are inappropriate for this scientific enquiry as 
they omit most contextual factors and aggregate variables into single indices so that 
scholars end up with fewer independent variables and more degrees of freedom 
(George and Bennett 2005). By contrast, the thesis is interested in examining if and 
how a variable caused a certain outcome rather than calculating to what extent it 
caused the outcome. It would also be incredibly difficult to come up with a way to 
measure complex explanatory variables, some of which build upon social norms. 
Moreover, case study research allows me to address the issue of ‘equifinality’, i.e. the 
possibility that different combinations of explanatory variables can cause the same 
outcome. The process-tracing method ensures that the causal pathways leading to the 
dependent variable are identified and tested. Process-tracing is as simple as it is a 
powerful tool for qualitative case study research. It essentially uses original sources, 
media coverage and the data from the semi-structured interviews to establish causal 
relationships. In other words, it traces the process of regulatory decision-making from 
start to finish. The process tracing exercise for the so-called repeal of Glass-Steagall, 
the passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999, actually starts in the early 1960s 
and in total spans four decades. The process tracing for the passage of Gramm Leach 
Bliley includes thousands of pages of media reports, court documents and decisions – 
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it is so vast and complex that the academic story of Glass Steagall’s repeal is being 
told in three separate chapters.  
As part of the within-case analysis, the author uses the method of process 
tracing to work his way back up to the dependent variable inductively. The author 
started by ascertaining all relevant speeches, testimonies, legal documents and 
newspaper articles, examining these in order to identify which factors caused policy 
decisions that resulted in the dependent variable. Process tracing allowed the 
establishment of a chain of causalities from start to finish. At every stage of this 
chain, the author checks and verifies the necessary conditions for causing the 
respective outcomes in order to build up a seamless, chronological and logical chain. 
This chain allows tracing and linking up of the explanatory variables to the dependent 
variable. 
Given the concentration of investment banking activity in only two Tier I 
centres (London and New York), and at most three to six additional Tier II/III 
financial market places (Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Tokyo, Singapore, Chicago and Hong 
Kong), an in-depth qualitative analysis is the only appropriate research design as a 
result of the lack of a sample group greater than eight to ten. In addition, US 
investment banks make up most of the market activity – both in the US and London. 
Besides conducting in-depth within-case analyses, the thesis also compares the 
cases with each other. Cross comparisons help identify patterns of similarity and 
differences which in turn allow  statements about the causes and consequences of the 
dependent variable that are not generalisable as such, but serve as a stepping stone for 
theory-building in the IPE of investment banking. With small N case study designs, it 
is impossible to make generalisations that hold the test of falsifiability. However, as 
George and Bennett point out, they serve an important purpose in developing theories 
which then can be tested by means of quantitative analysis thereafter (George and 
Bennett 2005).   
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3.3. CONDUCTING SEMI-STRUCTURED ELITE INTERVIEWS 
3.3.1 The Need For Interviews 
Gathering data about decision-making at the highest echelons of investment banking – 
both from an industry perspective as well as from a government’s perspective – is 
challenging for two main reasons:  
First, the public reporting about regulatory changes in investment banking is targeted 
at financial experts (such as the articles in the Wall Street Journal and the Financial 
Times) or lawyers (such as the updates from the various law-firms in New York City). 
The complexity of financial regulation not only requires a legally or financially 
trained mind, it also necessitates a certain basic interest and understanding of the 
material at hand. It is thus no coincidence that the vast majority of media outlets 
struggle to wrap the rather dry facts about investment banking regulation into an 
attractive story for their readers without compromising on quality and content. Several 
important regulatory decisions were incorrectly reported in even the most prestigious 
newspapers in the world, such as the New York Times’s articles on the SEC decision 
with respect to the net capital rule (Labaton 2008). However, rather than simply 
focussing on the role of the media and its faults, it also reflects poorly on the 
industry’s and government’s quality and efforts of communicating about regulatory 
changes. It either highlights an unintentional inability of the investment banking 
community to communicate effectively or a deliberate attempt not to decipher the 
complexity of regulatory decision-making and its impacts on a wider audience. 
However, given the relatively negative reporting about investment banks in the media, 
which is most likely not in the banks’ interests, it is probably safe to assume that it is 
extremely hard to manage their public relations. A key consequence of this 
relationship between the investment banking industry and its regulators with the 
media is the simple fact that there is relatively little reporting on the behind-the-
scenes facts, the reasons and incentives behind certain regulatory outcomes that go 
above and beyond the surface in mainstream media and rarely touch upon political 
economy aspects in the experts’ reporting. 
Second, and as a consequence of the first point, extremely little has been written about 
investment banking in the field of IPE. In addition, researchers will find it challenging 
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to identify the (“real”) motives of regulatory decision-making in the court filings, the 
lobby group communications and other public accounts alone. These accounts are 
very technical, which makes them hard to digest for researchers without a background 
in law and finance. In addition, the publications mostly do not address or reveal those 
aspects relevant to IPE researchers, such as who gains what and who receives more 
power? The publicly available data is thus incredibly sparse both from direct sources 
and in academia. 
 
3.3.2 Selecting Elites 
Given these two reasons, one of the most reliable methods of gathering information 
about regulatory decision-making in investment banking is through interviewing the 
key people involved. This target audience essentially consists of elites: people who 
occupied, or are still in charge of, key functions within the investment banking 
community -  at investment banks, law firms, lobby groups and public authorities, 
such as regulators. The process of identifying and then selecting a relevant group of 
interviewees was important, as the quality of interview data was strongly dependent 
on the interviewee having had a sufficiently elite knowledge of investment banking 
regulation. It would have been insufficient to interview people in highly technical, yet 
not senior positions or in mid-managerial functions as they often (i) lack an 
appropriate macro perspective (‘big picture’) and, more importantly, (ii) would not 
have been privy to the key meetings and confidential conversations at the most senior 
levels. Irrespective of their workplace, the author focussed on interviewees who were 
at the highest level of their organisation, i.e. the executive board, senior partner circle 
or head of their organisation.  
Before selecting interview partners, the search was narrowed down to four key groups 
or clusters within the investment banking community. They are, in order of 
importance:  
(i) Regulators; 
(ii) Law firms; 
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(iii) Lobby groups; 
(iv) Investment banks.  
 
Regulators are clearly the most important group within the community. They execute 
the laws, regulate and supervise the industry and often act as discussion fora for the 
industry to exchange views, worries as well as advice. Moreover, they can also steer, 
interpret and change regulation without the legislative. In sum, regulators are 
incredibly powerful by virtue of having the mandate to supervise their industry. For 
the dissertation, the author selected the following regulators and secured the 
corresponding interview partner(s):  
 The US Federal Reserve System 
o Member of the Federal Open Market Committee & Head of a US 
Federal Reserve Bank 
 The US Securities and Exchange Commission  
o SEC commissioner;  
o Director of a SEC Division 
 The UK’s Financial Services Authority 
o Board level members 
o Heads of division 
 The International Organisation of Securities Commissions 
o Member of the IOSCO Technical Committee 
 The UK government task force dealing with investment banks and the fallout 
from the financial crisis of 2007 – to date: head of this entity (further details 
would compromise his/her identity) 
 The US White House:  
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o Former Deputy Attorney General 
 The US Treasury Department: 
o Senior member of the financial regulation unit 
o Assistant Deputy Secretary 
  Congressional Research Service: 
o Senior member of staff on regulatory issues 
 Bank of International Settlements: 
o Former General Director 
 
Law firms seem an unlikely candidate to come out as the second most important 
group in the community of investment banking regulation. Nonetheless, they play a 
pivotal role in regulatory decision-making, especially in the United States. They 
perform three services that are essential for the industry as a whole: firstly, they can 
support the government in drafting new laws as well as help represent it in legal 
cases; secondly, many law firms also help investment banks in their day-to-day 
activities to ensure that they understand and keep within the regulatory requirements; 
and lastly, they act as lobbyists and represent the investment banking industry during 
public consultative processes with respect to regulatory changes. Because of the 
complexity of financial regulation and potentially extremely costly consequences in 
case banks get legal requirements wrong, one should not underestimate how much of 
investment banks’ activities is driven, and at least always monitored, by law-firms. 
Class-action lawsuits as well as SEC investigations can severely disrupt an investment 
bank’s operation, dampen its share-price and divert senior management’s attention 
from its core business. Law-firms thus take an important role in investment banking, 
especially in the US where investment bankers delegate many more tasks to lawyers 
than in the UK. The author selected only the top law-firms in the US and the UK, i.e. 
those belonging to the ‘magic circle’. Thereafter, the author focused on their financial 
institutions and regulatory practice and approached only senior partners or general 
counsels which have had more than 25 years of professional experience and were 
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involved in some of the most important transactions and regulatory decisions in 
investment banking. Since most of the interviewees are heading the investment 
banking or financial regulatory practice at their law firm, which is a small circle of 
people, the below list will only identify the law firm by location, but not name: 
 New York City & London:  
o Head of financial institutions practice at a top international law firm;  
o Head of financial institutions practice at a top international law firm;  
o Head of financial institutions practice at a top international law firm;  
o Senior Partner specialising in the SEC at a top international law firm; 
o Head of financial regulation practice group at top international law 
firm; 
o Head of financial regulation practice group at top international law 
firm; 
 Washington D.C.:  
o Head of financial institutions practice at a top international law firm;  
o Head of financial regulation practice group at top international law 
firm; 
o Head of financial regulation practice group at top international law 
firm; 
 
 In addition, one US Supreme Court judge agreed to be interviewed. 
Lobby groups take up an important part in representing and communicating the 
positions of their clients effectively in front of legislators, regulators, the government 
and the media. Many lobbyists have a legal background and, given the sheer legal 
technical knowledge need to opine on financial regulation, they need to be well versed 
in highly complex details. UK and US lobby groups vary tremendously in their modus 
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operandi and staff profiles. By and large, US lobby groups in the field of financial 
regulation are less focussed on PR – as many general UK lobby groups are – and are 
usually made up of former staffers to Congresswomen and Congressmen, former 
regulators as well as senior lawyers. Most of Washington D.C. revolves around 
politics and “the Hill” is made up of countless lobby groups and associations, all of 
which are an integral part of US policy-making. One of the greatest myths 
surrounding the work of lobbyists is the idea – time and again portrayed in the media 
and academia – that lobbyism is a blunt game of tit-for-tat between politics and 
business, largely focussed on campaign money, power and favourable regulatory 
outcomes. This, however, paints a severely distorted picture of reality. The 
dissertation does not argue that financial contributions are unimportant; on the 
contrary, financial support and the promise to create jobs and make investments are 
important and help lobbyists obtain access to law-makers. However, reducing 
lobbyism to a pure financial dimension ignores the complexity of lobbyism and the 
fact that there are numerous financially powerful lobby groups that compete with each 
other – across partisan lines and geographies – for influence on the Hill.  The data 
from the dissertation’s interviews as well as secondary sources paint a picture in 
which lobbyists’ money does play a role, but is certainly not the key determinant for 
lobbyists’ success (however defined) and should be more seen as an “investment” in 
what it takes to participate in the “Washington circus”. Lobby groups are an integral 
part of US policy-making as they provide important feedback from the industry on the 
current and proposed regulation and propose alternative scenarios. In doing so, they 
give regulators and legislators insights into how regulation affects or would affect 
their industry. Top lobbyists enjoy privileged access not simply by virtue of money, 
but also the importance of the consumer and/or industry groups they represent, their 
knowledge and seniority: they have built up their own network of contacts through 
their career and not vice versa. This is not to say that lobbyists are public servants – 
they represent particular interests after all; but in doing so, their work needs to be seen 
in a more holistic dimension that spans both financial contributions as well as expert 
knowledge. 
In the case of investment banking, ‘Wall Street’ was outspent by other financial 
service sectors, and the data from the interviews suggest that lobbyism is more 
centred on communicating the industry’s views on very specific, highly technical 
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and/or legal topics of certain aspects of financial regulation. Often, the lines between 
law firms and lobby groups are blurred, as many lawyers also act as lobbyists for their 
investment banking clients and register in Congress as such.  The author therefore 
selected a range of top lobbyists some of which worked for a lobby firm, others for 
law-firms: 
 
 Washington D.C.:  
o Head of one of the premier lobby firms focussing on financial 
institutions; 
o Head of the financial institutions practice at a top lobby firm; 
o Senior partner at the financial institutions practice at a top lobby firm; 
o Senior lawyer specialised in lobbying for financial institutions at a top 
law firm. 
 London, U.K.: 
o Board member of one of Europe’s most important industry 
associations of the financial sector 
o Head of a top PR firm. 
 
Lastly, investment banks themselves are naturally one of the key players. However, 
one has to make a clear distinction between investment bankers and investment banks. 
It is probably fair to assume that the overwhelming majority of investment bankers is 
neither interested in regulatory decision-making, nor has an intricate knowledge of it. 
This is not a criticism. On the contrary, one cannot expect investment bankers to 
understand those aspects of financial regulation that do not influence their functions, 
in much the same way as surgeons are not experts in medical law. Selecting a group 
of investment bankers which was both capable of answering my interview questions, 
but also had the time for an interview was enormously difficult. Through former work 
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contacts, the author managed, nevertheless, to track down some of the most senior 
figures in the global investment banking industry: 
 
 Global Co-Head of the Financial Institutions Group of the one of the world’s 
largest investment banks – based in London; 
 Managing Director in the FIG Practice of one of the world’s premier 
investment banks – based in London; 
 Team Leader of the FIG Practice for Europe at a top international investment 
bank – based in London; 
 Head of the FIG Practice of a Tier 1 investment bank – based in New York; 
 Managing Director, FIG Practice of a Tier 1 investment bank – based in New 
York; 
 Head of one the world’s largest hedge funds, former investment banker – 
based in London. 
 
Having identified these four groups from which to select interviewees, the response 
rate to interview requests varied widely between them. The respective response rates 
are: 
 Regulators: 90% 
 Law Firms: 50% 
 Lobby firms: c.33% 
 Investment banks: c.5% 
 
3.3.3 Scheduling And Conducting Interviews 
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A chapter on research design should also inform its audience about how an academic 
researcher can set up and conduct interviews with elites. It should advise on how to 
avoid common pitfalls, which in turn is a must to achieve sensible response rates. At 
the risk of sounding profane, any academic should be aware of the enormous cultural 
gap between academia and the world of investment banking. Whilst it is relatively 
easy in today’s world to gain the contact information of many key regulators, lawyers, 
lobbyists and bankers via the public domain, it is actually incredibly challenging to 
draft an appropriate written interview request. It goes without saying that any 
researcher has to have and utilise official university stationery. This is easier said than 
done, as some university departments restrict the use of their official paper to full-
time academics only. Any letter sent to a top partner at a law firm or a senior 
investment banker or regulator has to comply with unwritten rules adhering to the 
same high standards that are common in the business world.  
The real challenge, however, is the letter’s wording and content. Elites, if they 
do read letters themselves or have their executive assistants read them on their behalf, 
are impatient and will give you one brief chance to catch their attention and interest. 
The drafting of such a letter easily took as long as writing a chapter. Besides a brief 
introduction about oneself and the research project, the author made sure to be precise 
about why this interviewee was chosen, in what context, how long any interview 
would take, that all data remained non-attributable and that the author would get in 
touch with the interviewee’s secretary to check whether he/she agreed to the 
interview. Within two paragraphs, the letter set out the author’s as well as the 
project’s credentials and gave all details about the interview’s format, length and 
rationale. One of the most important elements of the letter was the fact that author 
would keep the lead in getting in touch, rather than handing over the initiative for 
follow-up to the addressees. This proved to be invaluable as it not only gave me 
legitimate reason to get in touch, but also allowed me to chase if I received no 
response.  
Once the interview is scheduled, it is obviously important to dress smartly, carry a 
nice briefcase, not least to fit in, but also to ensure that there is no visual gap in 
between interviewer and interviewees. The gap in seniority and status between 
(young) researchers and elites is already so large that researchers should not add to it. 
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More importantly, professional attire underlines one’s seriousness about the research 
project, and pays respect to the importance of the interview occasion. Finally, those 
researchers who feel inspired by the thesis to write about the investment banking 
industry as well should not forget that one’s outfit and behaviour are key factors to 
consider when conducting interviews, especially in an industry where image is 
important, as is the case in investment banking.  
The author chose to conduct semi-structured interviews. The world of 
academia is far removed from the sphere of investment banking, which in itself is 
detached from many other real world phenomena. Consequently, researchers have to 
be careful to ‘pick up’ the investment banking audience and find a common language 
during an interview. If researchers do not have a professional background in 
investment banking, it is important that they become familiar with the dominant 
cultural norms and industry lingo as the industry itself is fast-paced, rather aggressive 
and blunt. Asking questions with the right amount of respect, but also cheek is crucial 
for uncovering interviewees’ real opinions and feelings. A common understanding or 
at least familiarity between the interviewer and interviewee allows the conversation to 
progress and really dig into those aspects that ‘the insiders’ (interviewees) would not 
talk about with outsiders.  
Pressing one’s research into a corset of pre-defined questions does not bode 
well with elites. Elites are, by default, not used to being told what to do – neither 
professionally, nor in an interview context, particularly concerning more delicate 
questions. Structured interviews risk alienating elites and making them reluctant to 
talk openly. Moreover, they can be a hindrance to allowing interviewees to really 
develop their arguments and eventually actually answer the interviewer’s questions in 
any case. Rather than entering interviews with an agenda, the author prepared what he 
wanted to ask in terms of categories and specific dates. This gave interviewees 
guidance about the topic of the conversations without constraining the flow of their 
answer. Whenever they did trail off too much, they could gently lead the conversation 
back to my topic and agenda. This, however, was done without following a strict 
game plan or structure.  
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3.4 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The dissertation asks how, and under what circumstances, significant changes to 
financial regulation of investment banking occur. More specifically, it focuses on 
episodes of changes that have led to a decrease in financial regulation or intentional 
acts not to regulate financial markets. 
Financial regulation encompasses various aspects and addresses a range of 
different user groups: i.e. retail customers, high-net worth individuals, corporate 
customers and so called market counter parties or sophisticated investors. These user 
groups enjoy different standards of user protection, ranging from the highest standards 
in retail (i.e. based on the assumption that all retails users are by default laymen) to 
the lowest for professional investors or ‘market counterparties’. Financial regulation 
includes product design, codes of conduct – anti-money laundering rules, Know-
Your-Customer - as well as macro-prudential regulation.  
Referring to the literature review, the concept of ‘financial regulation’ 
essentially refers to a set of rules or governance either by the state or the market itself 
(or both) over the financial industry and its activities. The concept gives no insight 
about the type of regulation or the actors involved. As such, financial regulation 
covers a wide spectrum. If we define this spectrum by the degree of formal state 
supervision and regulation (rather than self-regulation by the markets) then financial 
regulation ranges from ‘strictly’ regulated financial markets, such as life insurance, to 
‘unregulated’ or ‘non-regulated’ financial markets, such as certain derivatives and 
‘dark banking pools’, for which there are no formal governance and regulatory 
requirements in place.  
Because of this wide variance in states’ role in regulating financial markets, it is 
important to differentiate the concept of financial regulation from  
(i) type or regime of financial regulation, i.e. tightly regulated or non-
regulated and;  
(ii) the acts of de-regulation as well as re-regulation.  
Whatever type or regime of financial regulation we analyse, financial industries, 
activities and products and their regulation are the result of deliberate actions by 
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legislators, regulators and the judiciary. In other words, whether a financial market is 
tightly regulated or not publicly regulated at all is a deliberate act.  
As stated before, the dissertation thus focuses on episodes of a decrease in financial 
regulation – it looks at regimes of financial regulation and acts of de-regulation. The 
dissertation argues that a decrease in financial regulation can be understood in four 
distinct ways:   
 Firstly, a decrease in the regulatory capital financial institutions are required to 
hold against their assets. An example would be the introduction of Basel II 
which allowed commercial banks to decrease the capital risk weights assigned 
to loans to private sector companies if those had a credit assessment of A- or 
better (Basel I assigned an across the board 100% capital risk weight to private 
companies); 
 
 Secondly, a widening of access to financial markets segments in which 
financial institutions are allowed to operate. An example would be to allow 
US Bank Holding Companies to enter insurance market activities which was 
previously seen as illegal; 
 Thirdly, a reduction in the administrative and regulatory burden depending on 
the classification of customers into private customers (i.e. retail), intermediate 
customers (i.e. small and medium-sized enterprises, local public authorities) 
and market counterparties (i.e. governments, central banks, regulator’s 
authorised firms, oversees financial institutions).  Investment banking clients 
classified as market counterparties receive a significantly reduced amount of 
investor protection since regulators regard them as sophisticated. The 
classification of clients into various categories allows investment banks to 
reduce the administrative burden considerably; for example, hedge funds are 
market counterparties and they regularly purchase complex structured 
products from investment banks without having to go through the advisory 
hurdles and paper trails retail customers would have to go through (if they 
were allowed to purchase the same structured product). The classification as a 
market counterparty thus reduces the risk for the investment bank of being 
sued for selling an unsuitable product (since it can be assumed that the hedge 
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fund understand the products without receiving advice); it also reduces the 
paper trail.   
 
 Lastly, an outright exemption from any regulation for new market segments 
and/or products other than the financial regulatory standards that apply to the 
financial institutions as a whole. Here, the over the counter trading in 
innovative structured products in the United States is an example.  
 
This study specifically examines the macro-prudential regime of financial regulation 
and excludes aspects of micro-prudential regulation, such as codes of conduct. 
Moreover, it concentrates on market counterparties, i.e. how financial institutions deal 
with each other in the market, not with retail customers. The empirical outcome the 
dissertation seeks to explain is the change in the macro-prudential regulation of 
investment banking, specifically, instances of a decrease in financial regulation of 
investment banking activities as discussed above. As such, the dissertation’s 
dependent variable is understood as a loosening of or outright exemption from 
financial regulation in areas of investment banking. The dependent variable does not 
analyse micro-specific regulatory issues, such as the regulation of specific investment 
banking products, investor protection policies or anti money-laundering statutes. 
Rather, it examines the regulation of investment banks as entities and investment 
banking markets. The dependent variable focuses on financial regulatory change and 
not financial regulation as a whole. 
Policy change can be defined and measured in a number of ways. In the field of 
financial regulation, a change in policy can, but does not have to lead to a loosening 
or tightening of financial regulation; this would be the case when a de facto industry 
standard becomes a de jure one.  
 
3.5 THE HYPOTHESES & EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
Three explanatory variables were defined prior to conducting fieldwork. Firstly, the 
thesis predicted that interest group pressure in the form of either lobbying or the 
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 
 77 
‘revolving door’ play an important role in financial regulation. Secondly, the thesis 
regarded the institutional set-up of financial regulation, i.e. the ‘rules of the game’, 
such as the US Bank Holding Company Act, as an important explanatory variable. 
Thirdly, the author believed that the role of ideas in the form of people’s ideas about 
appropriate financial regulation and market conduct would be a key response variable. 
All these variables are part of an inductive case study design. During the fieldwork 
and research the author identified an important further explanatory variable, which is 
part of the role of institutions: the role of the courts. As George and Bennett argue “in 
case studies, the inductive use of process tracing can turn up unanticipated variables 
that are directly tied to causal mechanisms” (Bennett and George 1998). In this case, 
the judiciary, as an institution, can play a significant part in financial regulation 
 
3.5.1 Interest Group Based Theories In IPE And Their Explanatory Variables 
As the literature review has shown, economists have developed demand and supply 
side models that regard regulation as the reflection of rent-seeking of powerful private 
interest groups made up of rational actors (Stigler 1971). Regulatory capture is a 
powerful concept that informs the arguments of Steil & Litan, who assert that the 
Basel Capital Accords were shaped by banks (Steil and Litan 2006), as well as IPE 
scholars writing about the Wall Street – Treasury Complex which reads like a who’s 
who of the IPE academia: Wade (Wade and Veneroso 1998), Helleiner & Porter 
(Helleiner and Porter 2009), Underhill & Zhang (Underhill and Zhang 2008) and 
Cerny (Cerny 1994)). There are three key assumptions that underlie the academic 
work in the field of private interest group power:  
 Firstly, well-organised and financially powerful interest groups can influence 
regulation by way of campaign contributions so that legislators, once elected, 
modify the regulatory environment to reflect the interest groups’ needs. In the 
case of investment banking, scholars allege that ‘Wall Street’s’ campaign 
contributions have led to regulatory capture of US financial regulators.  
 
 Secondly, by virtue of their operating model, market position, customer and 
product portfolio, interest groups have intricate, sometimes privileged 
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information into their industries. When legislators and regulators evaluate 
existing regulations and examine the possible impact of new regulation, many 
academics assert that financial institutions use their information advantage to 
supply only those pieces of information that support their cause. 
 
 Finally, scholars claim that besides an information advantage and the financial 
firepower, investment banks also enjoy privileged access to the key decision-
makers in the White House and the US Treasury by virtue of these key civil 
servants having been investment bankers in their former career, and who 
might return to Wall Street later on. The idea is known as the ‘revolving door’, 
and academics essentially portray both the current as well as former 
investment bankers as borderline corrupt. The thrust of their argument is based 
on the civil servants being lenient, if not favourable to Wall Street banks in 
return for them going back into investment banking and attaining a (fantastic) 
senior position. 
 
3.5.2 The Relationship Between Campaign Contributions And Regulatory 
Outcomes 
The thesis started to explore how and to what extent investment banking campaign 
contributions could influence the financial regulation of investment banks. Even the 
initial results were astonishing.  
The costs associated with running for Congress or President are high. Public 
funds are available for those running for President. Primary matching funds match the 
first USD 250 of individual contributions on the condition that the receivers accept 
public spending limits. These spending limits have caused many candidates since the 
late 1990s not to accept any primary matching funds and to rely on private donations. 
In addition to matching funds, public funding is also available for the national 
nominating conventions as well as the party nominee’s general election campaign. 
Again, receivers of these funds commit themselves not to spend more than USD 
50’000 of their own funds; both Romney and Obama rejected any public funding.  
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 
 79 
Having examined the size of the securities and investment industry’s 
contributions, the sector does not rank within the top ten of industry contribution for 
the aggregate amount of the period from 1998 until 2012. Indeed, it ‘only’ comes in at 
rank 12, which reflects that the industry certainly has had ample financial resources. 
However, its contributions were smaller than those of eleven other industries, some of 
which are competitors to Wall Street. From a pure financial firepower perspective, 
investment banks are not amongst the top contributors despite the media and 
academia attention they receive.  
Looking at Wall Street’s campaign donations in more detail, the contributions 
were made roughly evenly to both the Democratic Party as well as the GOP across the 
period of time under consideration (Opensecrets.org 2012). This is all the more 
astonishing as we have had four different US Presidencies, three different US 
Presidents and seven United States Congresses between 1998 and 2012.  
As a result, the thesis believes that no conclusive evidence can be drawn from 
analysing campaign donations as an explanatory variable at this stage. It is thus not 
part of the dissertation’s analysis. It is rather surprising how much attention 
researchers and journalists have given to the alleged power of ‘Wall Street’ by way of 
campaign contributions without presenting the underlying numbers.  
 
3.5.3 Content – Activity - Pathway 
Rather than analysing interest groups through the lens of preferences and financial 
endowments, the thesis examines interest groups by way of three distinct explanatory 
variables: the content of lobbying, namely the information they can offer, lobbying as 
an activity, and lobbying as a pathway.  
 
3.5.3.1 Information: content matters 
Imagine this: as a patient, would you expect your doctor to be an expert in his/her 
field of medical practice and general medicine? The answer to this rhetorical question 
is obviously ‘yes’; in fact, patients have become more like ‘consumers’ of medical 
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services and are selective about their choice of consultant and hospital. With respect 
to finance, law, regulation and investment banking, it is also natural to assume that 
those working in these industries are experts in their field. In fact, most professionals 
wishing to work at or for investment banks require a postgraduate degree, and a vast 
number will also have to pass regulatory tests and compliance criteria. Overall then, 
entry requirements to join the ranks (irrespective of the level of seniority) of 
JPMorgan, Goldman Sachs, Davis Polk and Cleary Gottlieb are among the highest 
and most competitive in the world. Corporate lawyers, accountants, PR consultants 
and bankers within investment banking have to withstand long working hours and 
enormous time and peer pressure without compromising the quality of their output. It 
is thus fair to assume that senior professionals within the industry are experts in their 
field, having worked on dozens of highly complex transactions, been intricately 
familiar with the ins and outs, the dos and don’ts of investment banking, its dealings 
and regulation. It appears rather bizarre that IPE scholars accuse these professionals 
of having privileged information or an information advantage – as a matter of fact, 
they very well should have it by virtue of their function, seniority and competence! 
The so-called information advantage could be defined by way of three categories: 
time, position, content. 
First, as their careers span several decades in an industry with one of the 
highest ‘up or out’ rates, they belong to the few senior executives that ‘survived’ and 
rose to the top. During their careers, they have been able to collect a wealth of 
experience and information that is therefore rare and highly valuable. 
Second, they are usually part of their firms’ executive committees that have 
direct dealings with other C-Suites, top regulators, the government and legislative [?]. 
Finally, and as a result, of the previous two points, senior investment banking 
professionals have accumulated a wealth of knowledge that is hard to match and even 
harder to replicate. Whilst this could be said for all senior professional jobs across all 
industries, investment banking is a little different in that the situations during which 
one learns and applies one’s skills – i.e. M&A deals, complex trading vehicles etc. – 
often push the intellectual (and legal in the sense which transactions, structures etc,. 
are permissible by law) boundaries of all actors involved, and are thus not easily 
replicable, as the industry is highly innovative.   
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Explanatory variable I: content is key for interest groups 
From a researcher’s perspective, senior investment banking professionals can thus be 
seen as having privileged information on their industries by virtue of their careers. As 
an explanatory variable, they thus have superior content – the very aspect IPE 
scholars criticise is actually a by-product of their careers. When legislators and 
regulators evaluate existing regulations and examine the possible impact of new 
regulation, they depend on industry information. Even with research assistance, such 
as the one provided by the Congressional Research Service, staffers and information 
analysts, the regulatory landscape is so complex that changing it may give rise to 
unintentional consequences. Industry information and feedback is thus essential for 
ensuring that regulators as well as legislators fully understand the potential 
repercussions – good and bad – of regulation.  
The Expert Information Hypothesis 
Interest groups fulfil an important role for legislators and regulators, as they provide 
expert opinions and feedback on existing regulation and potential future changes. 
Besides representing potentially significant industries and thus domestic economic 
interests, it is because of the information they have that they are invited to opine in 
front of Congressional and Westminster Committees.  
3.5.3.2 Lobbying: The activity 
One of the most infamous and most talked-about interest group activities is lobbying 
by way of campaign contributions to legislators. However, analysing this link is 
challenging as previously noted. Firstly, campaign contributions really only matter in 
US politics, yet not to the same extent in Westminster, where parties also receive 
substantial taxpayer funding. Secondly, the investment banking industry competes 
with other financial industries, such as insurance, asset management, thrifts and 
commercial banks for attention and legislative changes, and it is not at all clear 
whether investment banks have a greater and more important voice than say 
community banks, thrifts or commercial banks. In addition, investment banks simply 
do not have grassroots movements as other financial industries do, such as 
cooperative banks.  
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Claims about the lobby power of Wall Street are not only difficult to verify, 
but also have to be seen in context with other very powerful (and rich) industries, such 
as Silicon Valley, the Oil & Gas industry or Sugar Farmers. The thesis expects that 
even the lobbying to Congress is far less blatant and effective than people commonly 
assume. Moreover, regulators cannot be lobbied via financial contributions. The only 
form of lobbying the industry can legally do is to inform regulators about the impact 
of their decision-making. Finally, there is a logical flaw in most IPE scholars’ 
lobbying thesis. It is this: if the investment banking had such a strong grip on 
Washington and Westminster, why would they still need to lobby? In other words, if 
the key decision-makers are already “captured” by Wall Street, surely they do not 
need to be lobbied as well? 
Lobbying is better understood as the ongoing provision of key information to 
regulators, the public and legislators alike, all of whom depend on external data for 
the drafting of laws, amending existing regulations and analysing current events. 
Much of the content of these exchanges is freely available to the public and thus 
transparent: information provided during regulators’ comment periods, hearings in 
front of Westminster or US Congress committees. 
Content – as highlighted before – is important, but this information needs to be 
relayed to decision-makers if interest groups want to have an impact. The thesis 
argues that the activity of presenting and exchanging information is the main activity 
of interest groups.  
Explanatory variable II 
Lobby groups’ main activity is the provision of information to legislators and 
regulators. The information content is often highly complex, but also often publicly 
available.  
The Provision of Information Hypothesis 
The activity of lobbying is part of the information flow between investment banks, the 
industry and the regulators, and should not be seen as a key determinant in policy 
outcomes, as it is the content that is important and not the act of lobbying per se. 
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 
 83 
 
3.5.3.3 The pathway of lobbying: ‘the revolving door’ 
The majority of academics in IPE simply assume that by virtue of people 
moving from the investment banking industry to a regulator, and vice versa, that there 
has to be some form of capture (of the regulator, not the industry), if not an entire 
‘Wall Street-Treasury Complex’ (Bhagwati 1998). The thesis sets out the weakness of 
this literature in my review and highlights that the revolving door could be a 
necessary, but certainly not a sufficient condition for capture. One needs to 
understand people’s motives for moving jobs by way of interviews before drawing 
any conclusions as so many researchers do. It is rather shocking if we think about 
what the predominant ‘revolving door’ thesis actually argues: for industry insiders to 
capture parts of the civil service, their only motive would have to be financial gain. 
The simplest and most powerful way of proving the capture hypothesis is this: find a 
clear instance where an industry professional joins a regulator or where a person who 
has always been a regulator, either changes existing regulation or passes regulation 
that would not only significantly benefit the investment banking industry, but also 
provide that person with a lucrative job in that industry which he or she could not 
have attained otherwise, leading to personal gain. Ultimately then, it would be these 
personal financial pay-offs that are one of the key explanatory variables for regulatory 
outcomes that favour the industry. 
Before conducting my fieldwork, the author searched extensively for examples 
of the capture thesis and examined even extreme cases in which traders or bankers 
committed actual crimes, such as money laundering or unauthorised trading activity. 
There are many instances of such financial crimes, such as insider trading, 
unauthorised trading, market conduct violations, but the author has not found a single 
incident that would prove the capture thesis right. 
The dissertation’s case studies examine whether revolving doors played a role. 
The thesis expects to find less clear-cut situations, i.e. people may not have come or 
gone into Wall Street, but other positions, such as law firms, Senate staffers etc. In the 
case where Wall Street professionals leave their handsomely paid jobs and join 
regulators – the thesis expects that they are doing so not to manipulate regulation in 
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the industry, but as a form of public service. Conversely, the author expects that 
regulators join the private sectors because they have outstanding CVs and not because 
the industry regards them as having been lax. In both cases, current IPE scholarship 
regards the revolving door between Wall Street and Washington as one the key 
pathways of industry lobbying. The thesis aims to show that this is incorrect: First, as 
mentioned before, there seems to be a very limited revolving door between the US 
Federal Reserve Banks (which have a strong esprit de corps) and Wall Street; second, 
for a revolving door to be effective at actually impacting policy outcomes, it would 
have to be a revolving door of the very top executives and regulators; third, US 
Supreme Court judges have tenure for life and the vast majority (if not all) retire after 
their position at the court. 
Explanatory variable III: the revolving door as transfer of knowledge 
As an explanatory variable, the ‘revolving door’ is not an activity of lobbying, but an 
important pathway of exchange and transfer of knowledge between the elites of public 
service and the top executives of the investment banking industry. Gaining insights 
from market participants is key for regulators’ understanding of the markets and 
hence their regulatory response to it and vice versa. 
The revolving door hypothesis 
In cases where a revolving door between regulators and regulated exists, it does not 
lead to ‘capture’, but is a key function in enhancing the information flow between the 
two, thereby adding to the financial system’s stability. 
 
3.5.3.4 Regulators can alter the ‘rules of the game’ irrespective of their statutory 
authority  
When analysing episodes of regulators proposing rules that could cause significant 
regulatory change, regulators did so at times without having the statutory authority to 
do so. In other words, rather than being the guardians and executors of the rules of the 
games which legislators defined, regulators could establish new rules and thereby 
bring about regulatory change without legislative change.  
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As the thesis will show, the success or failure of regulators’ own regulatory 
initiatives does not depend on whether they have the statutory authority in doing so, 
but whether it is in line with the zeitgeist – the dominant market ideology at the time - 
and can be upheld in the courts in case the initiatives are being challenged. In both 
cases though, regulators can actively cause regulatory change without legislative 
change: in the thesis’s case studies, regulators stepped in and amended regulation 
when there was a Congressional impasse (as was the case with the Federal Reserve 
and Glass Steagall) or when there was an urgent need to act before Congress could 
pass respective laws.  
 These regulatory changes do not always stand the test of time, even when 
regulators are acting within their statutory authority. In the case of the Federal 
Reserve, it succeeded with its regulatory change as it was acting within its statutory 
authority. However, the CFTC, who also acted within its statutory authority, failed 
completely. The thesis will analyse the reasons behind these two specific examples. 
When regulators act outside their statutory authority, they expose themselves to being 
potentially challenged in the courts, which then determines whether or not they will 
succeed in bringing about the regulatory change. In case of the CFTC’s Swap Policy 
Statement (CFTC 1989), the commission lost out on its regulatory change when the 
US Courts ruled against it. However, the SEC’s CSE Programme succeeded despite 
being voluntary and outside the SEC’s statutory remit. Clearly then, there must be 
other factors involved that determine whether or not the regulatory change brought 
about by the regulators themselves succeeds or not.  
Explanatory variable IV: regulators can change the rules of the game with or without 
statutory authority 
As an explanatory variable, regulators can alter or set new regulatory rules without 
necessarily having the statutory authority to do so. Whether or not they will be 
successful in that depends on whether their rules are being challenged in the courts, as 
well as whether their rule change is in line with a broader regulatory as well as 
ideational consensus. 
The statutory authority hypothesis 
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Regulators can actively establish new sets of financial regulation, and their success or 
failure in being successful or not is not necessarily related to their statutory authority. 
In other words, regulators can change the rules of the game without having a 
legislative mandate.  
 
3.5.3.5 The judiciary: regulatory change by court order 
One of the most overlooked explanatory variables in IPE is the role of the courts. Of 
the three powers of the state, the judiciary, is by its very nature both independent and 
beyond any lobbying influence in a modern liberal democracy, such as the UK and 
the US. The most surprising factor during the research was the role of litigation. The 
idea that you can have regulatory change without legislative change is difficult to 
grasp at first. Having examined thousands of Federal Reserve and US court 
documents and publications from the American Bankers’ Association and the 
Securities and Investments Association, it became clear that many IPE scholars in 
finance overlooked the significance of litigation. The courts’ constitutional 
independence, especially at the higher end of the court hierarchies, elevates them 
above any lobbying and interest group pressure.  
Explanatory variable V: 
As such, the courts are one of the key institutional explanatory variables in bringing 
out regulatory change in finance without being a financial regulator. 
The judiciary as a regulator hypothesis 
The interpretation of laws by the judiciary can lead to significant regulatory change 
without any legislative or governmental involvement. In other words, the judiciary as 
one of the three powers of the state is an important actor in bringing about regulatory 
change.  
 
3.5.3.6 The role of ideas 
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Having worked in the glass, steel and marble offices of finance, the author 
experienced the industry’s strong esprit de corps, namely that of absolute laissez-faire 
capitalism: states should be reduced to guaranteeing the laws of the land, especially 
property rights, and should limit interfering with finance as much as possible, since 
the industry can regulate itself. The idea of limited government combined with market 
self-regulation is not new, however the author felt it was particularly pertinent in 
investment banking, its service industries, such as law and consultancy firms, and 
even amongst regulators. Having had a junior, yet active role in several important 
transactions in banking, the author participated in various high-level meetings with 
regulators, investors and chief executives alike.  
The real problem with the regulation of investment banking has been – and 
still is – the regulatory framework itself rather than specific, albeit spectacular, cases 
of professional misconduct. Since the establishment of the SEC, the regulation of 
investment banks had the protection of investors at its core. Accordingly, rules and 
regulations focussed on important micro issues, i.e. the rules and codes of conduct 
within investment banks, such as know your customer (KYC), anti money-laundering 
safeguards and market conduct rules. Whilst maintaining these rules, the de-regulation 
of financial services focussed on largely macro issues, the very modus operandi and 
structure of financial markets: the separation of investment from commercial banking, 
the regulation of OTC derivatives and the amount of capital investment banks have to 
hold. This caused a bizarre situation overall: whilst the rules governing the 
relationship between investment banks and commercial banks with their customers 
have largely not been watered down, the actual markets (and segments thereof) within 
which investment banking activity was conducted had become ever more de-
regulated.  
Prior to the onset of the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007/8, there has been 
little to no debate within banks, amongst regulators, let alone in politics, about 
regulators’ lack of macro-prudential supervision, and whether or not the industry 
(nota bene not individual banks, but the industry as a whole) regulates itself 
effectively. Consequently, the dissertation focuses on the macro-prudential regulation 
of investment banking and the reasons why policymakers decided not to regulate 
certain significant market areas. The argument that regulators are always behind the 
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curve and fail to attract the best human capital is too simplistic. Given that the 
institutional arrangements for the regulation of investment banking are completely 
different in the UK from the US, yet the macro-prudential regulatory standards for the 
industry appeared in many cases to be the same, the author expects that people’s ideas 
about what type of regulation was seen as appropriate has been a key variable in 
bringing about a regime of light touch regulation, de-regulation or even non-
regulation. The thesis would describe such a regime as ‘embedded laissez-faire-ism’ 
and would contend that it has been a key part of people’s understanding of how 
finance works and how best to regulate it. The thesis expects that policymakers’ 
mind-sets play an enormous role in deciding whether or not investment banks or 
investment banking markets, such as over-the-counter derivatives, should be able to 
regulate themselves or not. It is striking that the idea of embedded laissez faire-ism 
appeared to have cut across political lines as well as countries: both Democrats, 
Republicans, Tories and New Labour have had faith in market-based regulation. 
Consequently, the final explanatory variable is 
Explanatory variable VI: 
Ideas are a key explanatory variable that helps explain why key decision-markers 
believed that the appropriate regulation of investment banking would be light-touch or 
market based regulation, and intentionally decided not to regulate or de-regulate parts 
of the investment banking industry or markets. 
The role of ideas hypothesis 
People’s ideas about regulation are one of the key factors guiding their actions and 
decision-making in relation to financial regulation. 
 
 
3.6 CONCLUSION 
The thesis seeks to understand and to make a meaningful contribution to the political 
economy of investment banking regulation in the US. In doing so, it follows a 
qualitative research design and applies the comparative case study method as it seeks 
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to understand the ‘causes of effects’. It has identified five instances of major de-
regulation or non-regulation that all had a significant impact on the investment 
banking industry – the thesis dependent variable. De-regulation can be defined in a 
number of ways: a decrease in regulatory capital requirements, a widening of 
permissible financial activities, a reduction in the reporting and administrative burden 
or an outright exemption from regulation. The small N case study approach allows for 
an in-depth understanding of the complexities of regulatory decision-making in each 
of the cases that were selected.  
The thesis applied the process tracing method, which helped the author 
reconstruct the chain of causalities that ultimately resulted in an episode of de-
regulation. For this, hundreds of testimonies, public statements, newspaper articles, 
court orders, legislative bills, speeches and academic literature were analysed. In 
addition, the author conducted nearly forty semi-structured elite interviews with key 
decision-makers. The case studies were analysed through the thesis’s five hypotheses 
and explanatory variables to fully understand how one arrived at the dependent 
variable. The final chapter connects the findings from the case studies, discusses their 
similarities as well as highlights their differences and seeks to build towards a theory 
of the political economy of investment banking regulation that will hopefully guide 
future IPE scholarship of investment banking.  
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Chapter 4 
THE REPEAL OF GLASS STEAGALL:  
THE BEGINNINGS 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The repeal of the Banking Act of 1933 and 1934, commonly known as Glass-Steagall, 
is said to have been a watershed moment in US financial regulation. The Gramm 
Leach Bliley Act (GLB) of 1999 (USA Congress, 1999), also called the Financial 
Services Modernization Act of 1999, formally abolished most legal barriers to entry 
and operation of investment banking, commercial banking and insurance businesses 
in the US for financial institutions. Telling the story of the causes behind Gramm 
Leach Bliley and the ‘repeal’ of the Glass Steagall Act is complex and requires 
separating the material into three case studies. The first case study starts in the 1960s 
and encompasses a comprehensive process tracing exercise of the early legal and 
regulatory decisions in the 1960s and 1970s, with which the US Supreme Court 
provided interpretations of the meaning of Glass Steagall that would subsequently set 
the scene for its de facto demise. The second case study provides an in-depth process 
tracing analysis of the Fed’s regulatory decision-making during the Volcker years and 
the organisation’s increasingly uneasy position of further blurring the lines between 
investment banking and commercial banking in the absence of a new bill passed by 
Congress. Interestingly, the Board of the Fed itself became divided on this issue 
towards the end of Volcker’s rule. The last of the three case studies covers the Fed 
under Alan Greenspan. Under his reign, as the ‘Rock star of Central Bankers’ the Fed 
took an increasingly outspoken and aggressive approach towards the issue of (de-) 
regulatory without legislative change, in part because of Greenspan’s belief in the 
superiority of market self-regulation, which ultimately culminated in the GLB Act of 
1999. The second case study begins at the handover of the Fed’s Chairmanship from 
Volker to Greenspan, and continues until the actual passage of the Gramm Leach 
Bliley Act in 1999.  
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These three case studies seek to refute two commonly held beliefs in academia (and 
beyond): Firstly, ‘Wall Street’, i.e. investment banks, pushed for Glass-Steagall’s 
repeal. The thesis will show it was America’s Bank Holding Companies that pushed 
for the repeal whilst the actors on the other side of the fence, investment banks, tried 
adamantly to defend it, but lost. 
 
Secondly, it is commonly thought that the Gramm Leach Bliley Act was a watershed 
moment in financial regulation mostly driven by interest groups. However, all three 
case studies present a rather contrasting picture, namely that litigation-based 
regulatory change had hollowed out the separating effect of Glass Steagall so that its 
repeal only gave a new legal basis for the practical realities on the ground. Interest 
groups might have marginally contributed to this throughout the two decades that it 
took for the repeal, but were not a driving factor.  
 
The first case study starts with a review of the current research horizon and arguments 
in the IPE scholarship of Glass Steagall. The chapter then moves to the process-
tracing exercise to re-construct the story of the repeal of Glass Steagall dating back to 
the 1960s. The Federal Reserve Board issued a notice on the 12
th
 of August 1971 
saying that it intended to amend Regulation Y. This regulation essentially governs the 
practices of Bank Holding Companies (BHC) and defines which transactions of the 
BHC need the Fed’s approval. The Fed’s notice called for an increase in the list of 
activities Regulation Y defined as ‘closely related’ to banking, and to include the 
activity of investment advisory to a closed-end investment company to that definition.  
 
The trade association of mutual funds in the US, the Investment Company Institute 
(ICI), challenged both the Fed’s interpretation and, ultimately, its decision to amend 
Regulation Y, and decided to take legal action. The Courts accepted ICI’s case, but 
sided with the Board of Governors in the final level of jurisdiction. The three case 
studies will uncover that it was this Fed interpretation and subsequent court ruling that 
ultimately paved the way for the gradual, de-facto erosion of the separation between 
commercial and investment banking. The Courts would define the separating line 
between investment banking and commercial banking activities not between the 
investment banks or commercial banks, but within the legal entities of a Bank 
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Holding Company (BHC). This decision was as simple as it was radical, and would 
shape the future of the global investment banking regime as we know it. 
 
The three case studies show that the Federal Reserve Board of Governors chose to 
interpret the Glass Steagall Act in ways that it believed would legally allow Bank 
Holding Companies to re-enter investment banking activities. Over a period spanning 
two decades, the Federal Reserve would steadily test and stretch its interpretative 
room to manoeuvre within Glass Steagall. However, it was up to the US Courts to 
rule whether the Fed’s interpretations were permissible or not. The role of the courts 
in the story of the long road to repeal is one that has never been told before in the IPE 
of finance, and which should invite lively debate within which other important events 
in the IPE finance courts played a role that has not yet been fully discussed.  
 
 
4.2 THE IPE LITERATURE ON THE REPEAL OF GLASS STEAGALL  
 
Both case studies benefit from a short and focussed literature review, as the current 
research horizon in the IPE of Glass Steagall is riddled with inaccuracies. The 
following paragraphs focus on the relevant scholarly pieces in IPE on the repeal of 
Glass Steagall. The overwhelming majority of academics make claims about the 
power of ‘Wall Street’ as an industry and interest group, and regard the repeal of 
Glass-Steagall as a result of investment banking’s sway over legislators. Most of the 
evidence presented to support these claims is either anecdotal or remains empirically 
unsubstantiated (e.g. Helleiner, Bello, Underhill, Zhang). Only a minority group, 
which consists, to the author’s last count, of less than a handful of scholars in IPE, 
seriously engages with the underlying data and understands that Glass-Steagall was 
not simply ‘abolished’ by the US Congress in 1999.   
 
According to Helleiner (Helleiner, 2011), ‘Wall Street’ ‘captured’ its regulators and 
successfully lobbied for the repeal of the Glass Steagall Act. The argument here is 
that the repeal of Glass Steagall in 1999 was a momentous occasion and carried 
significant consequences. Helleiner asserts that it was the investment banks, i.e. ‘Wall 
Street’, that lobbied for the repeal. Helleiner, Underhill & Zhang (Underhill & Zhang, 
2008), Bello (Bello, 2006) and Baker (Baker, 2010) all allege that a “Wall Street - 
Treasury Complex” exists because of a close tie between Washington and Wall Street 
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by virtue of a revolving door of key staff. Baker emphasises that “financial regulatory 
capture was most pronounced in the Anglo-American heartland of the global financial 
system” (ibid, p.649). He asserts that “the general trajectory of reform […] was 
entirely congruent with the banking industry’s wishes” and lists the repeal of Glass 
Steagall as well as the SEC’s CSE programme as examples (ibid, p.652). The Deputy 
Director of the OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Blundnell-
Wignall, argues that “US banks and or investment banks supported and lobbied the 
US authorities first to remove Glass Steagall in 1999, move to new SEC rules in 2004: 
and to adopt Basel II as soon as possible” (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson, & Lee, 2008, 
p. 5).  
 
The three case studies will show that the aforementioned authors’ claims about 
the repeal of Glass-Steagall are not based on empirics and that they confuse 
investment banks with commercial banks. By way of process-tracing hundreds of 
documents, court hearings, newspaper articles as well as elite interviews, the three 
case studies on Glass-Steagall argue that the repeal was not against the investment 
banks’ will and that for from lobbying for it, they lobbied for keeping Glass-Steagall 
intact. Moreover, the cases will prove that it was the US judiciary and the Federal 
Reserve that provided the legal basis for commercial banks – i.e. Bank Holding 
Companies – to re-enter investment banking activities. Finally, the case studies on the 
SEC highlights that it was the process of European integration that forced US 
regulators to act and it was certainly not US investment banks which lobbied for the 
2004 SEC rules. In a way, the case studies on Glass Steagall’s repeal provide IPE 
scholars with a wealth of data that unearths the actual driving forces for its repeal. 
And it was certainly not US investment banks. 
 
Unfortunately, many IPE of finance academics, particularly the ones 
mentioned in the paragraphs above, relied heavily on secondary sources for their 
research without checking whether or not these references are factually correct. Even 
more unfortunate, this has established a relatively large, but self-referencing body of 
work in IPE of finance which has perpetuated inaccuracies about “Wall Street” and 
investment banking and has provided little to no new scientific insights.  
 
Why do these issues matter?  
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One of the driving forces for this thesis is to provide a better understanding about 
investment banks and their political economy. The thesis is not an end in itself, but 
wishes to guide future research so as to enable a more thorough appreciation of 
investment banks and how to more effectively regulate and govern them. One of the 
great ironies coming out of this research is that the US investment banks were far 
from being in the driving seat and actually had to adapt themselves to new regulatory 
realities created by other protagonists, such as the US Federal Reserve or the 
European Commission. Appreciating complex causal mechanisms driven by intended 
(EU consolidated supervision of conglomerates) as well as unintended consequences 
(hollowing out of Glass Steagall) is absolutely key for today’s as well as future 
policymakers and regulators.  
 
When comparing the empirically based research of this thesis to the current state of 
scholarship, it is surprising how sloppy, and sometimes even negligent many IPE of 
finance academics are in presenting their beliefs about and attitudes towards 
investment banking as facts. Moreover, it is not simply a matter of mixing up names if 
one equates investment banks with commercial banks because both are a ‘bank’. As 
the thesis shows, investment banks and commercial banks are completely distinct 
types of operational entities; each is governed by different laws, supervised by 
different regulators and operates in distinct markets. IPE scholars, especially the 
group that focuses on the IPE of finance, ought to be familiar with these terms and 
definitions. Incorrect research can easily become the source of reference for non-IPE 
academics, politicians and the media, thus further building up an aura of factual 
credibility. 
 
Two publications stand out in that their arguments rest on empirical 
foundations. Firstly, Abdelal’s book Capital Rules examines the causes and the 
consequences of liberal rules for global finance (Abdelal, 2007). Abdelal undertook 
considerable archival research and interviewed elites across different countries and 
industries. His results directly contradict most of the mainstream ideas about financial 
globalisation in academia. On the subject of the ‘Wall Street – Treasury Complex’, he 
argues that “there is, remarkably, almost no evidence to support this conventional 
wisdom […] instead Treasury policymakers were are best indifferent to the capital 
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liberalisation amendment, and some senior officials even opposed its progress [whilst] 
Wall Street was unambiguously against the amendment” (ibid, p. 13). As the thesis 
sets out in the literature review, Abdelal’s built his own dataset and did not rely upon 
the IPE of investment banking body of work that is (and becomes through doing so) 
self-referencing and lacks a sound empirical back-up - Helleiner and Underhill 
broadly fall foul of this. 
 
Secondly, Suarez and Kolodny’s journal article Paving the Road to “Too big 
to Fail”: Business Interests and the Politics of Financial Deregulation in the United 
States” is one of the first, if not the first, work in IPE to sketch out some of the 
complex history of the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act with a focus on the interest group 
coalition building in the financial community (Suarez & Kolodny, 2011). The authors 
examine the interests and alignments of the various financial sector lobby groups, in 
particular the American banking, investment banking and insurance industry. Suarez 
and Kolodny argue that Glass Steagall was ultimately only repealed when all three 
financial lobby groups jointly lobbied for legislative change. The journal article partly 
depicts the long road of the Glass-Steagall repeal, and shows that the lobby of ‘Wall 
Street’ was neither in a position, nor was it their preferred option at all times, to break 
down the Glass-Steagall barriers singlehandedly.  
 
However, the article sheds no light on two key factors of the repeal: first, the 
authors cannot explain why the Fed decided to allow commercial banks to re-enter 
investment banking activities starting in 1987. This is one of the most important 
pieces of the puzzle. They simply assert  “in a puzzling decision, the Fed – which was 
still under the chairmanship of Paul Volcker – granted the banks’ [commercial banks] 
request as longer as the securities activities did not exceed 5% of the subsidiary’s total 
revenue” (ibid, p. 85). But it was exactly this decision that changed the regulatory 
landscape dramatically, irrespective of any lobbying by various financial interest 
groups.  
 
A second major shortcoming in their research is the lack of analysis of / failure 
to analyse the role of the courts. These three case studies will argue that the repeal 
was not simply a case of industry group alignment. Rather, the judiciary played a 
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critical role in bringing out regulatory change without legislative change, and this 
independently of any interest group influence – be this informational or financial. 
 
The following three case studies seek to fill these important gaps in the current 
academic research whilst also providing the IPE community with in-depth, empirical 
evidence on the complex journey that ended with the repeal of Glass Steagall.
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4.3 THE UNINTENTIONAL BEGINNING OF THE REPEAL OF GLASS 
STEAGALL IN THE 1960s 
 
Advisers to closed-end investment companies  
The Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999 repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933. The 
US Congress provided the legal basis for the repeal, yet in practice, the US legislative 
lagged decades behind established market practice. This first case study highlights 
that the borders between commercial and investment banking had become porous 
over time, starting as early as the 1960s. It examines the reasons behind it and will 
point towards the consequences in what are discussed in the subsequent case study.  
 
The roots of Glass Steagall’s repeal are to be found in a complex court battle 
that ended in 1971 with a decision of the US Supreme Court: the Investment 
Company Institute v. B Camp National Association of Securities Dealers Inc. 
(Supreme Court of the United States, 1971). This case, which does not involve the 
Federal Reserve Board, is completely unknown to IPE scholarship.  
 
What happened? 
 
In 1963, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) ran a public 
consultation process requesting suggestions on ways to better the regulation of 
national banks’ trust activities. By way of background, Congress transferred the 
jurisdiction over the majority of trust activities in 1962 from the Federal Reserve to 
the OCC without, however, making any changes with respect to the content and scope 
of their regulation.  In order to accommodate this transfer of supervisory powers, the 
OCC established a new mantelpiece for the Fed’s regulation and called it ‘Regulation 
9’. Under the auspices of the Fed, collective investments of trust assets were only 
allowed for true fiduciary purposes whilst any type of trust activity of national banks 
was strictly prohibited. In the eyes of the Fed, banks should not operate common trust 
funds as investment trusts. Banks should neither attract customers’ money in that way 
nor be involved in the sale of participations in these funds to the public as investments 
(Federal Reserve, 1940); see also (Federal Reserve, 1956). During the OCC 
consultation, several commercial banks proposed to allow national banks to offer and 
operate managing agency accounts, which was tantamount to managing investment 
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trusts, which was itself an activity seen as typically done by investment banks. The 
OCC concluded the consultation and decided to change Regulation 9 in 1963 to allow 
for these activities in stark contrast to the Fed’s old regulatory regime. Two years 
went by without any movements: no national bank entered the managing agency 
business. The situation changed dramatically in 1965: a predecessor to today’s Citi 
Bank, the First National City Bank of New York, asked the OCC for approval to 
operate the collective investment of managing agency accounts (i.e. similar to an 
investment trust and hence investment banking). The OCC granted approval and First 
National City Bank of New York started to roll out collective investment services. 
Customers could thus invest between USD 10k and USD 50k in the bank’s funds, in 
return for which they received ‘units in participation’ relative to their investment, 
which the investment banks regarded as equity. All customers had to authorise the 
bank as their managing agent and the units of participation were freely transferable 
and redeemable to anyone part of this agreement. The fund was registered as an 
investment company under the Investment Company Act. First National City Bank of 
New York was not only the underwriter of the fund’s units of participation, but also 
the custodian, asset manager and investment advisor. In all but name, the bank 
essentially started an asset management business similar to those of investment banks. 
Competing national banks regarded these investment fund activities as a 
differentiating factor and as an additional source of income. They, too, started to draw 
up plans of their own so as to convert customers and/or customer funds from the 
investment banking industry on to their balance sheets.  
 
Confronted with the potential mass entrance of national banks into the 
investment fund business, the Investment Companies Institute (ICI) - one of the 
industry group representing the investment banking community - cried foul and took 
the OCC to court. The ICI argued that the OCC decision was in violation of Section 
16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. In particular, the ICC referred to Section 16, 
which stipulates  
 
Dealings in investment securities by a member bank are limited to the 
purchase and sale of such securities, without recourse, solely upon the 
order and for the account of customers […] and no member bank shall 
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underwrite any issue of securities (Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York, 1933, p. 9)  
 
and section 21 which states  
 
It is made unlawful, after a period of one year, for any person, 
corporation or other organization engaged in the issue, underwriting or 
selling of securities to receive deposits subject to check or to 
repayment upon presentation of a pass book or certificate (ibid, p. 12).  
  
In doing so, the ICI asserted that the purchase of stock by a bank's investment fund 
was tantamount to the purchase of stock by a bank for its own account, and thus in 
violation of Section 16. The ICI continued that Section 21 forbade deposit-taking 
banks to be engaged in the securities business, whether for retail, wholesale, 
underwriting, selling, or distributing purposes, which the ICC contended that the 
creation and operation of investment funds by banks was (Supreme Court of the 
United States, 1971). In the first level of jurisdiction, the District Court agreed with 
the ICC and ruled that the changed provisions in Regulation 9 were invalid under 
Glass Steagall. The OCC and First National City appealed, and the US Court of 
Appeals for the District of Colombia Circuit overturned the earlier ruling stating that 
the regulation was in line with the OCC’s statutory authority. The ICC appealed in 
turn and was granted certiorari by the US Supreme Court.   
 
Why is this relevant? 
 
The securities and the commercial banking industries had gone their separate ways for 
the most part since Glass Steagall in 1933, and had largely not encroached on each 
other’s turf. This dispute signalled a sea change in that relationship, namely from a 
co-existence to a more confrontational attitude. Indeed, the US Supreme Court saw it 
similarly and allowed the case to progress. The judges wanted to consider ‘important 
questions presented under federal regulatory statutes’ and believed that the issues that 
the ICI raised were both ‘novel and substantial’ (Supreme Court of the United States, 
1971). In other words, this case could have the characteristics of a precedent, not only 
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with regard to Glass Steagall and the separation of commercial from investment 
banking, but also with respect to the statutory powers of US regulators. 
 
The US Supreme Court’s acceptance of this case reflects how much this 
dispute was not a question of differences in legal interpretation, but rather a case that 
set precedent in that the highest court of the US provided legal clarification of the 
spirit and language of Glass Steagall and the statutory authority of regulators. The 
Court opened its hearing with a review of the history of national banks’ regulatory 
regimes, which showed that national banks had operated common trust funds since 
1927 and that the Fed had expressly authorised this in Regulation F in 1937. 
Simultaneously, national banks also acted as managing agents for individual 
customers. Importantly, however, the Court argued that “the union of these powers 
gives birth to an investment fund whose activities are of a different character” (ibid). 
The Court went on to state that “the differences between the investment fund that the 
Comptroller has authorized and a conventional open-end mutual fund are subtle at 
best and it is undisputed that this bank investment fund finds itself in direct 
competition with the mutual fund industry ” and that “16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall 
Act appear clearly to prohibit this activity by national banks” (ibid). In the view of the 
Court, Glass Steagall’s legislative history gave enough insights as to why the 
Congress of 1933 took the drastic step of separating investment from commercial 
banking. Congress felt that commercial banks exposed themselves to various 
‘hazards’ and conflicts of interest when operating in investment banking. The Court 
recited those hazards at length: they ranged from banks investing their own equity and 
customers’ deposits in ‘frozen or otherwise imprudent stock’, to corrupting 
‘disinterested commercial bankers’ by incentivising them to sell their bank’s 
investment banking products, and bankers extending loans to unsound companies that 
the bank owns (ibid). All these hazards, Congress asserted, would limit the function of 
banks as an impartial source of credit, cause bank depositors losses on their 
investments and undermine public confidence in the commercial banking system.  As 
a result, the Court argued that  
 
Congress acted to keep commercial banks out of the investment 
banking business largely because it believed that the promotional 
incentives of investment banking and the investment banker's 
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pecuniary stake in the success of particular investment 
opportunities was destructive of prudent and disinterested 
commercial banking and of public confidence in the commercial 
banking system (ibid). 
 
From a legal and legislative perspective, the Court’s verdict was clear. However, the 
Judges did not stop here, but continued to consider the limits of regulators’ statutory 
authorities. The Court “should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a 
regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement of that 
statute”, whilst the OCC is “charged with the enforcement of the banking laws to an 
extent that warrants the invocation of this principle with respect to his deliberative 
conclusions as to the meaning of these laws” (ibid). That is to say, the Supreme Court 
allows and expects regulatory agencies to establish reasonable regulatory statutes as 
long as they are within the spirit of the laws and to set out the regulator’s reasoning 
for their actions.  
 
The Supreme Court found that the OCC had enacted amendments that were in 
breach of banking law and failed to provide the Courts, the legislative and the wider 
public with any legal reasoning behind its interpretation of the law. This, the Court 
asserted, was “incompatible with the orderly functioning of the process of judicial 
review” (ibid). It was a damning public rapping of the OCC as a regulator and its 
work. In the eyes of the Supreme Court, the OCC failed three times:  
 
First, it “adopted no expressly articulated position at the 
administrative level as to the meaning and impact of the provisions of 
§§ 16 and 21 as they affect bank investment funds”;  
 
Secondly, it “promulgated Regulation 9 without opinion or 
accompanying statement” and; 
 
Finally, even in the OCC’s report to Congress, it “did not advert to the 
prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act” (ibid). Whilst the Court lauded 
the OCC’s counsel during the litigation hearings, this would be no 
substitute for an administrative interpretation of §§ 16 and 21 as 
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“Congress has delegated to the administrative official and not to 
appellate counsel the responsibility for elaborating and enforcing 
statutory commands” (ibid).  
 
The Court concluded, “quite obviously the Comptroller should not grant new 
authority to national banks until he is satisfied that the exercise of this authority will 
not violate the intent of the banking laws” and “if he faces such questions only after 
he has acted, there is substantial danger that the momentum generated by initial 
approval may seriously impair the enforcement of the banking laws that Congress 
enacted” (ibid).  
 
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the US Court of Appeals for the 
District of Colombia Circuit, outlawed the OCC’s amendments and ruled in favour of 
the ICI. In doing so, it stopped the inroads of the commercial banking industry into 
investment banking terrain. The Chief Justice took no part in the decision-making of 
this case, whilst two Associate Justices, Harlan and Blackmun, dissented. Associate 
Justices Marshall, Stewart, Douglas, White, Brennan and Black voted in favour.  
 
4.4 ANALYSIS AND CONSEQUENCES 
 
The Supreme Court’s judgment in ICI vs. Camp was pivotal in two key areas: first, 
the Court ruled in favour of the continued separation of investment and commercial 
banking. However, secondly and most importantly, the judges’ verdict was more 
fundamental than procedural. It was a verdict that expressed a clear discontent with 
the work and behaviour of the OCC. The Court essentially argued that the OCC failed 
to live up to its duties and responsibilities as a financial regulator within the US 
executive and in doing so, negligently overstepped its statutory powers. The judges 
took serious issue with the fact that the OCC failed to provide guidance as to the 
potential impact of the proposed regulatory changes and that it gave no thought to a 
detailed review of the existing laws. Moreover, and as a result of the aforementioned, 
the OCC should have shared any information gathered in this way with the public, but 
neglected to do so.  
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As such, the Supreme Court’s ruling clearly set out the rules, duties and 
standards for regulators interpreting and amending existing financial regulation. 
Examining the arguments of the OCC’s counsel during the hearings, it is apparent that 
the OCC amended Regulation 9 believing that it was compatible with the Glass 
Steagall Act. The judges expressed irritation that the OCC provided its rationale for 
changing Regulation 9 when the case was granted certiorari, and that it was not the 
OCC doing so, but its counsel and thus ex post. The Supreme Court’s verdict and 
conclusions were a public humiliation for the OCC – something it clearly would have 
wanted to avoid – and an unmistaken warning shot to all regulators: not to curb their 
statutory powers, but to act within the letter and spirit of the laws and interpret them 
wisely. As one of the top securities lawyers  representing one of the parties in front of 
court recalls, “the OCC’s decision was driven by wanting to be innovative and they 
did not want to step on other’s toes” (WW, 2010). However, “they were really green 
behind the ears […] and never expected their decision to be so controversial and 
particularly they did not expect ending up in court; never had it crossed their mind 
that this was even a possibility” (ibid). When asked whether interest group pressure or 
lobbying from national banks pushed the OCC into this direction he responded that “it 
had nothing to do with interest group pressure, but more with their positioning vis-à-
vis the Fed […] and don’t forget that these were very basic, evolving markets, so 
there was an element of experimenting here” (ibid). The US Supreme Court acted as 
checks and balances: it reversed the OCC’s regulatory change - essentially a de-
regulation from the perspective of national banks – as it failed to provide a sound 
legal rationale as to how their change of rules was compatible with the laws. The 
Court did not question the OCC’s statutory authority as such, but the way they 
executed it: “they were certainly made to feel embarrassed, but rightly so since their 
change in regulation was done haphazardly” (ibid).  
 
4.5 THE OPENING OF THE FLOODGATES: ICI vs. the FRB 
 
The cause of offence 
ICI’s victory was short-lived, as another potential threat of commercial banks 
intruding the securities industry’s territory emerged: just four months after the 
Supreme Court’s ruling in ICI vs. Camp, the FRB issued a notice stating its intention 
to amend Regulation Y. The Board intended to amend Regulation Y to permit BHCs 
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“to acquire or retain ownership in companies whose activities are ‘so closely related 
to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto’ ”1. The 
Fed’s decision was not related to the separation between commercial and investment 
banking as laid out in Section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Instead, it focused on the 
definition of which services were ‘closely related’ to banking. The Federal Reserve 
Board believed that the services of an investment adviser to an investment company 
were permissible for a Bank Holding Company. The Board proposed defining the 
advisory services to both closed-end and open-end investment companies as closely 
related to banking. By way of background and according to the US Investment 
Company Act of 1940, an open-end company (more commonly referred to as a 
‘mutual fund’) is continuously engaged in issuing its shares and stands ready to 
redeem them at any time; by contrast, a closed-end investment company typically 
does not issue shares after its initial offering except at infrequent intervals, equally, it 
does not stand ready to redeem the shares (United States Court of Appeals District of 
Colombia Circuit, 1979). 
 
Arguably, the Fed’s move was tactically clever: the amendment sought to 
avoid the impression of a “zero sum" game and positioned it as enlarging commercial 
banks’ activities without cutting that of investment banks. As in a Venn diagram, the 
Fed wanted to create areas of overlap between commercial and investment banks’ 
activities. 
 
The Investment Companies Institute vehemently opposed the Fed’s rationale 
and made this clear during the consultative process. The Institute saw the entry of 
Bank Holding Companies into investment advisory services to investment companies 
as a competitive threat and a clear violation of the Glass Steagall Act, and specifically 
referred to the ICI vs. Camp case as a precedent. In response to the vocal opposition 
from the ICI and the US Department of Justice during the consultative process, the 
FRB changed parts of its proposed amendment to Regulation Y and issued a detailed 
interpretive ruling. In the ruling, the Fed struck BHC’s investment advice to open-end 
investment companies off the list of activities defined as “closely related to banking”. 
Nonetheless, the FRB concluded that advice to closed-end companies was permissible 
                                                        
1 (Supreme Court of the United States, 1981) 
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and within the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act. In doing so, it made reference to 
the recent verdict in ICI vs. Camp and asserted that the US Supreme Court prohibited 
banks from operating open-end investment companies, but believed that closed-end 
investment companies were not subject to these prohibitions. In the eyes of the FRB, 
closed-ended investment companies had a relatively low level of securities activities 
and “are not primarily or frequently engaged in the issuance, sale and distribution of 
securities” (United States Court of Appeals District of Colombia Circuit, 1979). 
Moreover, the Fed also restricted BHC’s ability to extend credit to their closed-end 
investment companies. The Investment Company Institute analysed this amendment, 
but only filed a petition to the Board around 18 months later in December 1973: it 
requested the Fed to annul its amendment of Regulation Y. The Fed promptly denied 
the request.  
 
The legal route 
The ICI started legal proceedings and asked the District Court for an injunction 
against as well as declaratory judgement from the Court that the Fed’s action would 
be illegal. The District Court concluded that not it, but the Court of Appeals had 
subject matter jurisdiction and therefore dismissed ICI’s case (U.S. District Court for 
the District of Columbia, 1975). The ICI thus petitioned the US Court of Appeals, 
District of Colombia. In 1977, roughly two years later, the Court of Appeals heard the 
case and agreed with the District Court’s Judgement that it had jurisdiction, but asked 
the ICI to re-submit its petition given that three years had passed since the Fed’s 
amendment, and additional relevant information might have become available and 
ought to be included in the ICI’s submission for the court case (United States Court of 
Appeals, 1977). Finally, and by this time five years after the Fed’s original 
amendment, ICI vs. the Federal Reserve Board went ahead before the Court of 
Appeals in 1978.  
 
It is important to note the pace (or lack thereof) of the workings of the 
judiciary: no external factors could have influenced or sped up this process. During 
these five years, the absence of planning reliability for commercial banks (i.e. is it 
riskier to expand their businesses into disputed investment banking territory, at the 
risk of losing their investments in case the courts ruled them illegal, or riskier not to 
invest and potentially lose out on significant revenue opportunities, leaving the field 
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to competitors) as well as the potential threat of new market entries for investment 
banks which was surely in no party’s interest. It reflects in part the court’s insulation 
from industry interests.  
 
The Investment Companies Institute argued - as it did before in ICI vs. Camp - 
that sections 16 and 21 of the Glass Steagall Act clearly restricted the securities-
related activities permissible by Bank Holding Companies,  under which the advisory 
services to closed-end investment companies would fall. Indeed, the ICI won in the 
first level of jurisdiction, yet not on the merits of its arguments.  
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia rejected the 
ICI’s argument with respect to Glass Steagall, stating that “the prohibitions of 16 and 
21 of the Act [Glass Steagall] applied only to banks rather than to bank holding 
companies or their nonbanking subsidiaries” (Supreme Court of the United States, 
1981). However, in the same verdict, the Court of Appeals concluded that the Bank 
Holding Company Act, i.e. the legislation establishing regulation of BHCs, did not 
authorise the regulator - the Federal Reserve - to amend Regulation Y, even though 
the Act itself did not prohibit Bank Holding Companies from engaging in those 
financial activities outlined in 16 and 21 of the Glass Steagall Act. In other words, the 
Court of Appeals agreed with the Fed’s legal interpretation of the Glass Steagall Act: 
Bank Holding Companies could enter these new business activities. But the Court 
ruled that the Federal Reserve did not have the statutory authority to amend 
Regulation Y of the Bank Holding Company Act, as this was the task of legislators 
and not the Federal Reserve.  
 
The court’s decision was a Pyrrhic victory for the appellate as well as the 
defendant: not only did it fail to give a clear verdict as to the separation of investment 
from commercial banking, but it also appeared to put curbs on the statutory powers of 
regulators. Given this stalemate, the Fed asked for a re-hearing, which the Court of 
Appeals denied. Still, the Board believed that the Court of Appeals ruling reflected 
that the Fed was right in the substance matter – i.e. the Fed’s interpretation was 
compatible with Glass Steagall – and thus petitioned the US Supreme Court to review 
the case. The US Supreme Court granted certiorari.  
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The Supreme Court, yet again 
The case came before the Supreme Court in 1980, seven years after the Fed’s 
amendment. The Supreme Court overruled the US Court of Appeals and found that 
the “amendment to the Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Y determining that the 
services of an investment adviser to a closed-end investment company may be a 
permissible activity under 4 (c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company Act (12 USCS 
1843 (c) (8)), which authorises the Board to allow holding companies to acquire or 
retain ownership in companies whose activities are ‘so closely related to banking’ or 
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto” (Supreme Court of 
the United States, 1981).  
 
However, in an unexpected move, the Supreme Court went further. The judges 
shifted the focus of the legal dispute away from Sections 16 and 21 onto Section 20 of 
Glass-Steagall. The Court concluded that Congress did in fact not intend to prohibit 
commercial banks and Bank Holding Companies from being engaged in any 
securities related activities “to the contrary, it is more accurately read as merely 
completing the job of severing the connection between bank holding companies and 
affiliates ‘principally engaged’ in the securities business”.2  
 
The above ruling was more than a mere technicality: the Court’s legal 
interpretation fundamentally altered the then-established view of the Glass-Steagall 
Act. By focussing on the legal structure of commercial banks, i.e. the Holding 
Company, the Supreme Court essentially re-interpreted the Glass Steagall Act, and it 
can be summarised in layman’s terms like this:  
 
the line separating commercial from investment banking is not to be found between 
these two worlds of banking, but within commercial banks, namely within the Bank 
Holding Company and its subsidiaries.  
 
The Supreme Court went on to explain its ground-breaking judgement “the 
Congress that enacted the Glass-Steagall Act did not take such an expansive view of 
investment banking” and that “investment advisers and closed-ended investment 
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companies are not ‘principally engaged’ in the issuance or the underwriting of 
securities within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act”.3 By introducing the concept 
of “principally engaged”, the Supreme Court added a further layer of Glass Steagall 
interpretation. Examining the Supreme Court’s ruling, the judges drew two separating 
lines:  
 
First, they defined the Glass Steagall Act in relation to the bank’s legal structure, i.e. 
the commercial bank or the Bank Holding Company. As such, the judges ruled that it 
was illegal for a bank to enter into investment banking territory under Glass-Steagall, 
However, under certain circumstances (as set out below), it was legal for Bank 
Holding Companies to perform investment banking services via a subsidiary. The 
Judges acknowledged and confirmed that Section 21 of Glass Steagall prohibited the 
same legal entity from being active in securities underwriting, but ruled that Section 
20 did not prohibit a bank affiliate or subsidiary to be active in investment banking.  
 
In a second qualification and gating item to Glass Steagall, the judges ruled 
that the Bank Holding Company’s affiliate or subsidiary could only be active in 
investment banking as long as it would not be “principally engaged” in activities such 
as underwriting. The Supreme Court ruled it legal that a subsidiary of a bank holding 
company could be non-principally engaged in investment advisory services as long as 
it was not the banking part of a bank holding company that would offer these services 
at the same time. In this respect, the US Supreme Court ruled that “investment 
advisers to closed-end investment companies are not ‘principally engaged’ in the 
issuance or the underwriting of securities within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall 
Act, even if they are so engaged within the meaning of the Glass-Steagall Act sections 
16 and 21” (Supreme Court of the United States, 1981). This, then, refers to the 
Court’s second rationale, which is to make the separation of investment banking from 
commercial banking dependent upon a concept of being principally engaged in 
activities clearly defined as investment banking. Advising closed-end investment 
companies was not seen as investment banking overall, but even if it was, it was 
permissible for Bank Holding Companies as long as their subsidiary was not 
principally engaged in this business.  
                                                        
3 (Supreme Court of the United States, 1981) 
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Equally important was the US Supreme Court’s rejection of the Court of 
Appeals’ judgement about the Federal Reserve’s statutory authority with respect to 
amending existing financial regulation if permissible according to the law. In a 
landmark judgement, the US Supreme Court clarified and ultimately expanded the 
powers of the Federal Reserve. The judges argued that the Federal Reserve can amend 
Regulation Y, and doing so will not exceed the Fed’s statutory authority if  
 
(1) the Board’s determination is consistent with the language and 
legislative history of the act, (2) such investment adviser services are 
not prohibited by 16 and 21 of the Glass Steagall Act (12 USCS 24 
and 378) which restrict the securities related business of banks, and 
(3) the amendments avoids the potential hazards involved in any 
association between a bank affiliate and a closed-end investment 
company, an interpretive ruling (12 CFR 225, 125) issued by the 
Board with the amendment expressly prohibiting a bank holding 
company or its subsidiaries from purchasing or participating in the 
sale or distribution of securities of any investment company for which 
it acts as an investment adviser (Supreme Court of the United States, 
1981).  
 
In this judgement, six judges, namely, Stevens, Burger, Brennan, White, Marshall and 
Blackmun, dismissed the ICI’s petition whilst three justices abstained. 
 
4.6 AN IPE ANALYSIS OF Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System vs. 
Investment Company Institute 
 
The role of the judiciary is a lesser-known, if not completely unknown research topic 
in the IPE of finance. In the spirit of Montesquieu’s monumental work The Spirit of 
the Laws and the idea of the separation of powers – between judicative, legislative 
and executive – the US judiciary is independent from the US government and 
Congress (Montesquieu, Cohler, Miller, & Stone, 1989). Whilst the US President has 
the right to nominate Supreme Court judges, and the US Senate has to approve the 
President’s nominees (or veto them), the Supreme Court and its judges typically sit 
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above the daily business of politics. The Supreme Court is reactive: it neither 
interferes with the legislative nor executive unless a decision is brought up via the 
judicial court system that requires an interpretation or ruling from the highest court 
within the context of the US constitution and laws.  
 
One could argue that the US Supreme Court is politicised by virtue of the 
presidential nominations. There is clear tension between the US President’s power to 
nominate candidates that are seen as ‘close’ to or philosophically in ‘spirit’ with 
his/her political party ideology, i.e. either the Republicans or Democrats, and ensuring 
that the US Supreme Court does not get too politicised and really stands above the 
horse trading of Washington politics. Upholding both aspects requires a fine balance, 
but broadly speaking, the formal institutional setup of the US Supreme Court and 
even the approval process of judges has several features that act as barriers against 
politicising the highest court in the US: 
 
Firstly, Supreme Court judges have tenure for life, and can only be removed 
with a Senate majority vote. An impeachment of a Supreme Court Judge has never 
happened in the history of the US. Many potential candidates will have reached a 
certain age by virtue of having established a venerable track record in jurisprudence 
and this may, of course, shorten their potential tenure by virtue of age. However, 
looking at judges’ actual length of Supreme Court service, it is clear that many of 
them serve for twenty, often thirty years. Long tenures not only give a sense of 
continuity, but also lift judges out of the relatively short Presidential and 
Congressional cycles, making it challenging for any one ruling party to nominate a 
majority of judges, as the setup of US Supreme Court judges varies widely by age.  
 
Secondly, the nomination, approval and impeachment process of judges is 
rigorous, and nominees typically receive a greater proportion of Senators’ votes than 
any party alignment would otherwise suggest, or they win the approval from all 
Senators. Receiving more than a simple Senate majority is in itself a reflection that 
this process is both more removed from the day-to-day business of politics and that 
the nominees are of appropriate standing to both US parties. US Presidents’ 
digression in nominating candidates is thus checked by the US Senate, whose 
Committee on the Judiciary conducts all nomination hearings. The hearings are 
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rigorous, and committee members expect only candidates of the highest calibre to be 
nominated. This fact becomes obvious when looking at cases where the President has 
had to withdraw a nomination. President George W. Bush Junior nominated Ms. 
Harriet Miers as Supreme Court Judge in 2005. President Bush was widely and 
publicly criticised from all sides of the political spectrum for nominating Ms. Miers, 
who was considered lacking in experience and intellectual wit. In fact, the top-ranking 
members of the Committee were so irritated by the lack of Miers’s knowledge that 
they publicly “complained about the written responses they received from Supreme 
Court nominee Harriet Miers this week, and warned her to expect tough questions 
from Republicans and Democrats alike when her confirmation hearing begins Nov. 7” 
(Babington & Fletcher, 2005). Even before the hearing started, President Bush bowed 
to the pressure and withdrew his nomination of Miers. Whilst Bush’s move could be 
seen as exceptional, it was by no means the first such occasion: US Senators refused 
the approval of candidates who they believed unworthy of being a Supreme Court 
Judge.
4
 
 
Besides institutional safeguards to securing the political independence of the 
US Supreme Court, there are also several softer factors playing a significant role. Not 
infrequently, so-called ‘conservative’, ‘moderate’ or ‘liberal’ judges turn out to be 
either ‘swing voters’ (i.e. they do not follow a clear conservative or liberal line of 
judicial philosophy) or actually vote for the ‘other side’. Again, there are several 
reasons for this. Supreme Court judges are not party political animals, but are legal 
professionals who have and follow a clear legal philosophy. Being ‘conservative’ or 
‘liberal’ as a Supreme Court judge refers to the judges’ judicial philosophy, and can 
never be appropriately matched to the ideologies of US political parties: i.e. they do 
not pass judgement on US republican or democrat politics, but whether or not 
decisions taken by judges below them, the executive or the legislative, are within the 
spirit of the US constitution and laws.  
 
Depending on judges’ legal philosophy, they may interpret the US 
constitution and laws differently. Nevertheless, it is interesting that several so-called 
‘conservative’ judges have voted against legalising abortion, not on the grounds of 
                                                        
4 As of May 2015, a total of twelve nominees were fully considered and rejected,  
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 
 113 
morality or ethics, but simply on the grounds that a decision such as the legality of 
abortion is not an issue that ought to be defined via the US constitution, but decided 
upon by Congress rather than the Courts. As one former US Supreme Court judge put 
it during one of the author’s interviews  
 
Ruth
5
 and I would fight about the interpretation and meaning of the 
constitution all the time. She is an unbelievably fast and clever 
thinker and we both knew that our arguments were about 
intellectual differences, about the letter of the law. Never was it 
about party politics. Never. Only out of court at the opera or during 
meals or a glass of wine would we discuss politics. Never in court 
(SA, 2015). 
 
Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decisions are made public, and one can thus easily 
examine how individual judges ruled in each case and whether a consistent voting 
pattern emerges. With respect to ICI vs. Camp (401) and ICI vs. FRB (450), the table 
below summarises the judges’ decisions. The analysis shows that several judges have 
changed their votes on the issue of the Glass Steagall Act in favour of the Fed as a 
regulator and against a more narrow definition as laid out by the ICI. It is therefore 
not possible to establish a pattern according to liberal vs. conservative lines in these 
two key legal cases. 
 
 
 
When looking at judicial decisions, especially at the level of the Supreme 
Court, it is challenging for IPE researchers to apply their standard theoretical 
frameworks to analyse regulatory outcomes brought about by courts. Firstly, from a 
                                                        
5 US Supreme Court judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
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theoretical standpoint, interest group based theories cannot be applied. The judiciary 
is removed from the day-to-day activities of politics and business; it is, by default and 
law, unresponsive to any lobbying. Financial contributions to judges are simply illegal 
and there is no revolving door to Wall Street. In fact, none of the Supreme Court 
judges entered private practice post retirement. Their life tenure makes any private 
practice unlikely and it removes the possibility of any post public service pay-offs. 
Secondly, theories based on the idea that lobbying can influence and generate 
outcomes hold no teeth with the judiciary: if two powerful industries sue each other, 
we no longer face a situation of Goliath, i.e. big corporates, vs. David, i.e. 
consumers/citizens. In other words, not only can judges not be influenced via 
financial contributions or information sharing, but it is also not at all clear which 
financial industry is more powerful in the investment banking vs. commercial banking 
stand-off. Thirdly, the Supreme Court is an institution that ensures that actors play 
according to the “rules of the game”, but similar to the legislative, it can also alter the 
rules of the game. It is, thus, a hybrid. 
 
Looking at the decision Fed vs. Investment Company Institute through the lens 
of the thesis’s hypotheses, we can test the hypotheses’ applicability. ‘The Revolving 
Door’ hypothesis has limited application, as Supreme Court judges have tenure for 
life and did not enter investment banking after their service, nor did they join an 
investment bank or law firm specialising in Wall Street financial regulation after their 
tenure. In short, without knowing whether a revolving door has any impact on 
regulatory and or judiciary decision-making, the pathway of lobbying via revolving 
door between the US financial industry and the US Supreme Court does not exist. The 
involvement of the judiciary essentially contradicts the predominant scholarship in 
IPE about the revolving door.  
 
Looking at the thesis’s interest group hypotheses – owning privileged 
information which they provide to regulators and legislators – is applicable here, but 
not in the way that one would think: there is no behind-closed-doors information 
exchange or untoward tit-for-tat between the industry and government. On the 
contrary, the industry has to make its case, in public in front of the courts, as to why 
they are for or against certain regulatory decisions and thus changes brought about by 
the regulators. It is therefore in this very public setting and via the judicial process 
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that they provide the courts with information by virtue of being a defendant or an 
appellate. Moreover, let us take a step back and think about the defendant and 
appellate again: the US Fed vs. the ICI; clearly the investment banking industry lost 
this case.  
 
Applying the statutory authority hypothesis,namely that regulators can change 
the rules of the game irrespective of their mandate/statutory authority: this is broadly 
true here, even though the Fed was convinced that it was acting within its authority. In 
the words of one of the Fed’s counsels involved in this case at the time, “we did a 
through legal assessment before we issued our proposed amendment to Regulation Y 
– we were certain that the ICI would want to take us to court, but we were equally 
certain that they would have no leg to stand on” (BS, 2010). 
 
The thesis’s judiciary hypothesis – significant regulatory change brought 
about by the courts without legislative change – is proven correct here. The US 
Supreme Court has reviewed Regulation Y and essentially opened the doors for Bank 
Holding Companies to engage, albeit not principally, in investment advisory services. 
In fact, the thesis shows that this decision by the Supreme Court was ultimately to set 
in motion a lengthy process of both regulatory change and judiciary decisions that 
would bring about the repeal of Glass Steagall. Furthermore, it is absolutely key to 
highlight that the Fed neither proposed nor asked for such an re-interpretation of the 
Glass Steagall Act; in fact “we were absolutely surprised about the Supreme Court’s 
ruling and its interpretations, which we would never have put on the agenda; we were 
glad that we won the case, but also faced a very different Glass Steagall environment 
from then onwards” (ibid).  
 
The role of ideas hypothesis may be applicable in this case, but it cannot be 
verified, as some judges changed their judicial philosophy from moderate to liberal 
and vice versa during their career. However, as pointed out at the beginning, even the 
Senate hearings during the approval process of nominees question candidates’ legal 
philosophies, especially with respect to controversial matters, such as abortion. But it 
is important to keep in mind, as one former Supreme Court judge put it during the 
interview: “Supreme Court judges are not politicians, we are not bankers, we are not 
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lobbyists. We are simply concerned with the spirit of the law and its most appropriate 
interpretation. The Constitution is the Constitution” (SA, 2015). 
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Chapter 5 
THE REPEAL OF GLASS STEAGALL: THE VOLKER 
YEARS 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The first case study examined the origins of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act and 
ultimately found them in a court case between the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency (OCC) and the Investment Companies Institute (ICI) (Supreme Court of the 
United States, 1971). It was one of the first judicial cases that dealt with the 
separation of investment from commercial banking as set out by the Glass Steagall 
Act (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 1933). The OCC failed to provide adequate 
guidance as the first case study showed: the court case between the ICI and the 
Federal Reserve with respect to the Fed’s amendments to Regulation Y (United States 
Court of Appeals District of Colombia Circuit, 1979) ended with the US Supreme 
Court providing a legal interpretation of the Glass Steagall Act (Federal Reserve Bank 
of New York, 1933) that would radically redefine commonly held beliefs about the 
separation between investment banking and commercial banking on both sides of the 
industry fence. The Court ruled that Section 20 of Glass Steagall defined the line 
separating investment from commercial banking as being within the Bank Holding 
Company, i.e. between the Holding and its subsidiaries as well as affiliates. For as 
long as these subsidiaries and affiliates were not “principally engaged” in the 
securities business, the Bank Holding Company was not in breach of Glass Steagall. 
At the same time, the US Supreme Court clarified that the Federal Reserve had the 
statutory authority to amend Regulation Y, and that its amendment “was consistent 
with the language and legislative history of the act”.  
 
The Court’s ruling carries important learning and consequences for the 
scholarship in the IPE of finance: it introduces a hitherto neglected actor on to the 
stage of regulatory decision-making: the courts. The ICI vs. Fed case did not simply 
clarify whether or not the Fed exceeded its statutory authority; it actually brought 
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about significant regulatory change without legislative change and without the 
regulator, the Fed, seeking this specific legal interpretation of Glass Steagall. The US 
investment banking [body? Industry? Branch?] clearly lost this case: they had to 
accept the re-entry of Bank Holding Companies into their turf without anything in 
return. 
  
With the Supreme Court having set the stage for a re-thinking of Glass 
Steagall, the second case study examines the Fed’s next movements under the 
Chairmanship of Paul Volcker. The Supreme Court ruling made Bank Holding 
Companies’ re-entry into investment banking dependent upon the concept of their 
subsidiaries and affiliates not being ‘principally engaged’ in the securities business as 
per Section 20 of Glass Steagall. However, the Court did not provide a comprehensive 
list of activities, percentage limits or otherwise measureable performance indicators 
that would allow Bank Holding Companies to understand and identify when their 
operations would be principally engaged and when not. In other words, the court did 
not provide a definition as to what ‘principally engaged’ meant in practice.  
 
As this case study shows, the Fed received various requests from Bank 
Holding Companies who were encouraged by the US Supreme Court’s ruling and 
sought to re-enter the investment banking business. The Fed was put in the difficult 
position of having to interpret the US Supreme Court ruling as well as the original 
Glass Steagall Act by way of finding a compromise between the two. It was thus in 
the unique position of having to interpret Glass Steagall from a legal perspective in 
order to then translate its interpretation into regulatory decision-making.  It did so at 
various points in the Volcker years; each time it was taken to court, it won. However, 
whilst the Courts provided a specific interpretation of Glass Steagall, it was really the 
Fed as a regulator who established a body of ‘case law’ or precedents that ultimately 
confirmed the Fed’s amendments in front of the court as they were challenged by the 
investment banks. In sum, it was regulatory change by statutory authority without 
legislative change.  
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5.2 THE SIA VS. THE FED: THE CHARLES SCHWAB CASE  
 
Introduction 
 
Lobby groups, such as the American Bankers Association or the Investment 
Company Institute, can be in a dialogue with US regulators to exchange information 
or express their opinions, yet they cannot and do not influence regulators by way of 
financial contributions. The Chicago School of Regulation is thus not applicable in 
this case, as Congress did not intervene or change the laws governing BHCs. Even 
more striking is the fact that the Fed’s amendment of Regulation Y was then contested 
in the courts. The judiciary is both independent from the legislative and executive 
powers of the state, acts as a check towards them and is open to anyone (anyone has 
the right to go to court). The last point is important as it highlights that litigation is not 
an exclusive route that is only available to a select group of people or institutions. On 
the contrary, anyone could have contested the Fed’s decision to amend the BHC 
regulation.  
 
The courts themselves are above any external lobby influence. It is strictly 
illegal to influence the judiciary by way of lobbying in financial or informational 
terms. The courts rule whether amendments made by the regulators by-pass the 
legislative process. As such, the entire process by which lobby groups influence 
legislation through campaign contributions is hollowed out. The mechanism by which 
a regulator can thus propose regulatory change and have the courts either confirm or 
dismiss it is of vital importance. Moreover, the Supreme Courts decision is so 
significant as it established a basis upon which the Federal Reserve could judge 
whether certain financial activities, if carried out by BHCs, were in breach of the 
Glass Steagall Act. The judge’s reference to Section 20 and their legal clarification of 
its meaning are especially noteworthy. This case and the Court’s clarification of 
Section 20 became the point of reference for the Federal Reserve’s decision-making 
as regards the separation of commercial banking from investment banking.  
 
Roughly half a year after the Supreme Court’s Decision in Fed vs. ICI, Paul 
Volcker, Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, made 
several remarks during his speech at the Annual Convention of the American Bankers 
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Association (ABA) in San Francisco in October 1981 that picked up this case. 
Chairman Volcker remarked  
 
the line between banking and other financial services has become 
blurred. It needs both redefinition of the appropriate border, and 
clear recognition that some substantial overlapping in the provision 
of services by different types of institutions – bank and non-bank – 
can enhance [emphasis added by author] competition (Volcker, 
1981, p. 7).  
 
Paul Volcker is often, and wrongly, stylised as an anti-investment banking, pro Glass 
Steagall regulator, especially with regard to the relatively recent ‘Volcker Rule’1 
which the FT’s Lex column labelled “one of the silliest bits of the Dodd-Frank Act” 
(Lex Column, 2011). It is interesting that in his speech to the ABA in 1981, Volcker 
did not urge Congress to pass legislation and revoke the Glass Steagall Act. To the 
contrary, he simply argued that a ‘redefinition’ of the ‘appropriate borders’ between 
banking and investment banking was needed without mentioning who should be in 
charge of that redefinition, and explicitly making his point that he  
 
will not attempt to suggest here precisely where the lines should be 
drawn, but only the scope of the debate. For instance, the question 
of commercial banks selling commercial paper or underwriting of 
municipal revenue bonds, which the Federal Reserve Board has 
long supported, seems to me quite different from underwriting 
corporate stocks, where questions of ownership, potential conflicts 
of interest, and risk are much greater (Volcker, 1981).  
 
Moreover, Volcker highlighted that the overlap resulting from blurred borders could 
increase competition which would be positive for clients. According to Volcker, “the 
field for possible expansion [for BHCs] is broad indeed, including, for example, some 
forms of insurance, management consulting, travel services, at least some securities 
activities, money […], and data processing and transmission” (Volcker, 1981, p. 8).  
                                                        
1 To give a brief explanation of the rule: it essentially aims at preventing banks from engaging in risky financial activities, 
predominantly propriety trading.  
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Volcker’s statement reflects a very clear sense of direction for the Federal 
Reserve and its regulation of Bank Holding Companies: the Fed was comfortable with 
BHCs becoming somewhat active in a broad spectrum of financial services, many of 
which had not been described as being their “core”. He also supported the idea that 
BHCs should be able to sell commercial paper and underwrite municipal bonds, even 
though he was cautious not to be too descriptive as to where the spectrum of 
possibilities for Bank Holding Companies starts and where it ends (Volcker, 1981).  
 
Only a few months after Mr. Volker’s speech, the Federal Reserve took 
another important decision with regard to Glass Steagall and banking-related 
activities. In March 1982, the Bank of America Corporation, America’s second largest 
BHC by assets, filed an application for permission to acquire Charles Schwab, the 
parent company of America’s then largest discount brokerage firm. The Federal 
Reserve issued the application in its register and requested public comments (Federal 
Reserve, 1983). Contrary to the otherwise existing, extensive turf wars between US 
financial regulators (for example (Suarez & Kolodny, 2011), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) commented in favour of the Fed’s decision, as did the 
Department of Justice and the Comptroller of the Currency (Federal Reserve, 1983). 
This is remarkable, as the Federal Reserve indirectly gained more regulatory 
responsibility by way of allowing one of its regulated entities to gain more operational 
freedom. Despite the fact that Charles Schwab was SEC supervised, Bank of America 
was supervised on a consolidated basis by the Fed, which of course gave it unique 
insights into the ins and outs of the retail investment banking arm, i.e. Charles 
Schwab.  
 
The main opposition came from the Securities Industry Association (SIA), 
which represented the interest of the investment banking industry at large. Investment 
Banks were extremely alarmed that Bank Holding Companies were not only to come 
back on to their turf, but to acquire outright the country’s largest retail brokers for 
securities (DJ, 2010). The SIA asked for a formal hearing with the Fed. The Federal 
Reserve granted the SIA’s request and formal public hearings took place in front of an 
administrative law judge who was asked to consider the application. The hearings in 
which the SIA, the Fed as well as Justice Department participated took six days. The 
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judge in charge of this hearing issued his ruling thereafter: he found Bank of 
America’s acquisition proposal to be consistent with both the Bank Holding Company 
Act and Glass Steagall, and recommended that Bank of America’s acquisition be 
approved. 
 
After the formal hearing, the Fed ruled that “Schwab’s brokerage services are 
operationally and functionally very similar to the types of brokerage services that are 
generally provided by banks and that banking organizations are particularly well 
equipped to provide such services” (Federal Reserve, 1983, p. 107). The Board 
believed that the public benefits from increased competition, convenience and 
efficiency outweighed adverse effects. At the time, Charles Schwab was not just any 
discount brokerage firm, but the largest in the USA. The Board, however, assessed 
that Schwab was not “engaged principally” in any activities prohibited under Section 
20 of Glass Steagall, and that “the business of purchasing or selling securities upon 
the unsolicited order of, and as agent for, a particular customer does not constitute the 
“public sale” of securities for purposes of section 20” (Federal Reserve, 1983, p. 114). 
In its interpretation, the Federal Reserve Board then specifically referred to the Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve vs. Investment Company Institute case where  
 
“the Supreme Court has made clear, section 20 determines the 
permissible securities activities of an affiliate of a bank and the fact 
that a bank might be precluded from engaging in a particular 
securities activity does not necessarily mean that a bank holding 
company is precluded from performing such services” (Federal 
Reserve, 1983, p. 115).  
  
As was the case in allowing BHCs to enter the business of advisory services to 
closed-end investment companies, it was the regulator’s decision and not the 
legislator’s to give BHCs the go-ahead to acquire discount brokerages. However, the 
Fed operated within its statutory remit and could fall back on the Supreme Court 
Ruling which had made this acquisition possible in the first place. The lobby groups 
were able to provide their comments during the public hearing period, but ultimately, 
the regulators could not be lobbied financially, and the Federal Reserve followed the 
body of case law applicable to regulating Bank Holding Companies closely. As the 
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then General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission recalls, “the lobby 
groups, especially the SIA and ICI were unbelievably active, but only effective at the 
margin” (GE, 2010). As in the earlier case, the lobby group whose business was 
adversely affected started legal proceedings alleging that the Fed’s decision was 
violating the Glass Steagall and the Bank Holding Company Act.  
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided in July 
1983 that the SIA “petition for review [is] denied, because no statutory authority 
prohibited a bank holding company from engaging in retail brokerage, and respondent 
[Fed] acted within respondent’s discretion in approving intervener’s application”2. 
The SIA appealed, which was granted, but the Supreme Court affirmed the lower 
court’s decision in June 1984. In its decision-making, the Supreme Court argued  
 
that it was reasonable for the Board to determine that the 
acquisition was not prohibited by 20 of the Glass Steagall Act 
[…] and that the Board has authority under Paragraph 4 (c) 8 of 
the BHC Act to authorize a bank holding company to acquire a 
nonbanking affiliate engaged principally in retail securities 
brokerage (Supreme Court of the United States, 1984).   
 
The Supreme Court of the United States made thus another significant ruling and, as 
before, it was the process of litigation and the decision of the courts that ultimately 
confirmed the Federal Reserve’s regulatory change without there being correspondent 
legislative change. The investment banking industry lost against the Fed and the 
commercial banking industry once again.  
 
As was argued earlier, the judiciary is independent, and any interest group 
pressure on it forbidden. The courts thus take a central role in financial regulation. Let 
us assume for a moment that the Federal Reserve would have decided against Bank of 
America’s acquisition of Charles Schwab. In this hypothetical scenario, the SIA 
would have been content with the outcome, whilst Bank of America or any banking 
lobby organisation might have started legal proceedings and sought the path of 
                                                        
2 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1983) 
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litigation. Either way, any amendment made by the Federal Reserve, or any other 
regulator for that matter, is open to litigation by essentially any party. The judiciary is 
open to anyone and will hear any case if there is substantiated evidence for a breach 
of law. Applying the thesis’s judiciary as regulator hypothesis, this case reflects that 
the judiciary is the only power in the state besides the legislative whose decisions can 
verify, nullify and alter financial regulation. And yet, it is the only power within the 
state that is above and beyond any lobby group influence such that any interest group- 
based accounts of explaining regulatory change do not apply for the judiciary. The 
justification for this is simple: if interest groups could lobby and influence the 
judiciary, if the judiciary was not fully independent, then we are not talking about a 
modern advanced state with a clear separation of powers. Rather, we would be 
analysing a dictatorship or authoritarian state.  
 
Reasons for the Fed’s sanctioning of the Charles Schwab acquisition 
 
As can be seen from the Fed’s comments and Chairman Volcker’s statements, 
the Fed believed that the acquisition would result in more competition, which would 
increase the financial sector’s overall efficiency and convenience for customers. It 
was one of the first such statements in which the Fed argued that the externalities of 
freer, competitive markets would outweigh the adverse effects. There was, however, a 
second motive behind the Fed’s decision-making: Bank Holding Companies had 
suffered from a decline in their earnings power for a set of complex reasons (such as a 
cap on interest payables to customers, entry of thrifts into checking accounts, oil 
crisis, inflation etc.) “which concerned the Fed as it could affect the stability of the 
financial system whilst at the same time margins in many areas of investment 
banking, such as retail brokerage, were very attractive”(GRo, 2010). 
 
 
5.3 THE COMMERCIAL PAPER RULING 
 
The Federal Reserve’s decisions to amend Regulation Y caused the unintended 
consequence that the Supreme Courts clarified the meaning of Section 20 of Glass 
Steagall. It was this clarification that allowed the Federal Reserve to start “testing” 
which financial activities the Courts would regard as ‘principally engaged’ and which 
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ones they did not. The Board then used this definition when it reviewed Bank of 
America’s request to purchase Charles Schwab and granted BHCs permission to 
acquire discount brokers. As set out before, the courts not only provided the regulator 
with clear guidance as to how to interpret the laws and amend them as appropriate, 
they also sided with the Fed, and thus judged that the regulatory change as made by 
the Fed was legal. 
 
Congress was not complacent about the US Supreme Court’s ruling and its 
consequences. It did consider a bill called the ‘Financial Services Competitive Equity 
Act’ in 1984 that would have changed certain aspects of the Securities Exchange and 
the Banking Act of 1934 in order to overhaul Glass Steagall and allow greater 
freedom of operational movement between investment and commercial banking (US 
Senate, 1984). The Bill was introduced by Senator Edwin Garn from Utah and 
proposed two major amendments: first, it proposed to amend the Banking Act of 1933 
“to allow a member bank to be affiliated with a depository institution securities 
affiliate” and have officers, directors and employees from both being able to sit and 
serve on both the banking and securities affiliate at the same time; second, to change 
the Securities Act of 1933 “to exempt from the registration requirements of such Act 
the issuance of a holding company's shares in connection with a reorganization in 
which the holding company becomes the parent of a bank or thrift institution” (ibid). 
The bill passed the Senate, however it never made it through the House.  
 
 Absent legislative change, the Supreme Court decisions regarding Section 20 
and Volcker’s speeches encouraged Bank Holding Companies to seek a dialogue with 
the Federal Reserve as to which other activities the Fed regarded as ‘permissible’. In 
December 1984, Citicorp applied to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for 
permission to enter corporate debt capital markets, especially commercial paper. In its 
application, Citicorp argued that not the Holding Company, but an affiliate – Citicorp 
Securities – would carry out the securities activities. The Wall Street Journal reported 
that “the underwriting authority that Citicorp seeks would have been authorized by 
legislation that failed to win passage in Congress this year” confirming the earlier 
argument that the Fed could indeed alter financial regulation without there being 
legislative change if the courts confirmed the Fed’s amendments (The Wall Street 
Journal, 1984). The Wall Street Journal went on to say that “Citicorp was encouraged 
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to act by a federal appeals court decision – upheld this year by the U.S. Supreme 
Court – that allowed Bank of America’s acquisition of Schwab” (The Wall Street 
Journal, 1984). However only two months later, the Fed decided that Citicorp’s 
application would violate the Glass Steagall, in response to which Citi withdrew its 
application with the intent to file a new, modified one.  
 
The author interviewed a New York based senior partner specialising in 
banking regulation at a top international law firm. Widely regarded as one of the 
foremost experts in US and international banking regulation, he worked at the Federal 
Reserve as counsel in the 1980s and was privy to all these discussions and decisions. 
He recalls that “there was so much pressure from the big banks that they just had to be 
able to do some amount of underwriting in order to compete with the investment 
banks and keep their customers - this went on for years.”3 (BS, 2010). He highlights 
that “one day around the time of the Citi application, JPMorgan gave the Fed a paper 
where historic statistics showed that the most risky and dangerous financial business 
you could be in was commercial lending because you cannot sell it off” (ibid). This 
paper showed that securities could be sold off and benefited from the public 
disclosure whilst commercial loans – set aside the commercial paper market – “were 
illiquid, in a lot of cases fairly opaque and concentrated - so in fact, it is safer to 
underwrite and deal” (ibid). According to various accounts from interviews, the New 
York Fed was supportive of JPMorgan’s arguments, but the Washington Fed felt “that 
underwriting and dealing was just a very dangerous business” (BJ, 2010).  
 
Around the same time as Citi’s application, the Bank Holding Company 
Bankers Trust asked for permission to place commercial paper, but so that “Bankers 
Trust’s placement of commercial paper as described in this Statement does not 
constitute the “selling”, “underwriting” or “distributing” of commercial paper 
securities for the purposes of the Act [Glass Steagall]” (Federal Reserve, 1985, p. 
629). During the consultation period, the Fed received a range of comments, many in 
favour of Bankers Trust, but three opposing the application: The SIA, the ICI and 
Merrill Lynch Money Markets. All three contended that the activities Bankers Trust 
sought to undertake were in violation of the Glass Steagall Act, as these activities 
                                                        
3 Interview with a senior partner specialising in banking regulation. He is based in the New York office of a premier 
international law firm and published widely in his field. As a result of his deal record and expertise, he is seen as one of 
the world’s top experts in banking regulation.  
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were not closely related to banking, and would result in conflicts of interests and 
bring with them substantial risks. Furthermore, all three argued that the meaning of 
“principally engaged” had to be literally applied, as otherwise it could vitiate the 
central purpose of the Glass Steagall Act by allowing member banks to re-establish 
"security affiliates" that could rival the largest investment banking firms” (ibid).  
 
The Fed granted permission this time, as it believed that this activity passed 
the test of being closely related to banking. The guidelines to this test were 
established in a different court decision, known as the National Courier decision in 
1975. An activity ‘closely related to banking’ had to pass three criteria: firstly, banks 
provided the proposed activity before, secondly, they generally provide services that 
are functionally or operationally similar and thus equip them well to provide the 
proposed activity and, finally, banks provide services that are so “integrally related to 
the proposed activity” that they in fact necessitate their provision in a specialised form 
(Federal Reserve, 1987a).  
 
The Securities Industry Association was furious and opened litigation against 
this decision. A long and protracted legal battle followed, during which both sides 
scored victories and injunctions were issued. During this litigation process, Chairman 
Volcker testified before the House Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer and 
Monetary Affairs of the Committee on Government Operations in 1985 and said that 
“as things now stand, the pressures for change are reflected in, and potentially 
distorted by, exploitation of perceived loopholes, reinterpretation of existing laws by 
regulators and the courts” (Paul Volcker, 1985). In an apparent change of heart, he 
argued that “these questions about banking law and Congressional intent need 
urgently to be resolved by fresh expressions of substantive law […] the problem 
becomes steadily more acute with the passage of time” (ibid).  
He saw bank holding companies, thrifts, insurance companies and investment 
banks expanding onto each other’s territories “whenever and wherever they can find 
room through new interpretations of Federal law or new state law” (ibid). A few years 
back, Volcker talked about potential efficiency and convenience gains thanks to 
greater competition; in 1985 he warned that “long established policies set by the 
Congress are breaking down” which causes “confusion” and the loss of shareholders’ 
equity (ibid). What is slightly odd about Volcker’s statement is the depiction of 
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regulators, the Fed included, as passive agencies that have no choice but to grant ever 
greater permissions to Bank Holding Company requests. This appears contrary to the 
US Supreme Court Rulings which made it explicit that the Fed had statutory authority 
to decide when something is compatible with the intention of the law. If, as Volcker 
emphasised, “equity is lost” and “confusion abounds”, the Fed would not need to 
grant BHCs permission to expand into investment banking activities. 
 
Volcker’s statement, made fourteen years before Congress’s official repeal of 
Glass Steagall, highlights the problems associated with the process of regulatory 
change without legislative change. He was very candid and direct in identifying the 
factors behind this change as well as the culprits. Interestingly, this very emphatic 
statement has not been picked up in IPE sources so far.  
 
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia 
Circuit decided on 23 December 1986 that “the placement of commercial paper issued 
by third parties did not cross the line into investment banking; the literal requirements 
of the Glass Steagall Act limiting such activities were met”4. Only one day later, on 
Christmas Eve, the Board of the Federal Reserve granted Bankers Trust’ permission 
“to act as agent and adviser to issuers of commercial paper in connection with the 
placement of such commercial paper with institutional purchasers” (Federal Reserve, 
1987a, p. 138). Bankers Trust conducted these activities through its wholly owned 
subsidiary BT Commercial Corporation, itself a wholly owned subsidiary of BT 
Leasing Services Inc. 
 
The Fed imposed a long list of conditions for its approval. For examples, as a 
revenue and market test restriction, the  
 
Company would not be engaged in a general securities or 
investment banking business and where its gross revenue from 
commercial paper activities in any one year would constitute less 
than 5 percent of its total gross revenue and the volume of 
commercial paper outstanding at any one time placed by Company 
                                                        
4 (States, 1986) 
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represents less than 5 percent of the average amount of dealer-
placed commercial paper outstanding during the previous four 
calendar quarters (ibid).  
 
At the same time, the Board made a clear distinction between granting 
permission to the Bankers Trust and reviewing separate applications from Citigroup, 
J.P. Morgan & Co. because these “applications are substantially different from the 
Applicant’s [Bankers Trust]” since they involve “complex factual and legal issues to 
underwrite commercial paper, mortgage-backed securities, municipal revenue bonds 
and consumer-related receivables in an affiliate that also underwrites U.S. government 
securities” (ibid, p. 140).  
 
Chairman Volcker added a personal statement with the Board’s approval of 
Banker Trust’s application.  It says  
 
today’s decision, applying the Glass Steagall Act, makes as much 
good sense as is possible to draw from applying a law, adopted a 
half-century ago, to a banking marketplace that technology and 
other competitive forces have altered in a manner and to an extent 
never envisioned by the enacting Congress (ibid, p. 154).  
 
He justified the Board’s decision-making by saying, “in the light of the intent 
of the Act, which has long been considered, in short hand, to require the divorce of 
investment and commercial banking, the Board’s conclusion that the term “engaged 
principally” includes any substantial activity, even if that function is less than 50% of 
the total, seems to me to be correct” (ibid). He emphasised that “the limited decision 
taken by the Board today only emphasises the fact that authority for underwriting of 
securities by banking organisations urgently needs to be legislatively reviewed and 
updated” (ibid). He was concerned that  
 
no useful public policy goal is served by the incentive created by 
the Glass Steagall Act, as we must interpret it, to shift assets (such 
as commercial loans) out of a bank and into nonbank affiliates of a 
holding company so that the affiliates are large enough to permit 
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significant amounts of underwriting without being “principally” in 
that activity (ibid).  
 
Volcker’s position on the Glass Steagall Act and the Fed’s position of granting 
investment banks permission to re-enter investment banking activities clearly evolved 
over time. Back in 1981, Volcker was more positive about Bank Holding Company’s 
entry intro investment banking; by 1986 his mood turned negative and he wanted 
Congress to act. 
 
Six months later, the SIA finally lost its law-suit when the Supreme Court 
denied certiorari in June 1987.  
 
Towards the middle of the 1980s, the Federal Reserve amended various 
aspects of financial regulation. The Board did so after public comment periods and 
often receiving independent legal advice. The Supreme Court of the United States 
mostly judged in favour of the Fed’s amendments, thereby slowly building up a 
corpus of case law, and within it important regulatory clarifications and (re-) 
interpretations that allowed the Fed to grant Bank Holding Companies permission to 
re-enter more and more financial activities that were previously thought to be 
impermissible. As argued throughout these paragraphs, the motives behind the Fed’s 
decision-making need to be explained further, as the industry brought most cases to 
the Fed for its attention. It is not clear whether Chairman Volcker’s statement of 
frustration with the current regulatory framework and his repeated pleas for Congress 
to pass a new law is representative of the Fed as a whole. Indeed, as the court decision 
in OCC vs. ICI in the 1960s demonstrated, regulators had to provide a detailed 
commentary outlining their reasons as to why a permission is compatible with the 
legislative intent of a law. In the Bankers Trust case, the Fed – if it felt as uneasy as 
its Chairman – could have denied permission whilst providing detailed reasoning so 
as to stand up in front of the courts. However, the Fed did not. There thus appears to 
be some disconnect building up between Chairman Volcker’s remarks of the Fed 
having to stand by passively as events unfold and the Fed’s statutory authority in 
defining or interpreting as to where “principally engaged” starts and ends.  
 
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 132 
Analysing the data from the court decisions, the newspaper articles and the 
speeches, it is clear that the Board of the Federal Reserve did not want to do away 
with the separation of investment banking from commercial banking. Rather, the 
Board took a view, time and again, that certain financial activities, such as distributing 
commercial paper or acquiring a discount brokerage, were closely related to banking 
and as such not covered by Glass Steagall. Chairman Volcker’s speeches emphasise 
these points. He was clearly comfortable with BHCs entering these activities, as much 
as he was uncomfortable with crossing lines into the underwriting of securities or 
other services clearly linked with investment banking. At the same time, Chairman 
Volcker’s openly expressed his frustration about Congress’s inability to pass new 
legislation. According to the former Fed counsel, “Volcker had very 19th century 
views on commercial banking, was the one who said ‘stand back, let this market 
develop and see how it plans out’ [referring to the commercial banks entering 
investment banking activities such as commercial paper and discount brokerage] and I 
think that either explicitly or implicitly they kind of made a bargain with the industry 
– instead of having fairly rigid rules and the examiners coming in counting currency 
and this kind of thing, they were going to stand back, let them develop, let them 
compete, get the new products. The trade-off was more capital. There would be 
enough capital, because there would be enough capital to cover up the mistakes. So 
the result was that the industry did get a much freer hand than they used to have and 
they innovated and did these new things” (SB). It is interesting that Volcker’s 
ideational mind-set about financial regulation was clearly not a necessary explanatory 
variable to explain the regulatory outcomes at the time. He was neither fully for nor 
against the separation of investment banking from commercial banking - this can be 
easily proven with his voting patters in the Board and his speeches. In fact, he was 
simply for greater legislative clarity: in other words, a repeal or reform of Glass 
Steagall. 
 
The role of interest groups and their supply of information as in the case of the 
JP Morgan paper appear to have had some effect on these regulatory decisions in that 
it strengthened the voice of the NY Fed within the Fed System. In addition, lobby 
groups were allowed to provide public comments on the Fed’s proposed amendments 
and they were likewise able to start legal proceedings. Neither of these two aspects 
are exclusive pathways though. On the contrary, they are open to anyone. As such, 
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interest group hypotheses can be tested, but the provision of information had no 
meaningful effect as an explanatory variable in this instance. 
 
The judiciary has clearly been the necessary explanatory variable in all these 
outcomes. The Supreme Court’s decisions ultimately either reversed or – as was 
largely the case – confirmed the Fed’s decisions. The role of the Fed and its statutory 
authority was less clear – it clearly enjoyed the statutory authority, but it seems that 
there was no dominant ideational consensus within the Fed, as Volcker’s words of 
warning reflect (which stand in contradiction to the Fed granting permission to 
Bankers Trust).   
 
By the beginning of 1987, the lines between commercial and investment 
banking had become less clear, yet were still intact. However, as a result of the 
Supreme Court’s decision with regard to Glass Steagall and Section 20, BHCs were 
hopeful that the lines could become even more blurred: not as a result of legislative 
change, but as a result of further Fed amendments and court orders. It is in 1987 when 
the ultimate undermining of Glass Steagall began. A second bill to overhaul Glass 
Steagall was introduced in Congress, the so called “Proxmire Financial Modernization 
Act of 1988”, but did not make it through the House, again. Scholars attempted to 
understand why bills kept failing in either the House or the Senate through the 1980s. 
One of the reasons is certainly to be found in partisanship in Congress, but even when 
one party held the majority in both houses, bills did fail. Uncovering the reasons 
behind this could be subject to a separate PhD. However, it is important to note that 
Fed’s regulatory policy change, which the courts confirmed, probably had an impact 
on coalition building in Congress: members of the House and Senators whose districts 
had important bank holding companies would have had an increased incentive to act, 
as the Fed was already “reforming” Glass Steagall”. This subject area warrants further 
research. 
 
5.4 THE END OF VOLCKER 
 
Still under Volcker’s Chairmanship, the Federal Reserve Board received an 
application from The Chase Manhattan Corporation New York that went one step 
further than Bankers Trust. Chase applied to place commercial paper, as granted to 
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Bankers Trust, as well as to underwrite and deal in third-party commercial paper. 
During the public comment period, the SIA lodged its opposition to the proposal. The 
Federal Reserve, however, granted Chase permission to its application after weighing 
up the public benefits and potential adverse affects. The Board believed that “the 
proposed activity involved little additional risk or new conflict of interest” and since 
“only the nation’s largest and financially strongest corporation borrow funds in the 
commercial paper market” and because “the proposed activities would only be a 
minor part of the business of a well-capitalised, separate subsidiary”, the Fed granted 
permission and – in line with earlier decisions – imposed a long list of conditions, 
including the 5% thresholds as with Bankers Trust (Federal Reserve, 1987c). The 
Board unanimously voted for this motion and the order became effective on 18 March 
1987. Chairman Volcker was absent and did not vote. 
 
Encouraged by the Fed’s amendments to financial regulation, especially 
regarding commercial paper, and the courts’ confirmations of these, Citicorp, J.P. 
Morgan and Bankers Trust applied for permission to underwrite and deal in municipal 
revenue bonds, mortgage related securities, consumer receivable securities and 
commercial paper. The application thus asked for far-reaching new permissions to 
trade in a whole range of ineligible securities.  
The Fed responded to the applications in an unusually long commentary (32 
pages), published on 30 April 1987. In the response, the Fed highlighted that it did not 
take any initiative in pursuing the recent considerable regulatory changes, but 
“applicants’ member bank affiliates seek to activate until now dormant provisions in 
section 20 of the Glass Steagall Act to participate in underwriting and dealing in 
certain securities, so long as they are not engaged principally in this activity” (Federal 
Reserve, 1987b, p. 475). The Board went on to stress that “prior to this time, there 
apparently has been no incentive to test the meaning of this authorization” (ibid). 
Suarez and Kolodny’s research clearly did not cover the Federal Reserve Bulletins. 
They argued that “in a puzzling decision, the Fed – which was still under the 
chairmanship of Paul Volcker – granted the banks’ request as long as the securities 
activities did not exceed 5% of the subsidiary’s total revenue” (Suarez & Kolodny, 
2011, p. 85). Not only did the Fed explain very clearly why they granted permission, 
but the authors also got the percentage wrong. The Federal Reserve proposed, “with 
respect to the appropriate level of ineligible activity permitted under section 20, the 
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Board concludes that a member bank affiliate would not be substantially engaged in 
underwriting or dealing in ineligible securities if its gross revenue from that activity 
does not exceed a range of between five to ten per cent of its total gross revenues. The 
Board also believes that a similar range should apply to the market test it believes is 
appropriate under section 20” (Federal Reserve, 1987b, p. 475).  
 
The Board of the Federal Reserve was at pains to justify its decision-making 
on this occasion. In contrast to the vast majority of much shorter amendments and 
explanations, the Board gave  detailed reasoning, often with additional legal and 
economic aspects. The Fed believed that the activities proposed by the applicants 
could be conducted safely and soundly without undue risk. A further, crucial 
difference to earlier court decisions is the Board’s understanding that the underwriting 
and dealing in US government securities does not count towards the concept of 
‘securities’ within the ‘principally engaged’ rule. In other words, the Board allowed 
these subsidiaries to count these activities against the ‘ineligible security’ activities. 
Also for the first time, the Board expressed concerns with the Bank Holding 
Companies declining profitability, and stated that  
 
the evidence seems to indicate that without this authority banking 
organisations will be at a disadvantage in the competition to supply the 
credit needs of the most creditworthy borrowers with access to the less 
costly commercial paper market, with a consequent continuing decline in 
the overall quality of bank loan portfolios (Federal Reserve, 1987b, p. 
477).   
 
As before, the Board ran the ‘closely related to banking’ activity tests and 
concluded that “subject to the limitations established in the Order, approval of each of 
the three applications would not result in a violation of the Glass Steagall Act and 
would be consistent with the closely related and proper incident to banking standards 
of section 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act” (ibid). As with earlier 
decisions, the Securities Industry Association was bitterly opposed to any further 
amendments, especially this one, as it would finally undermine the Glass Steagall 
separation. The SIA contested the definition of the term ‘engaged principally’ once 
more.  
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Interestingly, and for the first time on such an occasion, the Federal Reserve’s 
Board was divided during the voting process. Chairman Volcker and Governor Angell 
voted against the amendment, but they were out-voted by Governors Johnson, Seger 
and Heller. Despite some newspaper commentary about partisanship within the 
Board, the votes did not reflect party lines. Governors Johnson and Seger are 
Republican, but Heller is independent. On the votes against the amendment, Chairman 
Volcker is a Democrat, yet Governor Angnell is Republican. Angell and Volcker 
issued a supplementary statement of dissent with the Fed’s decision. They support 
“the idea that affiliates of bank holding companies underwrite and deal in commercial 
paper, municipal revenue bonds, and 1-4 family mortgage-related securities, the 
activities involved in the Board’s decisions” and they support the Board’s limitations 
placed on the applicants, (ibid, p. 505). However, they disagree with the Board 
because 
 
we believe the plain words of the statute, read together with earlier 
Supreme Court and circuit court opinions, as we understand them, 
indicate that government securities are indeed “securities” within the 
meaning of section 20. Consequently, it appears to us that the 
applications approved today, as a matter of law, involve affiliations of 
member banks with corporations that are in fact not only ‘principally 
engaged’ in dealing and underwriting in securities, but in fact would 
be wholly engaged in such activities, thereby exceeding the authority 
of law. Our point is not merely one of legal formalisms. The 
interpretations adopted by the majority would appear to make feasible, 
as a matter of law if not Board policy, the affiliations of banks with 
some of the principal underwriting firms or investment houses of the 
country. Such a legal result, we feel, is inconsistent with the intent of 
Congress in passing the Glass Steagall Act (ibid, p. 505). 
 
In response, the Securities Industry Association started its most important and one of 
its lengthiest legal battles with the Federal Reserve. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit started litigation proceedings in June 1987, the same 
month that President Reagan nominated Alan Greenspan to succeed Volcker as 
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Chairman of the Federal Reserve. The U.S. Senate confirmed Greenspan in August. 
Under Volcker, the Fed was more akin to a recipient of banks’ requests in order to be 
granted permissions to enter certain, clearly limited areas of investment banking. The 
Board then attempted to interpret the letter of law and, as argued before, the courts 
mostly confirmed the Fed’s amendments. The Fed was acting fully within its statutory 
authority and the courts were confirming it. Overall, then, the Fed under Chairman 
Volcker was a prime example in bringing about significant regulatory change without 
legislative change. As a result, the impasse in Congress of passing a repeal or reform 
of Glass Steagall did not impact the BHCs. However, it negatively affected the US 
investment banks – contrary to the claims made in the IPE literature.  
 
5.5 CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Fed under Paul Volcker went from being a regulator, ensuring that the rules of 
the game are followed, to one that shaped and re-interpreted the rules. As we know 
from the author’s interviews with key decision-makers as well as the comments the 
Fed received during public consultations, the Fed was in a steady dialogue with Bank 
Holding Companies, who provided it with privileged, expert information. Two of the 
thesis hypotheses on interest groups can thus be easily tested and verified, namely the 
expert information hypothesis and the provision of information hypothesis. Despite 
the New York Fed being a market counterparty on Wall Street, the depth and breadth 
of Bank Holding Companies’ information was essential for the Federal Reserve in 
assessing the status quo of the industry and to better understand the potential impact 
of the section 20 and principally engaged rulings. The paper from JPM is just one 
such example. Was JP Morgan lobbying the Fed to allow it to ease the restrictions on 
tapping investment banking markets? The answer is a clear yes. However, this 
lobbying was without the exchange of any money and without a revolving door: it 
was restricted to an open exchange of expert information which allowed the Fed to 
better assess the risk and return profiles of certain industry requests and to triangulate 
the industry’s information with its own data. Moreover, it was the provision of this 
information and the ongoing dialogue the Fed entertained with its regulated entities 
which was important in making the Board comfortable with granting the permissions 
it did, for example, the direct reference the Fed made in relation to the declining 
profitability of commercial banking. Lobbying was effective “not when money was 
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exchanged, lobbying was effective when reliable, sound expert information could be 
gained and people built a reputation for themselves as being subject matter experts” 
(GRa, 2010). The revolving door hypothesis could not be tested in this case study, as 
the Fed really was more careerists [?] than the other regulators, and very few top Fed 
staff jumped ship to the industry – a fact that would remain true throughout the entire 
period under consideration (i.e. 1970 to 2008).  
  
The judiciary played, once again, a key role. As the “judiciary as regulator” 
hypothesis shows, the courts established a body of case law on the subject of Glass 
Steagall that added more information and detail as to the interpretation of this act. 
Moreover, and of critical importance, is the fact that a banking act from the year 1933 
is now interpreted in conjunction with other, more recent court decisions, such as the 
national courier decision. As a result, Glass Steagall is being assessed in the context 
of these rulings which re-defines its meaning in a more ‘modern way’. In doing so, 
the judiciary is confirming as well as guiding the direction of regulatory change.   
 
Analysing this case study through the lens of the statutory authority 
hypothesis, it is interesting that the Fed successfully managed to establish regulatory 
change without legislative change. This was made possible because it had the 
statutory authority to respond to the amendments the Bank Holding Companies asked 
for in a thoughtful and careful manner. It was thus within its authority and in a 
powerful position when it was challenged in front of the courts. Moreover, as the 
comments received during the public consultation period with respect to Bank of 
America’s acquisition of Charles Schwab show, the ideational consensus amongst 
regulators as well as the banking community was in favour of the Fed.  
 
The role of ideas hypothesis is thus of importance here, as the Federal Reserve 
not only acted within the boundaries of its statutory authority, but was also acting 
with the ideational support of at least more than just its own regulatory constituency. 
However, it was within the Fed itself that the issue of ideational support appears to 
have been most conflicted.  Volcker’s abstaining from votes as well as the dissents 
(which as Chairman carry enormous symbolic weight) point towards a paradigm 
change within the Fed: Volcker believed in achieving more efficient and competitive 
markets, but not at all costs. Greenspan’s Chairmanship changed this dynamic 
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dramatically, which the next and last case study on the long road to Gramm Leach 
Bliley will show. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE FED UNDER GREENSPAN & REPEAL OF GLASS 
STEAGALL 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Fed under Alan Greenspan had evolved tremendously from the Fed that issued 
the notice in the 1970s about its intention to amend Regulation Y to allow Bank 
Holding Companies to offer investment advice to investment companies. It was a very 
different animal. Whilst the Fed’s mandate did not change, its interpretation of the 
legislative acts that underpin the institution’s statutory authority and ultimately regime 
of financial regulation changed; as the three case studies have shown, the Fed 
gradually moved from being a bank regulator, policing the rules of the game, towards 
a more ‘activist’ stance in bringing about desirable regulatory outcomes without the 
legislative change that ought to underpin them. 
 Initially, as the first case study discussed, the Fed in the 1970s amended 
Regulation Y, as its staff had conducted a thorough analysis and deeply believed that 
these activities would be ‘closely related to banking’. As such, the Fed did not 
challenge the separation between investment and commercial banking, but simply 
sought to widen the net for Bank Holding Companies’ permissible business activities. 
It was the US Supreme Court’s interpretation of the legislative intent of the Congress 
that had passed Glass Steagall in 1933 that turned a court case about Regulation Y 
into a landmark decision. From the Fed’s perspective, this was unintentional and came 
as a surprise. The Supreme Court re-drew the lines separating investment from 
commercial banking, and turned the definition ‘principally engaged’ into a litmus test 
for how much investment banking business was legally permissible for Bank Holding 
Companies.  
 Initially, Chairman Volcker saw the Supreme Court’s decision in a positive 
light. He regarded it as an opportunity to enhance the US financial market’s 
competitiveness and efficiency. However, as bank holding companies requested to re-
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enter ever more areas of traditional investment banking activities, Volcker urged 
Congress to act, as he feared that market boundaries and effective regulations were 
breaking down, which would ultimately cause the loss of capital. A disconnect built 
up between Volcker’s public statements, where he expressed ever greater discomfort 
about the situation, and the Fed sanctioning the re-entry of Bank Holding Companies 
into investment banking. By 1987, the gap between Volcker’s ideas about Glass 
Steagall and that of the Fed’s Board had grown so wide that the dissent spilled over 
into the public with Volcker and Agnell’s statement of dissent. Under Greenspan, the 
Fed would move from bringing about regulatory change without legislative 
adjustment towards wanting to actively change the financial market structure of US 
(investment) banking. The Fed under Greenspan became synonymous with favouring 
market-based regulation on the basis of the efficient market hypothesis. So much so 
that “because Greenspan really believed in free market it influenced how things are 
done at the Fed” (ML, 2010).  In Greenspan’s own words: “I still found the broader 
philosophy of unfettered market competition compelling, as I do to this day” (Alan 
Greenspan, 2008). 
 
6.2 GREENSPAN AND THE CHANGING OF THE US FINANCIAL MARKET 
STRUCTURE  
In his first testimony to the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
Supervisions, Regulation and Insurance of the Committee on Banking, Finance and 
Urban Affairs, Greenspan said that “it would be appropriate at this time to concentrate 
attention on the specific suggestion to repeal the Glass Steagall Act” (Greenspan, 
1987). He argued that financial markets had changed significantly, both in the US as 
well as abroad. Repealing Glass Steagall would “permit banks to operate in areas 
where they already have considerable experience and expertise” (ibid). Whilst a 
repeal would increase the risks in the markets overall, this would be manageable and 
“would provide significant public benefits” (ibid). The Fed would prefer a complete 
overhaul of Glass Steagall “to the piecemeal removal of restrictions on underwriting 
and dealing in specific types of securities such as revenue bonds or commercial 
paper” (ibid). The latter would “artificially distort capital markets and prevent 
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financial institutions from assuring benefits to customers by maximizing their 
competitive advantage in particular markets” (ibid).  
In his testimony, Greenspan elucidated upon the pros and cons of allowing 
banks to re-enter investment banking, and he emphasised that “the risks of investment 
banking to depositary institutions are containable, that the regulatory framework 
established in the securities laws minimises the impact of conflicts of interest” (ibid). 
In a remarkable statement, when seen through the lens of the numerous bank and 
investment bank failures in the US during the late 1920s and early 1930s, Greenspan 
argued that Bank Holding Companies would “be effectively insulated from their 
securities affiliates through an appropriate framework” that included deposit 
insurance and access to the Federal Reserve’s discount window, both of which would 
“avoid the potential panic withdrawals from banks if affiliated securities firms 
experience losses” (Greenspan, 1987). As Greenspan writes in one of his more recent 
works, “I had long argued that the Glass Steagall Act was based on faulty history” 
because “only when computers made it possible to evaluate the banking system as a 
whole did it become evident that banks with securities affiliates had weathered the 
1930s crisis better than those without” (Alan Greenspan, 2008).   
In his first testimony as Fed Chairman, Greenspan stressed that the public 
benefits, in terms of lower customer costs and increased competition, would outweigh 
the adverse affects. This is because only a handful of top tier investment banks hold 
the majority of the market-share in most investment banking products, whilst on the 
flipside, commercial banks’ profits were in decline. Since one of the Fed’s mandates 
is to ensure the stability of the banking system, the Fed has an interest in Bank 
Holding Companies being profitable. The focus of Bank Holding Companies is on 
their soundness and profitability, in other words “the result is that the commercial 
banks and the regulators are joined at the hip” (WW, 2010). By contrast, the SEC 
“does not really care whether the ibanks make money as the capital rules are aimed at 
liquidating you overnight and give money back to investors – the relationship with the 
SEC was arm’s-length” (ibid). 
Greenspan emphasised that he wanted the Bank Holding Companies to be 
more profitable, and he would use its statutory authority to interpret Glass Steagall in 
such way  as to grant the BHCs’ requests to enter highly profitable areas of 
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investment banking on the condition that their affiliates or subsidiaries would not 
become principally engaged in those lines of business. 
Add to that the fact that “Greenspan really, really just believed in free markets 
- so he carried it forward and he was in favour of Glass Steagall cutting back, which 
he carried forward as well” (SB, 2010). According to former Fed staff, the Fed was 
already moving away from just following the letter of the law of the acts that make up 
the financial regulatory regime in the US to “interpreting the meaning of those letters 
to the limit which Volcker did not like, but was clearly no longer able to stop” 
towards pushing through meanings that were in line with “free market, the efficient 
market hypothesis” (ibid). This process gained momentum when Volcker left such 
that the Fed was fully in “favour of Glass Steagall repeal” when Greenspan took over 
(ibid). In this process, the New York Fed, which had trading desks on Wall Street and 
understood the markets well and was in favour of BHCs operating in securities 
markets, tilted the ideological balance towards its favour so that the historically more 
cautious Washington Fed fell in line with Greenspan (ibid).  
Nevertheless, it took a further twelve years for Congress to pass Gramm Leach 
Bliley. One of the reasons no bill made it past Congress was the relative importance 
of Bank Holding Companies and investment banks for certain key Senate and House 
Seats, so the balance never swung into one direction or the other, as a repeal was 
clearly not in the interest of Wall Street. Whilst commercial banks kept making  
“strong pleas to Congressmen to try to get them to repeal Glass 
Steagall, the investment banks were equally important to the House 
and Senate representative of certain key states, such as New York, and 
managed to make their voice heard loud and clear which in turn kept 
the Bank Holding Companies from pushing through the repeal 
because the investment banks actually wanted to maintain the 
separation” (OJ, 2010).  
The importance of the investment banks and bank holding companies as 
employers in the respective Senate and House seats played a key role, as any 
“important employer for a constituency would” (ibid). Asked whether Wall Street 
trumped the Bank Holding companies in campaign contributions, the “answer is no – 
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they were pretty equal” (ibid). When looking at contributions to Congressmen, 
because of the importance and size of both industries, it is not clear which lobby 
group is ‘more powerful’, but ‘Wall Street’ is certainly not the Leviathan that many 
IPE scholars thought it is; in fact, investment banks were regularly outspent by Bank 
Holding Companies as lobbying records from opensecrets reveal.  
As a former Federal Reserve lawyer argues  
“the Fed’s real concern were the courts: If you read the original section 
20 orders, because the Fed knew that they would be taken to court and 
they thought they did 5% just to be super safe, but they said in the order 
that 10% is probably ok. And the courts said it is fine and we don’t see 
a problem with 10% and immediately after that the Fed moved it to 
10%” (ibid). 
 
6.2.1 A Political Economy Analysis Of Greenspan’s ‘Takeover’ Of The Fed 
Alan Greenspan let no time pass to leave his mark on the Federal Reserve. He took 
office as Chairman on August, 11
th
 1987 and gave his testimony before the 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation & Insurance of the 
House Committee on Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs on November, 18
th
 1987, 
during which he made the above statements. The statements were such a sharp 
departure from the Volcker years that one could argue that he conducted a ‘take-over’ 
of the Fed; at least those Federal Reserve Member banks and departments which had 
previously felt as uneasy about the piecemeal ‘regulatory change without legislative’ 
approach as Volcker did. Though only three months in office, he made it clear to 
people – if they had not known it before – that he “had no time for pro regulation 
research papers or discussions” (ML, 2010). In light of these facts, the author tests 
two of the thesis’s hypotheses already: first, the statutory authority hypothesis can be 
tested, as Greenspan essentially told the investment banking industry that the Fed 
would continue to let bank holding companies enter investment banking activities via 
piecemeal regulatory change based on the statutory authority of the Fed in the absence 
of significant legislative change. In his testimony, he said he ‘preferred’ a big 
regulatory overhaul to the status quo. However, given the distortions Glass Steagall 
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caused in capital markets despite the fact that bank holding companies had expertise 
and experience in investment banking, Greenspan publicly justified why the Fed had 
to continue its policy of piecemeal regulatory change: it was in the public’s and 
consumer’s interest, and a clear declaration of war on the investment banking 
industry. The second hypothesis that is worth testing is the role of ideas hypothesis: as 
current and former Fed staff said during interviews (and Greenspan himself stated in 
public): the idea of the efficient market hypothesis and the concept of market-based 
rather than government-imposed regulation had been deeply ingrained in Greenspan, 
so much so that it impacted what type of issues, research papers and people knew ‘he 
had time for’. With respect to the Fed’s interpretation of Glass Steagall, if Greenspan 
could not get his ‘preferred’ regulatory overhaul through a bill passed in Congress, he 
would continue pursuing the piecemeal strategy in order to bring about freer and more 
efficient markets.   
 
6.3 THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION’S FINAL BATTLE 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit started the hearing process 
on the 23
rd
 of June 1987.
1
 The Securities Industry Association (SIA) petitioned to 
review the Federal Reserve’s Board order regarding the applications by the BHCs to 
underwrite and deal in municipal revenue bonds, mortgage-related securities, and 
commercial paper. The SIA’s lawyers argued that the Fed’s approval was in clear 
violation of section 20 and that previously bank-eligible securities have to count 
towards the concept of securities when considering section 20, whereas the Fed 
excluded them. SIA’s point was not just a mere technical one: by excluding 
previously bank-eligible securities, it gave Bank Holding Companies much more 
room to manoeuvre before reaching the revenue limits of the section 20 subsidiaries’ 
‘principally engaged’ tests. If the previously bank-eligible securities were to be 
included, they would have to be deducted from the rest of the subsidiaries’ 20 
business in investment banking and thus reduce the market volume. The SIA 
challenged the Fed’s meaning of ‘principally engaged’, whereby the Fed used revenue 
and market share tests to define this term to mean ‘substantially’. The SIA argued that 
the term ‘principally engaged’ meant that the Bank Holding Company affiliate had an 
                                                        
1 (United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1988) 
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integral and regularly occurring part of their business in underwriting and dealing. All 
these points of contention might be technical, but had a major impact on how much 
investment banking business Bank Holding Companies affiliates were allowed to 
execute. 
The court ruled on the 8
th
 of February 1988 that “the Board’s Section 20 interpretation 
was reasonable and that its decision was to be upheld” (United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1988). The judges agreed with the Fed after 
conducting its own legislative and historical analysis that  
the term ‘securities’ in section 20 only referred to bank ineligible 
securities since underwriting and dealing in government securities 
posed no hazards to banks themselves, the court held that bank 
affiliates should be able principally to engage in the same activity 
(ibid). 
Even more striking is the court’s decision to eliminate the market share test/limitation 
that the Fed imposed, thereby only leaving the revenue limitation in force.  
In sum  
the court denied the petitions for review of the Board’s decisions to 
permit bank subsidiaries to underwrite and deal in municipal revenue 
bonds, mortgage-related securities, and commercial paper. It was not 
Congress’s plan to forbid affiliates from activities that banks 
themselves could engage in without limitation (ibid).  
Subsequently, the Federal Reserve raised the revenue limits for Section 20 
subsidiaries to 10% in September 1989 reflecting the court’s decision-making 
(Federal Reserve, 1989).  
The Securities Industry Association was not giving up and continued the 
litigation process. It approached the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit and appealed the previous ruling. The proceedings started on 6
th
 
March 1990, and the court decided less than a month later on April 10
th
, 1990. The 
SIA reiterated its claims and included a range of other arguments against Bank 
Holding Companies’ investment banking activities – some of these were more 
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 147 
spurious. For example, the SIA alleged that banks would lack the negotiation skills 
necessary for conducting investment banking business, since government securities 
would only ever be sold via a competitive process.   
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made 
a firm rebuttal highlighting that “petitioner was barred by the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel from re-litigating the claims it lost before the Second Circuit, because the 
questions before the court were the same, and the national importance of the issues 
did not justify re-examination”2. The court emphasised that  
the petitioner’s argument was weak on the merits because of the 
deference the court was obliged to give the Board’s determination that 
the activities proposed were closely related to banking, and the 
Board’s view was supported by substantial evidence (United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1990).  
Around the same time as the court order was published, media reports 
indicated that the SIA would drop its opposition to the repeal of Glass Steagall and 
work with regulators instead to feed back comments on a new regulatory framework. 
On December 1
st
 1989, the Wall Street Journal reported that “a secret campaign by 
three influential Wall Street investment banks led to the securities industry’s startling 
move to consider dropping its longstanding fight to keep banks out of the securities 
business” (Winkler & Power, 1989). The newspaper article continues to report that 
“top Wall Street executives have concluded that banks are already winning their battle 
to gain securities powers with help from the Federal Reserve and from a string of 
court orders knocking away the barriers prohibiting them from the securities 
business” (Winkler & Power, 1989).  
Indeed, the SIA abolished its longstanding opposition against Glass Steagall reform 
on the day of its annual convention. The Financial Times reported that 
the SIA would accept changes in the law to allow subsidiaries of 
commercial banks to offer a broad range of securities and securities-
related activities […] in return it would seek […] permission for its 
                                                        
2 (United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1990) 
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members to offer consumer banking services and to borrow from the 
Federal Reserve system in emergencies (Oram, 1989). 
 The FT article highlighted that  
for years the SIA has fought all the way to the Supreme Court to 
preserve the division between the two banking industries laid down in 
the 1933 Glass Steagall Act but despite the SIA’s efforts, courts and 
regulators have granted commercial banks significant new power in 
such areas as corporate bond underwriting, commercial paper and 
securitisation of assets (Oram, 1989).  
In the end, even a powerful lobby group like the SIA had to give in and stop its 
opposition to Glass Steagall repeal as a result of the decisions by the courts (SAn, 
2010). As the New York Times observed, this happened despite the fact that “the 
securities association has spent millions of dollars in a decade-long effort to fight any 
attempt to weaken the Glass Steagall Act” (Eichenwald, 1989). Indeed, the SIA tried 
to block any legislative reform as much as the Bank Holding Companies pushed for 
the repeal. Interviewing a former senior officer of the SIA, he argued that the SIA’s 
mandate was to “to continue to preserve the Glass Steagall distinction between 
investment banking and commercial banking, which they did for 20 years” (BS, 2010) 
He explained “a bill would pass the House and die in the Senate and vice versa 
depending on who controlled it as neither one of the two separate House committees 
wanted to get rid of Glass Steagall, whilst the Senate wanted the repeal” (ibid). 
However, the SIA was not successful in winning the court cases it brought against the 
Fed in relation to the Fed’s interpretative rulings of Glass Steagall. As a result, “we at 
the SIA decided to stop the litigation as the Fed simply undercut the process by 
expanding the definition of principally engaged” (ibid).  
Losing this last court case against the Fed was the ‘final nail in the coffin’ for the 
SIA’s campaign (ibid).  The Federal Reserve, as predicted (or threatened, depending 
on which side one stands) by Greenspan in his first testimony in the House in 1987, 
continued to pursue piecemeal regulatory change on the basis of its statutory duty 
(and authority) to review and interpret the relevant laws. It is thus a prime example for 
the statutory authority hypothesis. However, one can also successfully test the 
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judiciary as a regulator hypothesis, since the courts were the ones who had to opine 
whether the Federal Reserve’s interpretations of the law were correct and within its 
statutory authority. The interplay of these actors – the Fed and the Courts – had 
brought about significant regulatory change without Congress passing any new laws.  
 
6.4 THE FINAL ROAD TO GRAMM LEACH BLILEY 
The Federal Reserve Board under Alan Greenspan continued to oppose Glass Steagall 
and worked towards undermining the separation of Glass Steagall. For nearly four 
years, the Federal Reserve proposed no considerable amendments to Section 20. It 
was only in January 1993 that the Fed introduced an alternative revenue test for 
calculating section 20 revenues. This alternative method was indexed to track changes 
in interest rates since 1989. In this order, the Fed argued 
the Board took this action in response to historically unusual changes 
in the level and structure of interest rates, which have distorted the 
revenue test as a measure of the relative importance of ineligible 
securities activities in a manner that was not anticipated when the 
Board established the 10 percent limit in September 1989 (Federal 
Reserve, 1993).  
In particular, “short-term interest rates had declined sharply in recent months but that 
there had been very little corresponding decline in longer term rates, producing an 
unusually wide difference between short- and long-term rates”(ibid). What is striking 
is that the Fed Board was split in its vote on this issue. Chairman Greenspan and 
Governors Kelley, LaWare, Lindsey, and Phillips voted for it, but Governors Mullins 
and Angell against. Mullins and Angell published a statement of dissent emphasising 
that the revenue test was unreliable and thus “the Board should directly consider an 
increase in the 10 percent level” since it has “a considerable degree of latitude in 
selecting the appropriate quantitative level for applying the engaged principally 
standard” (ibid). However, both tests were tantamount to an increase in the revenue 
limits: the first test could produce results that are greater than the old 10% limit in 
case the index and the markets move upwards. The dissenters’ suggestion would also 
lift the limit and be more transparent as it is not linked to an index. Congress 
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continued its impasse and not passing legislation even after the SIA dropped its 
opposition to Glass Steagall’s repeal. Several bills calling for the repeal of Glass 
Steagall were introduced in both the House and the Senate, but none of them was 
passed, meaning the legislative stalemate lasted until Gramm Leach Bliley.  
The Federal Reserve filed a notice on July 31
st
, 1996 that it proposed to 
increase the revenue limit from underwriting and dealing in securities for section 20 
subsidiaries, i.e. the subsidiary of a Bank Holding Company that engages in 
investment banking activities, from 10% to 25% (Federal Reserve, 1997). The notice 
stated that  
based on its experience supervising these subsidiaries and developments 
in the securities markets since the revenue limitation was adopted in 
1987, the Board has concluded that a company earning 25 percent or 
less of its revenue from underwriting and dealing would not be engaged 
principally in that activity for purposes of section 20 (ibid) 
The new revenue limit would be effective from March 6
th
, 1997. The notice gives 
insights into Fed’s motives and thinking. Accordingly,  
the Board stated its belief that the limitation of 10 percent of total 
revenue it adopted in 1987, without benefit of this experience, had 
unduly restricted the underwriting and dealing activity of section 20 
subsidiaries […] whilst the product mix that section 20 subsidiaries are 
permitted to offer and developments in the securities markets had 
affected the relationship between revenue and activity since 1987 (ibid, 
p.8). 
The Fed received 42 public comments in response to its proposal: 26 comments from 
Bank Holding Companies and their industry associations, three from investment 
banks, one from the SIA with the remainder from other groups, such as Congressmen 
and think tanks. Of all comments, 34 were in favour of the Fed’s proposal, eight were 
against it; in terms of industry, the banking industry comments were typically 
supportive of the proposal, with several asking the Fed to increase the limit to 49% 
instead of 25%. The comments from investment banks were opposed to the SIA 
linking the adoption of the revenue limit increase with a potential failure to achieve 
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 151 
comprehensive financial regulatory reform. For the SIA, “the adoption of the 
proposed increase in the revenue limit to 25% would significantly decrease the 
likelihood that Congress could continue to develop the broad-based consensus 
necessary to enact comprehensive financial services modernisation legislation” (SIA, 
1996). 
Moreover, the SIA was concerned that raising the limit to 25% before a repeal 
of Glass Steagall was signed into law would mean that “banks and bank affiliates will 
have little or no incentive to support a financial services modernisation bill, because 
they would have received by rule much of the relief they would have sought in 
legislation” (ibid). The SIA went on to highlight that securities, insurance and other 
financial services firms would be placed at a competitive disadvantage with respect to 
banks, because many of these firms still would be unable to affiliate with a bank, or 
accept deposits (ibid). 
Finally, the SIA argued that the Fed “lacked the authority” to increase the 
revenue limit to 25% as this would allow banks to acquire “some of the largest and 
most prominent” investment banks since “it is likely that many of these firms – 
particularly in light of their broad and diversified activities – do not derive more than 
25% of their revenues from bank-ineligible securities underwriting and dealing 
activities” (ibid).  In a direct reference to the Fed’s policy of regulatory reform 
through the courts without legislative reform, the SIA stressed that the Fed may 
“disagree with the lines drawn by the Glass-Steagall Act, and may believe that 
perhaps no such lines should have been drawn at all” (ibid). However, “the Board 
cannot redraw those lines on its own authority, only Congress has that power” (ibid).  
Having received all comments, the Fed stated that the interpretation of section 
20 was challenging because of “intrinsically ambiguous language and further inquiry 
into the legislative history is therefore necessary to interpret it” (Federal Reserve, 
1997). The Fed believed that although Glass Steagall was enacted to separate 
investment from commercial banking, “the express language of section 20 clearly 
allows some level of investment banking for bank affiliates” (ibid). The dismissed 
criticism that a review of its section 20 subsidiaries’ revenue limits would negatively 
impact industry and Congress’s efforts to pass a comprehensive reform package for 
financial services regulation. To the contrary, the Fed is “exercising its statutory 
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responsibility to administer section 20 in light of significant changes to the securities 
markets in the years since the Board first analyzed its term” (ibid).  
Consequently, “after considering the comments received, the Board has 
decided to adopt the proposal and amend its section 20 orders to allow up to 25 
percent of total revenue to be earned from underwriting and dealing in bank-ineligible 
securities” (ibid).  
Ultimately, this Federal Reserve decision “gave Congress the final push it 
needed as it allowed pretty much any investment bank to be acquired by a Bank 
Holding Company without the reverse being possible” (MC, 2010). The investment 
banks had finally lost out to the Bank Holding Companies. Gramm Leach Bliley was 
thus brought under way in Congress, not because BHC needed to acquire investment 
banks, but because they wanted to acquire insurance companies (LR, 2011). As one 
senior US government official involved in coordinating the Gramm Leach Bliley Act 
for the Clinton administration put it during an interview 
really most people believed that GLB was shooting a dead horse as the 
exceptions were so large anyhow and the banks were doing it anyhow 
[…] the only institution that really, really wanted that bill was 
Citigroup which needed the bill in order to make the acquisition of 
Travellers legal, but really at the time there was not any other bank 
that really wanted to be in the insurance business (LR, 2011). 
Senator Phil Gramm introduced ‘S.900’ – The Gramm Leach Bliley Act (GLB) on 
April 28
th
, 1999 in the US Senate where it was considered by the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. It passed the Senate on May 6
th
, 1999 and 
passed the House of Representatives as the ‘Financial Services Act of 1999’ on the 1st 
of July. President Clinton signed the Act into law on November 12
th
, 1999. Gramm 
Leach Bliley was the culmination of years of legislative haggling. It broke the 
legislative deadlock and gave US financial institutions greater operational flexibility 
to be active in insurance, banking and securities as one financial services firm. 
Ironically, as the head of a leading New York law firms put it during the interview, 
“by the time the barriers between insurance and banking were taken down, this 
business model was no longer pursued – you had a move away from the one stop 
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 153 
shop” (WM, 2010). This ‘one stop shop’ was meant to provide US customers with 
more choice and better priced products thanks to an increase in market competition. In 
some ways though, the GLB finally provided a legislative basis for the enormous 
regulatory and structural changes that had been the realities on the ground in 
investment banking.  
 
6.5 A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS 
Testing the statutory authority hypothesis, according to former Fed officials “the Fed 
knew exactly what they were doing, they wanted to broaden the revenue limit and the 
type of test for the limit so that Merrill Lynch would satisfy the 25%” (SB, 2010). In 
order to justify increasing the revenue limit, his former colleagues “came up with a 
rather clever analysis” whereby the original 10% revenue limit is appropriate when 
interest rates were higher and equity markets lower so that you could earn more 
eligible income which would in turn put a break on how much business you could 
execute (ibid).  However, once interest rates came down and equity market prices had 
gone up, which they did in the 1990s, “the numbers are at a lack and 10% does not 
allow them to do the same amount of business as they would be allowed to do so they 
moved it up to 25%” (ibid).  
The Fed was now not only interested in BHC being able to re-enter certain 
areas of investment banking activity, this time “the main motivation was just to let 
them in”, i.e. allow BHCs being able to acquire entire investment banks (ibid): “we 
worked on the first deal: Bankers Trust (a BHC) acquiring Alex Brown (an 
investment bank); and we worked on the second one: Bank of America buying Robert 
Stephens – and it was because of the of the Act that this could happen” (ibid). 
Applying the thesis’s conceptual framework, the Fed was ruthlessly pushing 
through its statutory authority – in line with the dissertation’s statutory authority 
hypothesis – in order to undermine, bit by bit, the Glass Steagall Act with the ultimate 
goal of achieving more flexible, freer and thus competitive markets. In providing a 
specifically tailored definition to the term ‘principally engaged’, coupled with raising 
the revenue threshold, the Fed deliberately cracked open the US investment banking 
markets; in the absence of legislative change, the Fed essentially created the 
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 154 
possibility for BHC to extensively participate in US investment banking markets 
through Mergers & Acquisitions, i.e. the revenue threshold of 25% was carefully 
calibrated so that an acquisition of an entire investment bank by a BHC was made 
legal. At the same time, the Fed also used its statutory authority to bring about an ever 
more challenging status quo of financial regulation in the US and entice Congress to 
act. The Fed was guided by Greenspan’s ideology in free, efficient markets. 
Greenspan did not hide his distaste of Glass Steagall when he started as Federal 
Reserve Chairman. He could now finish his mission with the increase of the limit to 
25%, as it would de-facto erase the separating line between Bank Holding Companies 
and investment banks, at least for the former, if not for latter. Applying the role of 
ideas hypothesis, it is clear that Alan Greenspan’s influence on the Fed and his 
ideology were all pervasive at the Fed – right from the start. It is thus fair to argue that 
the Fed used its statutory authority to fulfil Alan Greenspan’s vision. 
The investment banking industry was clearly shocked about the Fed’s move, 
as they did not expect the Fed to raise the revenue limit to a percentage point whereby 
some of Wall Street’s key players could be bought by Bank Holding Companies 
despite Glass Steagall still being in place. The SIA was also extremely irritated that 
the Fed pursued the increase in the revenue limit during the ongoing deliberations in 
Congress with respect to Glass Steagall’s repeal. In the words of one of Washington’s 
most senior attorneys specialised in financial services regulation, “I think the 
investment banks fucked up GLB, but not the way you think” (MC, 2010). There 
were two ways to do Gramm Leach Bliley: first, one could approach financial reform 
as expanding existing banking powers, i.e. the authority and activities that Bank 
Holding Companies could do; or, second, you could repeal the Bank Holding 
Company Act (ibid).  
When it was clear that the repeal of Glass Steagall was becoming a real 
possibility, it could be “one of these two ways: keep the Bank Hold Company Act and 
expand the powers by getting rid of Glass Steagall and the inability to own insurance 
companies or you could say, we are not going to have the BHC Act at all” (ibid). 
The Bank Holding Company Act was “like a fence, but if you were outside it 
– like the investment banks – and you thought about it, you do not want to go in it, 
because you were able to do all kinds of things outside the fence, such as merchant 
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banking, investments etc. etc.” (ibid). Senator D’amato introduced a bill that would 
have repealed the BHC Act “and then there was Leach’s bill, which was a Fed bill, he 
was called ‘Fedo-phile’, he loved the Fed and the Fed loved the BHC Act and Bob 
Rubin became Secretary of the Treasury and the administration could have gone 
either way” (ibid). The investment banking community formed a group to review both 
bills and they “proposed this investment banking holding company and supported 
going down the road of Leach, which we passed as GLB. Guess who made use of the 
Investment Banking Holding Company? Not a single investment bank” (ibid).  
Testing the dissertation’s interest group-based hypotheses through the lens of 
the investment banking community – expert information, provision of information 
and the revolving door –it becomes clear that none of them influenced the regulatory 
decision-making in this case study, i.e. the widening of Bank Holding Companies’ 
access to investment banking. The investment banking community had been very 
vocal about the impact of the Fed’s regulatory decision and provided input during 
consultation periods as well as in the media, but without an impact. Likewise, there 
was no revolving door between the investment banks and the Federal Reserve, at least 
not at the level of the elites.  
In line with the judiciary as a regulator hypothesis, Bank Holding Companies 
benefited from the de-regulatory moves by the Fed, the investment banks had no 
levers to fight back within their own turf since the US courts upheld that the Fed’s 
interpretative amendments of the Glass Steagall Act were within the legislative intent. 
In other words, a regulatory regime that is built on the regulator’s statutory authority 
and confirmed through the courts can only be changed through the legislative.  
 
6.6 CONCLUDING REMARKS ON THE GLASS STEAGALL CASE STUDIES 
The three case studies have traced back the levers and factors that ultimately led to the 
passage of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, Glass Steagall’s repeal. Each of the cases 
focussed on a distinct episode of Glass Steagall’s repeal that was unique and would 
not repeat itself in the following cases: 
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1. The pre-Volcker years case study examined a deregulatory episode by which 
the Fed amended Regulation Y (Supreme Court of the United States, 1971). 
When the ICI took the Fed to court, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant 
would have been able to predict that the US Supreme Court would look at 
their case as setting precedent and thus needing to provide a detailed ruling on 
the legislative intent of Glass Steagall that ultimately kicked off the process of 
the Glass Steagall’s demise. This case study is important as it highlights how 
the judiciary can dramatically alter the meaning and interpretation of laws, so 
much so that it brings about significant regulatory change without any 
legislative change. Here, the US Supreme Court provided two new key pieces 
of information: first, the line separating investment from commercial banking 
is to be found within the Bank Holding Company, namely between the Parent 
Company and its affiliate engaged in investment banking; second, the 
Congress that passed Glass Steagall did not have such an expansive view of 
the separation between investment and commercial banking in mind, but one 
whereby a bank’s affiliate or subsidiary can be active within investment 
banking markets for as long as it is not principally engaged. The thesis’s 
explanatory variables of statutory authority and the ‘judiciary being a 
regulator’ are particular important in understanding this event of de-regulation, 
namely a widening of the legally permissible business activities of Bank 
Holding Companies. 
 
2. The second case on Glass Steagall studied the Fed under the Volcker years. 
Here, the Federal Reserve is best classified as an institution in ideological 
transition with a Chairman that became increasingly uncomfortable with the 
newfound power of regulatory change by virtue of its statutory authority to 
interpret and amend existing laws which are then upheld in the courts. 
Because the Fed was concerned about the low profitability of Bank Holding 
Companies and the lack of competition in the highly profitable investment 
banking markets, the thesis’s explanatory variable of the role of ideas helps 
explain why the Fed felt justified in using its statutory authority to provide a 
definition for the term ‘principally engaged’ which was upheld in the courts, 
became part of the case law and subsequently allowed BHCs to re-enter 
investment banking markets via separate affiliates, as long as these affiliates 
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were not ‘principally engaged’. Volcker, who was initially comfortable with 
this as it helped BHCs to be more profitable (which, in turn, is not the mandate 
of the Fed, but intricately linked with its mandate of banking stability) and 
gave consumers greater choice and better prices, grew more and more 
sceptical over time. He disliked the automatism of the process by which the 
Fed would provide updated interpretations of banking rules that it saw 
compatible with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of Glass Steagall, which 
meant that BHC were becoming more and more entrenched in investment 
banking markets. Towards the latter years of his Chairmanship, Volcker 
became more at odds with the rest of the Federal Reserve Board over this 
issue. He saw it as problematic and costly not to have Congress pass new 
regulation. As the case study showed, the Fed was in ideological transition: as 
an institution, it became more and more subscribed to the efficient market 
hypothesis. Ultimately, Volcker resigned from the Fed: he had grown apart 
and disagreed publicly with the Fed’s decision on commercial paper (States, 
1986). 
 
3. The final case study, the Fed under Greenspan, is a distinct episode in that 
Alan Greenspan took over the sceptre at the Fed and immediately made his 
mark: within weeks, he testified that the Fed would be in favour for Glass 
Steagall’s repeal. It was a declaration of war to the investment banking 
industry. During the same testimony in Congress as Fed Chairman, Greenspan 
not only provided the public essentially with an assessment of the situation 
under the Glass Steagall regulatory regime; he also made a strong case that 
bank holding companies should be allowed to operate in investment banking 
markets, and that any risks could be managed through the deposit insurance 
scheme as well as access to the discount window so that, overall, the public 
benefits would be greater than the risks. The role of ideas – namely those 
associated with the efficient market hypothesis – became a dominating factor 
within the Fed’s internal governance as well as its stance towards regulation. 
This is in line with the thesis’s role of ideas hypothesis. Greenspan made it 
clear from the very beginning of his tenure that he would ‘prefer’ a repeal of 
Glass Steagall, but at the same time implied that he would go down the route 
of using the Fed’s statutory authority to break down Glass Steagall in a 
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piecemeal fashion. Under Greenspan, the Fed took its statutory authority to the 
extreme, and felt reassured that its decisions would be upheld in the courts, 
which they were. Because of the Fed’s ideological consensus that was 
increasingly pro market self-discipline, Greenspan and the Board felt justified 
in pushing their statutory authority with respect to section 20’s interpretation 
to the extreme. Ultimately, the combination of an ideational consensus 
coupled with the authority and the back up of the courts made for a powerful 
cocktail that eventually brought down Glass Steagall and forced Congress to 
react. 
 
Overall, then, the story of the repeal of Glass Steagall is a complex one. It is a story of 
de-regulation, but it is also a story of an epic Wall Street defeat, and as such runs 
counter to conventional wisdom in both media and academia as the literature review 
demonstrated. 
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Chapter 7  
CFMA 2000: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NOT 
REGULATING OTC DERIVATIVES 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The political economy of the Commodity Future Modernisation Act of 2000 (CFMA) 
is fascinating: all key actors in financial regulation, the Clinton Administration, the 
Senate, the House and all US financial regulators, with the initial exception of the 
U.S. Commodities and Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), were in consensus that 
it was necessary to pass a bill that explicitly outlawed the regulation of a wide range 
of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives markets. It was one of the key episodes in US 
financial history where one had a broad policy consensus – driven by the idea that 
markets can regulate themselves – across the political spectrum, government, 
regulators and industry that culminated in the CFMA legislation. The main regulator 
of large segments of OTC derivatives markets, the CFTC, played a near- tragic role 
under Chairwoman Brooksley Born. As a relatively young regulator, founded in 1974, 
it originally focussed on regulating the agricultural and commodity exchanges and 
trades. With the rapid speed of innovation and financialisation of commodity markets 
– especially in the segment of OTC derivatives - the regulatory framework in the US 
for off-exchange transactions could not keep up, which meant that the key actors and 
markets developed offshore and not in the US. The CFTC, even though it had no 
statutory authority to establish a regulatory regime of regulation – or exemption 
thereof – for OTC derivatives, wanted to provide market participants with legal 
certainty so they could develop these innovative markets as well. The Commission 
published a policy statement in 1989 that it would not enforce regulation on certain 
OTC derivatives, such as swaps. However, lacking statutory authority, the judiciary 
ruled an OTC derivatives case in 1990 that interpreted the then existing regulatory 
framework covering OTC derivatives, the Commodity Exchange Act, such that 
forwards would be classified as futures and had to be traded on exchange and not 
OTC, as otherwise they would be deemed illegal and unenforceable instruments. 
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Despite the court ruling, the CFTC issued an ‘interpretative statement’ telling markets 
that though the courts had decided, the regulator would not enforce the court’s 
decision. In response, Congress acted and passed legislation in 1992 that gave the 
CFTC statutory authority to exempt certain OTC derivatives from regulation, which it 
then promptly did. As the OTC derivatives markets continued to develop rapidly both 
in terms of product offering and size, the SEC was confronted with a similar situation 
as the CFTC was in the 1980s, namely that key US investment banks would execute 
trades offshore due to domestic regulation being too burdensome. The SEC proposed 
a ‘Broker Dealer Lite’ regime that allowed well-capitalised US investment banks to 
establish OTC derivative trading subsidiaries in the US that benefited from reduced 
capital and reporting rules. It was this SEC rule proposal that set in motion a chain of 
events at the CFTC that would see its Chairperson go against the rest of the US 
regulatory and legislative community, which was unified by their belief in the 
superiority of self-regulating markets and the innovative powers thereof. The case 
study examines with process tracing the steps and decision points that ultimately led 
to the resignation of Ms. Born and the passage of CFMA. 
 
 
7.2 THE OUTCOME 
Ten days before Christmas Eve 2000, the US House of Representatives passed H.R. 
5660, also known as the Commodity Futures Modernisation Act of 2000 (USA 
Congress 2000); the US Senate followed the day after, and President Clinton signed 
the bill into law on December 21
st , 
2000. CFMA has been the outcome of what is a 
best described as a short, but eventful two years of regulators, legislators, the industry 
and the US Treasury Sectary being at loggerheads not with each other, but 
predominantly with another regulator, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
(CFTC) and its Chair, Ms. Brooksley Born. 
CFMA focussed on the regulation, or non-regulation, of over-the-counter 
(OTC) derivatives and futures in the United States. A derivative, by way of a 
definition, is a financial contract for either the purchase or sale of one or more 
underlying assets (i.e. currencies, commodities, debt capital market products etc.) and 
whose value is derived from the performance of these underlying assets. Common 
financial derivatives instruments are: forwards (i.e. a contract to buy/sell a specified 
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asset at a specified time in the future at a price agreed upon when signing the 
contract), futures (i.e. a more standardised forward contract), options (i.e. a contract 
that gives the buyer the option, but not the obligation to buy or sell a specified asset or 
liability), and swaps (i.e. a contract between two parties whereby both swap the cash 
flows of each other’s financial instruments). An OTC derivative is a financial 
instrument that is not traded through an exchange or a regulated market, but on a 
bilateral basis between two parties and thus off-exchange (hence over the counter).  
The bill’s preamble states that CFMA was introduced to Congress “to 
reauthorise and amend the Commodity Exchange Act to promote legal certainty, 
enhance competition, and reduce systemic risk in markets for futures and over the 
counter derivatives, and for other purposes” (USA Congress 2000). The Act 
established several areas of explicit non-regulation for a range of market 
counterparties and financial instruments: certain derivatives, swaps and commodities 
were thus explicitly not being regulated – it was forbidden by law to do so. With 
respect to these derivative transactions, “nothing in this Act governs or applies to an 
agreement, contract or transaction in an excluded commodity” as long as these 
transactions are between “eligible contract participants at the time” (USA Congress 
2000, p.36). Eligible participants were defined as individuals with more than $5m in 
assets entering into transactions for risk management purposes (USA Congress 2000, 
p.17). Security hybrid instruments were also expressly excluded from regulation: 
“nothing in the Act governs or is applicable to a hybrid instrument that is 
predominantly a security” (USA Congress 2000, p.38). With respect to swap 
transactions,  
no provision of this Act shall apply to or govern any agreement, 
contract, or transaction in a commodity other than an agricultural 
commodity if the agreement, control or transaction is (1) entered into 
only between persons that are eligible contract participants at the 
time they enter into the agreement, contract or transaction; (2) 
subject to individual negotiation by the parties; and (3) not executed 
or traded on a trading facility (ibid).   
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But Congress went further in relation to the non-regulation of swaps – it not only 
excluded swaps from regulation as the above statement reflects, but also forbade the 
SEC from regulating security-based swaps  
the Commission is prohibited from registering, or requiring, 
recommending, or suggesting, the registration under this title of any 
security-based swap agreement […]. The Commission is prohibited 
from (A) promulgating, interpreting, or enforcing rules; or (B) 
issuing orders of general applicability; under this title in a manner 
that imposes or specifies reporting or recordkeeping requirements, 
procedures, or standards as prophylactic measures against fraud, 
manipulation, or insider trading with respect to any security-based 
swap agreement (ibid, p.237) 
In sum, the CFMA excluded all off-exchange Swap transactions between 
sophisticated investors from any regulation, and in doing so provided legal certainty 
that these transactions were in line with US regulation. This intentional act of non-
regulation was approved 292-60 yea to nay votes in the House of Representatives, and 
in the US Senate by ‘unanimous consent’. Weeks before, the White House proclaimed 
that it ‘strongly supported’ the bill, and it was important for it to be enacted this year 
(N.B.: 2000) to “promote innovation, enhance the transparency and efficiency of 
derivative markets, maintain the competitiveness of U.S. businesses and markets, and, 
potentially, reduce systemic risk” otherwise, these markets would go offshore to 
countries with “more updated regulatory regimes” (President William Clinton 2000). 
 
7.3 PROCESS TRACING OF CFMA’S HISTORICAL ROOTS  
7.3.1 The Beginnings 
CFMA 2000 significantly changed the Commodity Exchange Act of 1936 (CEA). The 
CEA, which itself made considerable amendments to the Grain Futures Act of 1922, 
moved the entire US commodity trade onto registered exchanges and required 
commodity traders to register with the authorities. The CEA managed to remove 
barriers to commodity trade between US states, and introduced curbs to what the CEA 
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refers to as ‘excessive speculation’ and ‘excessive trading’ – both long and short – 
with the aim to limit price and market manipulation (US Congress 1936). From then 
onwards, trades had to be recorded and records had to be kept for Federal Inspections. 
A government agency was created within the US Department of Agriculture, the 
Commodity Exchange Authority, which acted as regulator until the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974 established the CFTC as an independent 
federal regulator. In the ‘House Report’ of the US House of Representatives, the Act 
was praised as  
a major legislation strengthening the federal regulation of the 
nation's 400 billion dollar commodity futures trading industry [and..] 
provides the first complete overhaul of the Commodity Exchange 
Act since its inception, and proposes a comprehensive regulatory 
structure to oversee the volatile and esoteric futures trading complex 
(Congress 1974, p.4). 
The newly established CFTC not only took over powers from the US 
Department of Agriculture, but also had the authority to act in market emergencies, a 
fact that the derivatives industry challenged, but the courts upheld. The CFTC had to 
deal with many market emergencies throughout the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. During 
the same period, the CFTC’s regulatory remit had become more complex as a result of 
the industry inventing more and more innovative derivative and future products. For 
example, in 1977, the CFTC approved the first futures contract on long-term U.S. 
government debt, and in 1982, the first option on future contracts. Because of industry 
innovation, the CFTC’s area of jurisdiction started to overlap with that of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The chairs of both commissions became 
active and developed a CFTC/SEC Jurisdictional Accord, also known by the 
chairmen’s names: the ‘Shad-Johnson Accord’. The Accord clarified the respective 
regulatory responsibilities of the CFTC and the SEC: the SEC would regulate options 
on securities (both corporate and municipal), foreign exchange traded on national 
securities exchanges and certificates of deposits; the CFTC would regulate future 
contracts (and option on future contracts), broad-based indices of equities and foreign 
exchange options not traded on national securities exchanges (US Congress 1982). 
Congress integrated this Accord into their legislative process and passed the Futures 
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Trading Act of 1982, signed into law by President Reagan. Besides the CFTC/SEC 
jurisdictional clarification, the Act renewed the CFTC’s mandate, legalised the trading 
of options on agricultural commodities and banned future contracts on single stocks 
and narrow-based equity indices.  
 
7.4 THE SWAP POLICY STATEMENT 
In a much-overlooked statement – both in the media as well as IPE academia alike – 
the CFTC issued a ‘Swap Policy Statement’ in 1989 in which the CFTC wrote that 
“most swap transactions, although possessing elements of futures or options contracts, 
are not appropriately regulated as such under the CEA” (CFTC 1989). Nevertheless, 
the CFTC provided a ‘safe harbour’: it stated that it would not classify certain swap 
agreements as future contracts within the meaning of the CEA, meaning these swaps 
would not be regulated as futures and could thus be traded off exchange, i.e. over the 
counter (ibid). The CFTC did not provide a concise definition of which swap 
agreements would fall under this safe harbour, but stated that these agreements ought 
to be negotiated individually (as opposed to off the shelf products), settled in cash, 
between two parties and based on cash flows “measured by different interest rates, 
exchange rates, or prices, with payments calculated by reference to a principal base” 
(ibid). Moreover, the agreements had to reflect that the specific business activities of 
the contractual parties should only be terminable with counterparty consent and thus 
hold on to maturity and not be marketed to the public. Several issues arose with 
respect to the Statement: firstly, it did not provide clear guidance as towhich parties 
were permitted to enter into swap agreements, such as high net worth individuals (i.e. 
‘sophisticated investors’) or collective investment vehicles that offer share 
participation to the public. Secondly, the CFTC lacked statutory authority to 
determine whether or not certain futures would be exempt from regulation under the 
CEA; thirdly, the statement gave the industry some comfort, but it was open to be 
challenged in the courts. It was thus the CFTC itself that intentionally placed a vast 
amount of swap agreements outside its own and any other regulators’ supervision, and 
it did so despite lacking the statutory authority.  
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A year later, a ruling in a judicial case that had started in 1986 and concluded 
in 1990 showed the limits to the CFTC’s policy statement, and once again highlighted 
the importance of the courts in upholding as well as re-defining financial regulatory 
laws. Bermuda-based Transnor sued British Petroleum (BP), Conoco, Shell and 
Exxon for losses it suffered in the Brent Oil market on the grounds of the CEA’s anti-
manipulation provisions. The defendants argued that the derivatives instruments the 
parties entered into were forwards, and as such not covered by the CEA. The US 
District Court for the Southern District of New York disagreed with the defendants’ 
claim and argued that these specific forwards, but more generally all highly 
standardised forwards, were to be classified as futures (S.D.N.Y. 1990). In response, 
the CFTC issued a ‘Statutory Interpretation Concerning Forward Transactions’ that 
the Brent Oil forwards would fall under the CEA’s forward exclusion and were – 
contrary to the Court’s ruling – not futures (CFTC 1990). The situation was really a 
standoff between the Courts and the CFTC, and one that the CFTC could not win 
given its lack of statutory authority. This court ruling unnerved market participants 
who felt that the US regulatory regime was unable to provide them with legal 
certainty. The choice was thus between having fewer and fewer OTC derivatives 
markets in the US, and regulatory reform through the enactment of new laws. 
Congress became active, and committee hearings began on the ‘The Futures 
Trading Practises Act of 1992’ in early 1991. After much deliberation and changes to 
the original proposal introduced to the House and Senate, the Act was signed into law 
in October 1992. It authorised the CFTC to grant exemptions from regulation for OTC 
derivatives, such as swaps and hybrid instruments, under the CEA in 1992 (US 
Congress 1992). In the words of President Bush Senior, “the bill […] gives the CFTC 
exemptive authority to remove the cloud of legal uncertainty over the financial 
instruments known as swap agreements. This uncertainty has threatened to disrupt the 
huge, global market for these transactions” (President George Bush 1992). 
Interestingly, the bill itself did not define whether a swap agreement is a future 
contract or not, but simply deferred this task to the CFTC via its newfound statutory 
authority. Within months, the CFTC used its authority and published exemptions from 
regulation for certain OTC hybrid and swap agreements. Swaps between eligible swap 
participants (i.e. institutions and sophisticated investors) that were non-standardised 
(i.e. ‘not part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardised as to their 
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material terms'), not traded on a “multilateral transaction execution facility” continued 
to be exempted, and the creditworthiness of the counterparties is a “material 
consideration in entering into or determining the terms of the swap agreement, 
including pricing, cost or credit enhancement terms” (US Congress 1992). Swaps 
meeting these criteria were exempted from being regulated as futures, but not from 
the CFTC’s anti-manipulation and anti-fraud authority. Bizarrely, the CFTC 
emphasised in its Swap Exemption that it wished to enhance legal certainty, but that 
the issuance of the Swap Exemption ought not to be interpreted as a CFTC decision 
that swap agreements are not subject to regulation under the CEA.  
 
7.4.1 A Political Economy Analysis of The Swap Policy Statement 
The Policy Statement is a clear episode of intentional non-regulation for eligible 
swaps. Since there was no public comment period, we do not have official records of 
industry groups commenting on this statement. However, as one interviewee recalls, 
who was the General Counsel to the Securities Industry Association at the time  
the CFTC was concerned that the legal uncertainty would deter 
business from the US offshore and prevent innovation; they had all 
the US commodity exchanges come in and complain to them that 
banks can be in the derivatives business offshore, but they cannot 
profit from it in the US (MP 2010). 
 The author cannot extensively test the Provision of Information Hypothesis or the 
Expert Information Hypothesis, but the information received from elite interviews 
with former CFTC staff does suggest that industry experts were providing the CFTC 
with information on a regular basis. The interviewee confirmed that the industry 
presented the CFTC with data and studies “all the time”, and that the legal uncertainty 
hanging over the industry’s head as to when a swap could be classified as a future that 
had to be traded on exchange “gave them sleepless nights and made them take the 
business to Europe” (ibid). With respect to the Revolving Door Hypothesis, the CFTC 
is probably one of the prime examples, as several CFTC commissioners on the Board 
at the time had spent part of their previous careers in the industry they were 
regulating, such as banks and agricultural commodity traders (such as William E. 
Hans Trees 
SGIA, Durham University 
 168 
Seale, Kalo A. Hineman, Robert R. Davies and others). The CFTC was “not a 
respected agency on the Hill – it had far less budget and staff than the SEC – but US 
Presidents recruited its Commissioner often from strong industry backgrounds, which 
somehow helped overcome the other resources gaps” (ibid). Interestingly the CFTC 
issued its statement knowing that it had no statutory authority to provide a safe 
harbour, but nevertheless, its statement did assuage markets, as it  
removed the legal risk that the CFTC would take enforcement action 
against certain swaps, but it did not remove the legal risk that a swaps 
counterparty might try to have a court invalidate a swap as an illegal, 
off-exchange futures contract (US GAO 1997).   
The subsequent court’s ruling questioned the legality of the CFTC’s swap policy 
statement: because of the absence of the statutory authority, the courts are ultimately 
deciding what is compatible with the legislative intent of the CEA. The CFTC’s 
interpretation statement was a bizarre attempt at calming down the markets and 
providing them with the certainty that the CFTC would not enforce Brent Oil 
forwards as future contracts; however, any party entering into such contracts would 
also have known that the counterparty could question the legality of the instruments 
and would win in court. From a political economy lens, it was a very odd situation: 
the CFTC had to accept the court ruling, but nevertheless issued a statement that it 
decided not to apply it, and this despite not having the statutory authority to make 
such ‘interpretations’ in the first place. Ultimately, anyone could have challenged the 
CFTC on its interpretation, but no one did. The stalemate between the regulator and 
the courts created a situation in which Congress needed to act, and they did so with 
the passing of the Futures Trading Practises Act. 
 
7.5 THE SEC’S MOVE 
President Clinton appointed Ms. Brooksley Born to the CFTC in April 1994, 
and she became Chairperson on August 26
th
 1996. US Congress and President Clinton 
re-authorised the CFTC in 1995 for five years without making any changes to the 
CEA. On December 17
th
, 1997, the SEC published a proposed rule that would amend 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934  
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would tailor capital, margin, and other broker-dealer regulatory 
requirements to a class of registered dealers, called OTC 
derivatives dealers, active in over-the-counter derivatives markets 
[…] intended to allow securities firms to establish dealer affiliates 
that would be able to compete more effectively against banks and 
foreign dealers in global over-the-counter markets (Securities 
Exchange Commission 2007). 
The proposed rule would offer investment banks that are mainly active in privately 
negotiated OTC derivatives transactions an alternative registration regime and avoid a 
registration as an SEC regulated investment bank. The SEC acknowledged that 
because of the regulatory and capital burden involved as being fully registered as an 
SEC regulated investment bank, many investment banks had moved their OTC 
derivatives trading offshore: 
the capital and margin requirements applicable registered broker-
dealers […] impose substantial costs on the operation of an OTC 
derivatives business and make it difficult for U.S. securities firms 
to compete effectively with banks and foreign dealers in OTC 
derivatives markets (ibid).  
US investment banks should thus not be pushed to offshore their business “solely to 
address competitive disadvantages that result from Commission regulation” (ibid). 
The proposed SEC rule gave US investment banks the optionality to benefit from 
“limited” broker-dealer regulation for their OTC derivatives business only. These 
limited regulations included: exemption from certain margin requirements, exemption 
from becoming a member of a Self-Regulatory-Organisation, such as national stock 
exchanges (i.e. the New York Stock Exchange) and an amended net capital rule. 
Under the existing net capital rule requirements, unsecured receivables had to be 
deducted in full when calculating excess net capital, whilst this included interest rate 
derivatives as well as any unrealised gains on swaps. At the same time, investment 
banks were not allowed to offset their OTC derivatives positions if possible (and as 
commercial banks were allowed to) so that, overall, they were forced to hold more 
capital than non-US investment banks or commercial banks that were allowed to use 
VaR models.  
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The SEC thus proposed to allow OTC derivatives dealers to add back any 
trading gains and unsecured receivables from OTC derivatives to their assets and “use 
VaR models to compute their capital charges on proprietary positions instead of 
taking haircuts on them as required under the current rule” (ibid). However, the SEC 
proposed that an OTC derivative dealer had to maintain $100m tentative net capital 
and $20m net capital at all times and operate appropriate internal risk management 
systems.  Echoing many elements that would later be included in the SEC’s 
alternative net capital rule and Consolidated Supervised Entities Programme of 2004, 
the SEC argued for a “flexible approach for determining capital requirements” that 
accounts for the “special nature” of OTC derivatives business and takes account of 
international developments and the Basel Accord (ibid).  
With the proposed rule, the SEC wanted to offer regulatory and financial 
incentives for these investment banks with a regime that was less ‘burdensome’, 
hence in the industry, the proposed rule became known as ‘broker dealer lite’. In its 
release, the Commission emphasised that because of the innovation and creativity in 
OTC derivatives, “some of these products may cross regulatory boundaries” (ibid). 
Whilst investment banks transacting in OTC derivatives in securities which were 
regulated as part of the Securities Exchange Act were already under SEC regulation, 
those investment banks that were only active in non-securities OTC derivatives or 
commercial banks would not fall under any SEC regulation, thereby putting full SEC 
registered OTC derivatives dealers at a competitive disadvantage and driving their 
business offshore: “the proposed rules […] are intended to improve the efficiency and 
competitiveness of U.S. securities firms participating in global OTC derivatives 
markets […] be deregulatory and […] impose fewer costs” (ibid). However, the SEC 
made it clear that it did not want a ‘race to the bottom’ in terms of regulatory capital, 
such that the “regulation as an OTC derivatives dealer would be available only to 
large, well-capitalized firms” (ibid). 
 The SEC received six comment letters: three from industry association (“The 
Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities” of the American Bar Association, the 
Securities Industry Association (“SIA”) and the End-Users of Derivatives Association 
“EUDA”), two from industry participants (Goldman, Sachs and D.E. Shaw) and one 
from a US regulator (the CFTC). The American Bar Association was in support of the 
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rule, but argued London or Zurich were used as off-shore locations because the net 
capital rule “has distorted capital flows by causing OTC derivatives creation to be 
expatriated to countries that have been more flexible” since “the costs of […] net 
capital rule exceed the benefits” (American Bankers Association 1997).  They 
recommended “to exempt entirely from the net capital rule all derivatives dealers that 
do not hold customers' funds or securities” (ibid). The SIA “strongly endorsed” the 
rule, but cautioned that VaR models should also be allowed to calculate credit risk, 
that OTC dealers should not be limited in their non-securities activities and simplify 
the capital and risk management standards (Securities Industry Association 1997).  
EUDA’s feedback was much more cautious, arguing that it would like to 
better understand the split between SEC and CFTC jurisdiction, especially with 
respect to anti-fraud authority, and it recommended that “our members should have an 
opportunity to review and consider the comments submitted to the SEC by the CFTC 
on matters affecting the CFTC's jurisdiction over ‘non-securities’ OTC derivatives” 
(End‐Users of Derivatives Association 1997). Goldman Sachs “enthusiastically 
supports the initiative taken by the Commission in proposing rules that would permit 
registration of an OTC derivatives dealer”, endorsed the comments from the SIA and 
“does not believe that the Commission’s proposals encroach in any way on CFTC 
jurisdiction, as the CFTC and others have suggested in comment letters to the 
Commission” (Goldman Sachs 1997). The hedge fund DE Shaw was supportive of the 
initiative, but very critical of some of the proposed rule’s details and stressed that 
$100m tentative net capital was too much and would not address the anti-competitive 
nature of the current regime (D.E. Shaw 1997). 
 The CFTC commented as well. It stated that the SEC proposal “extends 
beyond the SEC's authority to regulate securities” which spans only “a small 
percentage of the overall volume of the OTC derivatives market - approximately 1.4% 
of the notional value of total derivatives contracts outstanding in early 1995 are 
subject to SEC authority” (CFTC 1997). Despite this, the “SEC's proposal would 
attempt to regulate the large number of OTC derivatives transactions beyond its 
jurisdiction, many of which are subject to the exclusive statutory authority of the 
CFTC”. As a result, it would cause a “specter of future regulatory inconsistency”, 
various conflicts with the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and create gaps as well as 
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inconsistencies in the proposed treatment of OTC derivatives dealers - “both as 
currently set forth and as modified in the future in response to developments in the 
rapidly changing OTC market”  (ibid).  
The letter went on to accuse the SEC that its proposed rule would “ignore the 
applicability of the CEA” and create an additional layer of regulation so that “market 
participants could be in full compliance with SEC regulations but in violation of the 
CEA and CFTC regulations, or vice versa” (ibid.). In this context, the letter 
highlighted that the SEC’s proposal definitions might be in congruence with the then 
current CFTC regulation and exemptions, but because the CFTC “has both the power 
and the statutory obligation to update its regulations in light of market developments” 
this could cause legal uncertainty going forward. The letter gave specific examples of 
where the SEC’s proposal conflicted directly with the CEA, such as the SEC’s 
definition of eligible OTC derivative instruments which would be similar, but not the 
same as the CFTC's. Consequently, transactions permissible under SEC's proposed 
rules would not be exempted under CFTC provisions, and these “transactions entered 
into in reliance on the SEC's standards for OTC derivatives dealers might be illegal if 
not within an exemption from the CEA” (ibid). The CFTC letter stressed throughout 
that “the CFTC has the statutory mandate to oversee the markets for instruments 
designed primarily to shift risk among parties” and that “Congress recognized and 
reaffirmed this point in 1992 when it granted the CFTC authority to exempt certain 
instruments, including OTC derivatives” (ibid). It concluded by urging the SEC to 
limit this regulatory initiative and to work jointly with the CFTC “to craft a 
coordinated and comprehensive approach to the OTC market that avoids duplicative, 
inconsistent regulation” (ibid). The CFTC also disclosed in its letter for the first time 
that it was already in the process of developing a reform agenda for OTC derivatives 
regulation (or exemption thereof) given the significant growth and innovation in this 
segment. To this end, it would issue a “concept release” shortly and conduct a public 
consultation to gather the views from “across the spectrum” of people from the 
industry as well as regulators who would have “ample opportunity to provide input” 
(ibid). In a further criticism of the SEC, any regulatory reforms that were to be 
proposed would consider the views of all parties involved, including other regulators 
so as to avoid conflicts and overlaps. Any reform would “seek to ensure the continued 
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growth and innovation in the OTC derivatives market as well as to protect customer 
interests and market integrity” (ibid). 
 The SEC was not surprised that the CFTC would seek to defend its turf, but 
“we thought that the wording of its comment letter was somewhat terse and 
defensive” (NA 2010). From interviews with key decision-makers at the SEC, it is 
clear that the SEC was especially taken aback by the CFTC’s announcement that 
would issue a concept release: “for nearly four years, Ms. Born and the CFTC neither 
gave an indication nor reached out to us that it was contemplating regulatory reform 
of the OTC derivatives markets; it was as if our proposed rule was a wake-up call for 
them” (CR 2010). The SEC’s OTC Derivatives Dealers proposal was driven by the 
fact “that you no longer had a level playing field: our investment banks had stricter 
capital requirements than US commercial banks and the European and Japanese 
ibanks”, as a result of which “our guys just took their business offshore”. Moreover, 
“we disliked not knowing what our investment banks were up to in derivatives, 
because it was done from abroad”. According to the interviewees, “we believed that 
our capital regime was becoming outdated, you know, others could use VaR models, 
our guys could not” and the “pendulum that was swinging towards greater market 
self-regulation, the idea that sophisticated investors would be able to look after 
themselves and use state of the art risk management techniques” (ibid). The SEC was 
thus driven by levelling the playing field, a belief that this market was highly 
innovative with transactions between sophisticated investors, and not regulatory turf 
wars: “of course we expected the CFTC to get irritated somewhat, but we very careful 
to tailor our proposal to derivatives of securities only” (ibid). 
 
7.5.1 A Political Economy Analysis of the SEC’s Derivatives Dealers Rule 
The SEC’s proposed and enacted Derivatives Dealers Rule is a further case of 
deliberate de-regulation. US investment banks had become important players in the 
OTC derivatives markets, but chose to execute their trades offshore because of the 
regulatory burden associated with the SEC broker dealer regulation. As the comments 
during the public consultation process highlight, investment banks and their industry 
association group, the SIA, were ‘enthusiastic’ about the SEC’s proposal and strongly 
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supported it. The proposed rule addressed highly complex subject matter that had to 
account for the SEC’s regulatory regime, the CFTC’s regulatory regime and the 
unfolding Basel Accords. The commentators thus provided very detailed feedback, as 
can be seen, for example, by the SIA’s letter, that was of tremendous importance to 
the SEC. The industry and its legal counsels were often in a situation where they 
could draw from business experience, such as operating OTC derivatives trading 
operations in Europe, which the SEC did not have, but which was intended to support 
the SEC in adapting its rules to the realities on the ground. As such, we can test both 
the Expert Information Hypothesis and the Provision of Information Hypothesis 
positively, and conclude that the provision of this privileged information to the SEC 
from interest groups was vital for the process.  
The role of ideas hypothesis can also be tested and confirmed. The SEC 
emphasised in its proposed rule, as did the senior SEC officials during the interview, 
that they did not simply want to ‘lure’ investment banks’ OTC business back to the 
US. Rather,  they believed that the use of VaR models was ‘state of the art’ risk 
management, and they also believed that the ‘well capitalised’ investment banks were 
sophisticated enough, by virtue of self as well as market discipline, to be allowed to 
operate OTC derivatives trading in the US within a regulatory regime that was less 
burdensome administratively, but also from a net capital perspective.  
With respect to the statutory authority and the mandate of the SEC, this 
episode of de-regulation is particularly interesting, as it involves a potential clash of 
two regulators, both of which had statutory authority over OTC derivatives market 
segments that were in theory clearly defined, but in practice subject to increasing 
interpretation as markets became ever more innovative. The SEC’s establishment of a 
Derivatives Dealers Regime, also known as ‘Broker Lite’, was thus strongly rebutted 
by the CFTC whose comment letter argued that the SEC’s proposed rules would cause 
confusion and legal uncertainty. The revolving door hypothesis is not testable on this 
particular case, as the elites involved did not switch industries. 
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7.6 THE CONCEPT RELEASE 
In the months between the SEC’s publication of its proposed rule for OTC Derivatives 
Dealers in December 1997 and the publication of the CFTC’s concept release on May 
7
th
, 1998, the CFTC was finalising the draft of its concept release. Prior to the release, 
Chairperson Born presented some key aspects of the release at the National Futures 
Association annual conference in Florida in March 1998 (Brooksley Born 1998). The 
vast majority of industry feedback during that conference was negative, with one 
investment banker calling the concept release a ‘death knell’ to the swaps market 
(Lucchetti A.  Schroeder 1998).  At the same time, back in Washington, key decision-
makers started to get worried about the timing and process of the Concept Release. 
Senator Richard Lugar, then Chairman of the US Senate Committee on Agriculture, 
Nutrition and Forestry – the Senate Committee holding the CFTC to account –, wrote 
a letter to Born asking her to hold off on publishing the concept release and instead to 
carefully examine the OTC derivatives markets jointly within the framework of the 
President Working Group (AN 2011). Born refused.  
Born behaved similarly at one of the US’s most high profile and powerful 
working groups – the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (PWG). 
President Reagan established the PWG in 1988 to identify and review any major 
issues in financial markets and provide recommendations thereof, with the aim of 
“enhancing the integrity, efficiency, orderliness and competitiveness of US financial 
markets” (President Ronald Reagan 1988). The PWG consisted of the Secretary of the 
Treasury, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the 
Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, or his designee and the 
Chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, or her designee.  
Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, his deputy Larry Summers, Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the SEC Arthur Levitt and Chair of the 
CFTC Brooksley Born attended the PWG meeting on April 21
st
, 1998 to discuss the 
topic of OTC derivatives regulation. According to the notes, the CFTC was preparing 
a concept release to seek clarification as to how to avoid OTC derivatives markets 
from destabilising and how better to monitor them. Born argued that she sought 
comments from the public and the industry alike that the concept release “does not in 
any way alter the current status of any instrument or transaction” (Meeting Notes 
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1998). Rubin warned Born that he received industry feedback, and that the financial 
community was “petrified” about the potential ramifications of defining swaps as 
futures and as such requiring them to be on-exchange traded. It would “raise 
uncertainty over trillions of dollars of transactions” and could render them 
unenforceable and illegal, thereby introducing the possibility of litigation. Greenspan 
stressed that “regulation should enhance the development of financial innovation 
[and] OTC derivatives made an important contribution” which regulation might 
suppress. Rubin, Levitt, Greenspan and Summers urged Born and the CFTC to think 
about “airing this issue differently” and to think whether there is a “better way to 
proceed” (ibid).  
 Despite these unanimous pleads, Born went ahead and the CFTC published the 
‘Concept Release’ on May 7th, 1998 stating that the CFTC had been “engaged in a 
comprehensive regulatory reform effort designed to update the agency's oversight of 
both exchange and off exchange markets” which includes “re-examining its approach 
to the OTC derivatives market” (CFTC 1998). The CFTC explained the need for its 
release with the dramatic growth in trading volumes as well as product varieties in 
OTC markets that started to attract customers of various level of sophistication. The 
CFTC sought to gain relevant data from the public’s comments that would help it 
determine whether “its current regulatory approach continues to be appropriate or 
requires modification” whilst maintaining “adequate safeguards without impairing the 
ability of the OTC derivatives market to continue to grow and the ability of U.S. 
entities to remain competitive in the global financial marketplace”. In part because of 
the strong reaction Born received during the April 21
st
 PWG meeting, the CFTC went 
out of its way to emphasise that it had “no preconceived result in mind”, that it would 
be “open” to data supporting more regulation as well as less, and that any potential 
new regulation would only be applied prospectively and after seeking additional 
comments (ibid). Any changes would “be carefully designed to avoid unduly 
burdensome or duplicative regulation that might adversely affect the continued 
vitality of the market” (ibid).   
 On the issue of the 1993 CFTC swap exemption, the concept release 
highlighted that this exemption was in part based on the fact that the OTC derivatives 
market were dominated by large and sophisticated investors, and trades were 
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decentralised and off-exchange, and thus did not provide any price functions. 
However, within the last five years, swap OTC derivatives markets recorded 
“explosive growth” with new end-users, products (some of which were more 
standardised) and proposals to establish centralised clearing platforms. In addition, the 
number of losses and their size had grown, even among sophisticated investors, so 
much so that “market losses by end-users may lead to allegations of fraud or 
misrepresentation after they enter transactions they do not fully understand” (ibid). 
The CFTC’s sought comments to questions it asked the public in relation to the Swap 
exemption. For example, the CFTC asked in what ways the swap markets had 
changed  
with reference to the nature of the products, participants, location of 
transactions, business structure of participants, nature of 
counterparty relationships, mechanics of execution, methods for 
securing obligations and the impact of the current regulatory 
structure on any of the foregoing (ibid).  
Other questions focussed on whether the definition of eligible trading participants for 
swap transaction should change, whether any clearing functions for swaps already 
exist, whether any capital requirements were needed for OTC derivatives dealers, 
whether all dealers should be required to register with the CFTC etc. The CFTC 
included 75 questions in its comment list, the majority of which addressed 
fundamental issues rather than specific details. This caused considerable concern in 
the industry which feared that the CFTC – against all statements to the contrary - 
planned a major overhaul of the swaps market regulation.  
 The concept release also included a dissenting remark from CFTC 
commissioner Barbara Pedersen Holum, which stated that “it appears that the 
dramatic growth in volume and the products offered in the OTC derivatives market 
may be attributed in part to the Commission's past exemptive action” (ibid). Whilst 
she argues that it is “appropriate” for the CFTC to examine the continued applicability 
of the exemptions, “the release goes beyond the scope of regulatory review by 
exploring regulatory areas that may be inapplicable to an OTC market” (ibid). 
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7.6.1 The Reaction 
In what must have been an unprecedented move, the US Treasury Secretary Robert 
Rubin, Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan and SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt issued a joint 
statement on the same day of the Concept Release. They expressed their  
grave concerns about this action [the Concept Release] and its 
possible consequences”, “seriously question the scope of the CFTC's 
jurisdiction in this area and [..] are very concerned about reports that 
the CFTC's action may increase the legal uncertainty concerning 
certain types of OTC derivatives (US Treasury Secretary Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve  Chairman of the SEC 1998).  
Rubin, Greenspan and Levitt agreed that the concept release raises “important 
public policy issues”, however these “should be dealt with by the entire regulatory 
community working with Congress” (ibid). In a final blow to the CFTC, they state 
that they “are prepared to pursue, as appropriate, legislation that would provide 
greater certainty concerning the legal status of OTC derivatives” (ibid).  
 From then onwards, events snowballed. On June 5
th
, the US Treasury, the Fed 
and the SEC issued a joint, temporary legislative request to Congress that the PWG 
should conduct an in-depth study of the OTC derivatives market, and that, “prior to 
the enactment of legislation authorizing appropriations for the CFTC for any year 
after the year 2000, the CFTC shall not propose or promulgate any rule, regulation or 
order, or issue any interpretative or policy statement, that restricts or regulates activity 
in any hybrid instrument or swap agreement” (US Treasury Secretary Chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Chairman of the SEC 1998).  On June 10
th
, Born testified in front of 
the US House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, Subcommittee on Risk 
Management and Speciality Crops. It was her first testimony on this topic (Born 
testified in front of the US Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry 
on May 14
th
, but this was in relation to the CFTC’s readiness for the “Year 2000” IT 
issues) in Congress since the publication of the Concept Release. It was a very 
combative testimony during which Born dismissed the release critics’ arguments one 
by one. She asserted that many concerns about the release either “reflect a lack of 
understanding as to the nature and purpose of the release or a desire to avoid 
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government oversight” (Born 1998). She dismissed the issue of legal certainty, 
claiming that “the Commission does not believe that this robust, multi-trillion dollar 
market is so fragile that mere governmental examination of it will cause dislocation, 
[…] the market will benefit from assuring that government regulations do not ignore 
developments and innovations in the marketplace” and that “the Commission has thus 
sought to ensure that the Concept Release will not jeopardize the legal status or 
enforceability of any OTC derivative contract” (ibid). She defended the CFTC’s 
statutory authority to review the regulation of OTC derivatives markets and stated 
bluntly that the claim that the CFTC lacked jurisdiction with respect to OTC 
derivative instruments was incorrect. The CFTC had “decades of expertise” in dealing 
with OTC derivatives, and she pointed to various pieces of legislation where Congress 
approved and acknowledged the CFTC’s jurisdiction (ibid). Given the sensitivities 
surrounding the Concept Release and the joint statement made by the Treasury, Fed 
and SEC, Born’s testimony – even if it were factually correct – reflected an openly 
aggressive stance that was not well received in Washington’s political circles. 
On June 16
th
, 1998, Republican member of the House of Representatives Jim 
Leach introduced a bill “to provide for the study of derivatives regulation, and for 
other purposes that may also be cited as ‘Financial Derivatives Supervisory 
Improvement Act of 1998’” (Jim Leach 1998). The bill called for the establishment of 
a working group on financial derivatives, made up of the Secretary of the Treasury, 
the Federal Reserve Chairman, the Chairman of the SEC and CFTC, the Comptroller 
of the Currency, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Chairperson of 
the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the President 
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The working group should examine 
derivatives market regulation from the perspective of all potential market participants 
– i.e. bank holding companies, investment banks and foreign banks – and present its 
findings in two reports. The bill wished to enhance legal certainty, and called for a 
moratorium imposed on the CFTC which “may not, without the approval of the 
Secretary of the Treasury propose or promulgate any rule, regulation, or order, or 
issue any interpretive or policy statement, that restricts or regulates activity in a 
hybrid instrument or swap agreement” (ibid). The introduction of this Bill reflected 
two things: firstly, a significant loss of trust by lawmakers in the abilities of the 
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CFTC, and secondly, the level of panic in the financial industry about the legal 
uncertainty in relation to swaps.  
 On June 18
th
, the CFTC extended the end of the comment period for its 
concept release from July 13
th
 to September 11
th
. On July 17
th
, the House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Banking and Financial Services held the first of two 
hearings concerning OTC Derivatives Market. During the first hearing, the 
Committee invited industry representatives and academics to testify. Most were 
overwhelmingly negative and concerned about the CFTC’s Concept Release. Mark 
Brickell from JPMorgan stated that they were greatly concerned about “persistent and 
potentially harmful legal uncertainties surrounding the status of swaps transactions 
under the Commodity Exchange Act”, and believed that swaps by default “cannot fit 
within the regulatory framework defined by the CEA”, and if they were, “would 
instantly call into question the enforceability of thousands of swap transactions and 
undermine billions of dollars of transactions at American banks, brokers, and 
corporations” (JP Morgan 1998). Dennis Oakley of Chase Manhattan Bank – then the 
bank with the largest derivatives portfolio worldwide – stated bluntly that “if legal 
uncertainty posed by CFTC assertions of jurisdiction is not removed, Chase will be 
forced to move this business to another location, probably London, where we don't 
have the specter of legal jeopardy that has been raised by the CFTC” (Chase 
Manhattan Bank 1998). The eminent Professor of financial regulation, John Coffee, 
testified that if Congress did nothing, the “OTC derivatives business will continue to 
flee the United States and migrate to London” despite the SEC “broker/dealer lite” 
proposal; but if the CFTC did retract the swap exemptions, “then the adverse 
consequences would become far more serious” (John Coffee 1998). Unsurprisingly, 
representatives from the commodity exchanges, such as the Chicago Board of Trade, 
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange and the New York Mercantile Exchange defended 
the CFTC against some of the criticisms, such as the claim that the concept release 
alone would cause legal uncertainty, whilst simultaneously stating that the system of 
non-regulation of swaps should be kept in place, but be moved on to registered 
exchanges, which would obviously benefit them significantly rather than allowing 
large parts of the markets to be off exchange.  
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 A week later, a second hearing took place in front of the House Committee, 
during which mainly regulators testified. One of the most fascinating and 
intellectually stimulating testimonies was by Alan Greenspan. He started by “taking a 
step back from these issues of immediate concern to address the fundamental 
underlying issue, that is, whether it is appropriate to apply the Commodity Exchange 
Act (CEA) to over-the-counter derivatives (and, indeed, to financial derivatives 
generally) in order to achieve the CEA’s objectives – deterring market manipulation 
and protecting investors” (Greenspan 1998). He argued that markets of financial 
instruments and their derivatives are deep, with essentially unlimited supply and thus 
hard to manipulate. This would be contrary to markets in derivatives based on 
commodities whose supply is finite and often defined by seasons. As a result of these 
two very different markets, “the type of regulation that is applied to crop futures 
appears wholly out of place and inappropriate for financial futures, whether traded on 
organized exchanges or over-the-counter, and accordingly, the Federal Reserve Board 
sees no need for it”. He essentially dismissed that the CEA was relevant to OTC 
derivatives, and stressed that not regulating these markets as privately negotiated OTC 
contracts between professional counterparties demonstrated that they could protect 
themselves and manage their risks. Whilst he has  
no doubt derivatives losses will mushroom at the next significant 
downturn as will losses on holdings of other risk assets, both on and 
off exchange […], I see no reason to question the underlying stability 
of the OTC markets, or the overall effectiveness of private market 
discipline, or the prudential supervision of the derivatives activities of 
banks and other regulated participants (ibid).  
Richard Lindsey, the SEC’s Director of the Division of Market Regulation, 
testified that the SEC was concerned with a potential increase in the legal uncertainty 
concerning swaps and its impact on markets (SEC 1998). The SEC believed that the 
CFTC change of the current swap exemption could curb innovation and push further 
business offshore. For him and the Commission, swaps were not futures, and they had 
“serious doubts as to the CFTC’s authority to regulate OTC markets” since “Congress 
gave the CFTC broad exemptive, not regulatory, authority regarding OTC swap 
transactions […] without making any determination regarding the status of swaps and 
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other OTC derivative instruments under the CEA” (ibid). The SEC argued that any 
legislation should be jointly coordinated with the President’s Working Group (PWG) 
as the forum.  
 Ms. Born’s testimony raised significant concerns with the House Bill from 
Representative Leach: it would prevent the Commission from taking action in OTC 
markets, or other emergencies arising in that portion of the OTC derivatives market 
within its statutory authority, would forbid the Commission from enforcing its 
existing laws and regulations relating to certain transactions in that market, and would 
bar the Commission from addressing new developments in that market” (Brooksley 
Born 1998). She argued that the Concept Release had not created any market 
emergency and that the CFTC had been engaged in “comprehensive regulatory reform 
effort designed to update, to modernize and to streamline its regulations and to 
eliminate undue regulatory burdens” (ibid). Ms. Born’s testimony was in large part a 
repeat of her earlier testimony from June 10
th
, which was perceived as defensive as 
well as dismissive of the views voiced by the CFTC’s critics.  
On the same day and in contrast (or contradiction) to her testimony, Born 
conceded and told the Chairman of the House Agriculture Committee, Robert Smith, 
in a letter that the CFTC would not issue any new rules for over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives until Congress had the opportunity to review this market and its regulation 
during the CFTC’s re-authorisation process in 1999. Chairman Smith thanked Born 
for “her leadership" and the CFTC for acting “responsibly” in delaying the review, as 
Congress had not determined whether swaps were futures contracts, so this 
“controversy could be put to bed” (Robert Smith 1998).  
  Six days later, on July 30
th
, Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence Summers, 
Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan, SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt and CFTC Chair 
Brooksley Born testified in front of the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, 
and Forestry on the subject of the regulation of OTC derivative markets. Levitt, in line 
with the SEC’s earlier statements and testimonies, argued that the CFTC’s concept 
release introduced the possibility of a comprehensive regulatory overhaul of the 
current swap and hybrids exemptions, and marked a “significant departure from the 
careful approach taken by the SEC and other regulators” (Arthur Levitt 1998). Such 
an overhaul might increase legal uncertainty, and if the CFTC concluded that swaps 
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were futures under the CEA, it would destabilise the OTC derivatives market. Levitt 
said that no “convincing argument” had been made as to why the CFTC had to 
consider such a “vast, new scheme to regulate this market”, which he as well as most 
of the industry looked upon with “grave concern” (ibid). He went on to stress that 
Congress “did not intend for the CFTC to use its exemptive powers to establish a new 
regulatory regime for the OTC derivatives market” (ibid). Levitt welcomed Born’s 
letter to hold off on any regulatory action, but believed it should have remedied any 
legal uncertainties caused by the concept release by explicitly stating that most swaps 
are not futures. Greenspan largely repeated in his testimony what he said in front of 
the House. Lawrence Summer gave the most critical testimony: whilst the concept 
release raised legitimate questions that merited study, it had cast a shadow of legal 
uncertainty over the OTC markets despite the fact that it was unclear whether the 
CFTC actually had broad jurisdictions over these markets. (Lawrence Summers 
1998). According to Summers, there had been “implicit consensus” that OTC 
derivatives markets should be left to grow based on the assumption that swaps were 
not subject to the CEA. For him, the concept release “upset” this “fragile consensus”: 
the vast amount of fundamental questions the release asked implied the possibility 
that CFTC was considering a deep regulatory reform that could define swaps as 
futures. Summers stressed that the Treasury’s concerns were not simply a “Wall 
Street” concern, but would affect corporates’ ability to use swaps for risk management 
purposes, meaning had already started shifting business offshore. He, too, welcomed 
Born’s letter, but with reference to the joined Fed, US Treasury and SEC request for 
legislation, criticised that the letter did not raise the topic of conducting a coordinated 
study of OTC derivative markets.  
 Born continued her defence: she started her testimony criticising the Treasury 
proposal that, if adopted, would “harm important public interests” since it would 
“retroactively legalise certain OTC futures contracts that have been forbidden by law 
since 1982”, even though the concept release had not caused any emergency 
(Brooksley Born 1998). Moreover, the Treasury proposal would essentially prevent 
and forbid the CFTC from enforcing regulations, “raise more legal questions than it 
resolves” and “create significant regulatory gaps by tying the Commission's hands in 
addressing emergencies and wrongdoing in the market” (ibid). 
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In what can only be retrospectively described as an error of judgement, Born 
argued that by having the PWG, instead of the CFTC, undertake a study of OTC 
derivatives market regulation, it would not only impair the CFTC’s exercise of its 
statutory duty, but also transfer this duty to “an ad hoc coordinating body with no 
budget, no staff and little expertise in derivatives market regulation” – she was 
referring to none other than the US Treasury Secretary, the Chairman of the SEC and, 
at the time, Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Fed. Born argued that Alan 
Greenspan’s testimony in front of the House Committee on Banking and Financial 
Services from July 24
th
, in which he argued that derivatives should not be regulated 
by the CEA, was “incorrect and overly narrow, and ignores that the Act and the 
regulations issued thereunder have been repeatedly amended over the years to address 
the regulatory issues raised by the tremendous growth in financial derivatives” (ibid). 
Born emphasised that the arguments that the CFTC lacked jurisdiction over futures 
and options were incorrect, and that it was absolutely within the CFTC’s statutory 
duty to issue the concept release and, if necessary, amend the swaps exemption. 
 On September 11
th
, 1998, the CFTC extended the comment period for a 
second time until October 13
th
. Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”) – the 
infamous hedge fund whose founders included two Nobel laureates (Myron Scholes 
and Robert Merton) – collapsed on September 23rd, 1998 as a result of huge losses on 
its derivatives positions. Because of the systemically important nature of LTCM’s 
position within the derivatives market, the Fed oversaw a $3.6bn dollar bailout paid 
for by private sector banks. Born testified on the issue of the LTCM collapse before 
the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry in October 1998, and 
said that “the LTCM episode raises a number of important regulatory questions 
relating to hedge funds and to the OTC derivatives market – most of these questions 
are raised by the Commission in its Concept Release on OTC Derivatives” (Brooksley 
Born 1998).  
However, despite LTCM’s collapse, public opinion on derivatives market 
regulation did not change. Ms. Born resigned on January 19
th
, 1999, by announcing 
her intention not to seek reappointment to a second term at the end of her term in 
April (Brooksley Born 1999). It seemed that the private and public lobbying efforts 
against Ms. Borne from the highest echelons of the Federal Reserve, the US Treasury 
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and the SEC paid off. Mr. William J. Rainer replaced Born as Chair of the CFTC. In 
November 1999, the PWG issued its joint report on the ‘Over-the-Counter Derivatives 
Markets and the Commodity Exchange Act’, in which it concluded that “under many 
circumstances, the trading of financial derivatives by eligible swap participants should 
be excluded from the CEA” and to  
remove legal impediments to the development of electronic trading 
systems, which have the potential to increase market liquidity and 
transparency, and appropriately regulated clearing systems, which 
can reduce systemic risk by allowing for the mutualization of risks 
among market participants and by facilitating offset and netting of 
contractual obligations” (President's Working Group 1999). 
Both these recommendations were in stark contrast to what the CFTC had argued for 
under Born. They remained in place and became part of the CFMA 2000 Act. 
 
7.7 CONCLUSIONS 
The history and political economy of CFMA 2000 provides a rich tapestry for testing 
the thesis’s hypothesis. As the process tracing exercise has shown, the financial 
industry provided detailed financial market insights and legal feedback to proposed 
rules by both the CFTC and SEC, and had kept the regulators informed on an on-
going basis. Given the speed and complexity with which OTC derivatives market had 
been developing, both regulators relied heavily on the provision of expert information. 
This is clearly in line with the expert information hypothesis and the provision of 
information hypothesis. Both the CFTC and the SEC would have struggled to fully 
understand the dynamics of OTC derivatives markets, as these were off-exchange and 
in large part outside their geographic area of jurisdiction. The OTC derivatives 
industry was clearly able to influence both the CFTC and SEC, and was able to make 
a strong case that legal certainty was needed in terms of the CFTC continuing to 
exempt OTC derivatives markets from regulation. They made a convincing case that 
the exemption was crucial in keeping markets onshore, ensuring the market’s 
innovative powers and making them grow. Not a single statement from the CFTC or 
the SEC – including the concept release – doubts the importance, the growth potential 
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and power of innovation of OTC derivatives markets. As such, the industry could 
effectively lobby for its view of the world and can actually take credit for having been 
able to influence policy outcomes, such as the CFMA, but also the CFTC 
‘interpretative statement’ from 1990.  
With respect to the revolving door hypothesis, US Presidents had typically 
recruited CFTC commissioners who had deep industry knowledge, which clearly 
helped the regulator to better grasp these markets and their developments. However, 
there has been little by way of a revolving door of market actors – not lawyers – 
between the SEC and its regulated entities. If anything, the expert information 
hypothesis and provision of information hypothesis show that there were clear gaps in 
the technical and market knowledge at the CFTC and the SEC, which would not have 
been the case if these regulators had derivatives traders within their organisation. It is 
hard to ascertain the degree to which the revolving door between the industry and the 
CFTC helped in bringing about CFMA since the entire regulatory policy community, 
the Clinton Administration and Congress were aligned in not regulating OTC 
derivatives.  
When testing the statutory authority hypothesis, three key learnings come out: 
first, absent statutory authority – as was the case for the CFTC in the area of swaps 
exemption prior to the enactment of the Futures Trading Practises Act in 1992 – 
regulators have no room to manoeuvre whenever the judiciary is being involved. They 
can issue statements and interpretation, but they expose themselves to being 
successfully challenged in the courts as they act outside their statutory boundaries. 
This happened to the CFTC and Congress had to step in and act. The Glass Steagall 
case studies showed that the judiciary can determine the boundaries of regulators’ 
statutory authority and can provide interpretations of legislative acts; however, the 
CFTC case showed that regulators will not be effective in their decision-making if 
they are acting outside their statutory authority whilst having cases being ruled upon 
by the judiciary. Secondly, if certain market segments could be regulated by two 
different regulators, both of which have statutory authority, regulation will only be 
effective and accepted by market participants if both regulators jointly develop a 
regulatory road-map and coordinate their rules. The Shad-Johnson Accord is a 
positive example of this; the SEC OTC Derivatives Dealers is a negative one that 
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caused enormous friction and legal uncertainty, as it was not coordinated with the 
CFTC. Third, regulators who do have statutory authority over certain issue areas and 
financial communities will fail to act upon it if the broader policy consensus of the 
industry, legislators and regulators is opposed to its actions. The CFTC was within its 
statutory rights to issue the Concept Release and actually amend the rules governing 
OTC derivatives markets. The CFTC could have abolished the swaps exemption, as it 
had the statutory authority to do so, and this would have most likely also stood up in 
the courts, which speaks in favour of the judiciary as a regulator hypothesis. However, 
testing the role of ideas hypothesis, the consensus not to regulate OTC derivatives was 
so widespread and deeply anchored among all key decision-makers in Washington as 
well as market participants that ultimately the CFTC lost the trust and confidence, 
ending up with having the power to act, but unwilling to do so in practice.  
The CFTC is a particularly interesting case, as the regulator moved from not 
having the statutory authority to act, but being backed up by an ideational consensus 
shared amongst Congress and market participants alike (i.e. exempting OTC 
derivatives from regulation), to having the statutory authority to act, but being outside 
the predominant ideational consensus. In the former, the CFTC was keen to act, but 
could not, whilst in the latter it was authorised to act, but would not. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE SEC’S CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITIES 
PROGRAMME  
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
The SEC’s alternative net capital rule, which the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised 
Entities Programme (CSE) established, has been widely blamed for allowing 
investment banks to leverage themselves above 12:1 leverage ratios and is said – as 
the literature review has shown – to be driven by Wall Street. This case study shows 
that these claims could not be further from the truth. It traces the origins of why the 
SEC established the consolidated supervised entities (CSE) programme back to the 
European process of ever-closer political and economic integration and the European 
Commission’s Financial Service Action Plan (FSAP). Instead of Wall Street, 
European politicians and policymakers set out to build a single integrated capital 
market in the EU that would require financial conglomerates wanting to be active in 
the EU to be subject to consolidated supervision, irrespective of where their home 
regulator is based. Subsequently, third-country supervisory regime for financial 
conglomerates needed to pass an equivalence test in the EU, or else their 
conglomerates had to establish separately capitalised and institutionalised holding 
companies within the EU. Because of this legal requirement, the SEC was forced to 
react, and developed the CSE programme on a voluntary basis as it lacked statutory 
authority. The programme was built around consolidated supervision, and the SEC 
adapted its net capital rule to bring it more in line with international capital standards 
at a time when frequent discussions and meetings took place to draft up Basel II as a 
new capital adequacy standard. As part of this ideational consensus, it essentially 
lowered the capital requirements for CSEs – a clear act of deregulation – but in the 
firm belief that the risk management standards and internal models would actually be 
more robust than the standard SEC net capital rule. The SEC, which was clearly not a 
banking regulator, was dependent on inputs from experts – something the investment 
banking community was eager to provide; in a self-serving move that went beyond 
normal lobbying, investment banking industry experts supported the regulator in 
establishing a new regime that would ultimately have to be tried and tested by the 
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European financial supervisors. Overall, then, the case study shows that the events 
behind the establishment of the CSE programme and its net capital rule took a very 
different turn and beginning than is commonly understood in the IPE of finance. 
 
8.2 THE OUTCOME 
On August 20
th, 
2004, the United States Securities Exchange Commission (SEC or 
Commission) adopted rule amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
Exchange Act). These amendments created a new regulatory regime – known as the 
Consolidated Supervised Entities (CSE) programme – for certain eligible investment 
banks, as well as amended an already existing voluntary regulatory regime referred to 
as Supervised Investment Bank Holding Companies (SIBC), which has never been 
used by the industry and been steadfastly neglected by IPE scholars since its inception 
in 1999. As US Congress did not pass legislation to change the then existing 
regulation of investment banks, the SEC had no statutory authority to impose either 
the CSE programme on investment banks or the SIBC. Instead, the SEC established 
the CSE on a voluntary basis.  
For the CSE Programme, the Commission changed one of the Exchange Act’s 
key rules, Rule 15c3-1, better known as the net capital rule, and introduced an 
alternative method for calculating net capital for eligible investment banks.  
Previously, the rule required larger investment banks to apply ‘the alternative 
indebtedness method’ and hold net capital of at least or greater than either $250k or 
2% of the investment bank’s customer related receivables (i.e. cash owed by 
customers to the investment bank) – also defined as the base capital requirement. 
Smaller investment banks followed the ‘basic indebtedness method’, which requires 
investment banks to hold net capital of at least or more than $250k or 6.67% of 
aggregated indebtedness, which amounts to $1 of net capital held for every $15 of 
debt. 
To comply with these requirements, investment banks have to first calculate 
their equity according to US Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“US 
GAAP”) by deducting their Balance Sheet US GAAP liabilities from the US GAAP 
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assets – both of which are marked to market on a daily basis. Thereafter, debt that is 
subordinated to creditors’ claims, certain deferred income tax liabilities and accrued 
liabilities are added back to US GAAP equity before all Balance Sheet assets not 
deemed to be readily convertible into cash are deducted, such as fixed assets (i.e. 
building), intangible assets (goodwill), prepaid items (i.e. rent) and the majority of 
unsecured receivables (i.e. bridge loans). The sum arrived at is defined as ‘tentative 
net capital’. In a penultimate step, haircuts are applied to security positions within the 
tentative net capital. These haircuts are defined in great detail and depend on the 
security type, its maturity, marketability and quality. For example, haircuts applied to 
the market value of US municipal debt securities range from 0% to 1% depending on 
maturity. Preferred stock carries a haircut of 10% of market value. After deducting all 
haircuts, the investment banks arrive at their net capital. Finally, the base capital 
requirement is deducted from the investment bank’s net capital to determine its excess 
net capital position.  
Importantly, the SEC saw the net capital rule as a liquidity test and not as a 
leverage ratio or capital adequacy standard. Its purpose was to protect investment 
banks’ customers, creditors and counterparties by ensuring that investment banks 
were liquid enough at all times to settle all claims in a timely fashion (United States 
Government Accountability Office 1998). In other words, in the absence of a lender 
of last resort, the SEC’s net capital rule was a mechanism that was not meant to 
protect investment banks from failing (as would be the case for commercial bank’s 
capital standards). On the contrary, the net capital rule was meant to allow for an 
orderly liquidation of a failed or failing investment bank so that all counterparties, 
creditors and customers would speedily receive their money or investments back in 
full.  
Under the CSE programme, the SEC allowed eligible investment banks to 
apply to join the programme and use an alternative method for calculating net capital 
that “responds to the firms’ requests to align their supervisory risk management 
practises and regulatory capital requirements more closely” (SEC 2004). The CSE 
programme attempted to bring the SEC net capital rule for US investment banks more 
in line with the Basel II capital adequacy standard. In doing so, CSE investment banks 
were allowed to calculate their own deductions for certain market and credit risk 
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positions on the basis of their own internal Value at Risk (VaR) and scenario analysis 
models. For market risk, the SEC allowed two new options: first, it defined, on a case-
by-case basis, for which of the investment bank’s positions VaR models could be 
used, and determined that the VaR of these positions had to be based on a ten working 
day movement in rates and prices and calculated using a 99% confidence interval 
before multiplying that result by a factor of three; second, if scenario analysis (ScA) 
were to be used, investment banks had to use a loss experience within the worst 
trading day movement over the four years preceding the greatest loss. In case of 
insufficient data, “the deduction shall be the largest loss within a three standard 
deviation movement in those risk factors, prices or spreads over a ten day period, 
multiplied by an appropriate liquidity adjustment factor” (ibid).  
The SEC provided detailed rules on credit risk weights, many of which were 
shadowed along the lines of Basel II, but included marked to market on a daily basis. 
For example, any collateral pledged against credit had to be marked to market day-by-
day, liquid and transferable and in the investment bank’s control. Collateral could not 
be made of securities issued by the counterparty. With respect to credit risk weights, 
these were: 20% credit risk weight for any transactions with counterparties that had 
ratings for senior unsecured long-term debt or commercial paper in one of the two 
highest rating categories by a Nationally Recognised Statistical Rating Organisation 
(NRSO) such as Standard & Poor’s (S&P) or equivalent; 50% credit risk weight for 
counterparties with the third and fourth highest rating, and 150% credit risk weight for 
counterparties with a rating below the fourth highest. However, investment banks 
could apply for SEC approval to come up with their own credit risk weights based on 
internal credit risk calculations for those counterparties not rated by an NRSO. All 
investment bank’s VaR models had to fulfil a range of minimum qualitative and 
quantitative requirements for SEC approval.  
The Commission was aware that the CSE programme’s deductions for market 
and credit risk would likely be lower than under the standard net capital rule, thereby 
reducing regulatory costs for “very highly capitalised firms that have developed 
robust internal risk management practises”, which the Commission saw as a “major 
benefit” (ibid). The application of mathematical models would enable investment 
banks to reallocate capital to areas of higher return. Specifically, the Commission 
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estimated that investment banks applying for the CSE programme and switching to 
the CSE’s alternative net capital method would be able to realise, on average, a 
reduction in capital deductions of c. 40% amounting to a total of c. $13bn for the five 
investment banks they believed would apply (i.e. Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns), which in turn would increase 
their return on equity by 20 basis points (i.e. 0.2%) by reallocating the freed up capital 
to more profitable business lines. In the words of one of the top aides to the Clinton 
Administration, “everybody thought at that time that the Basel standard, which had 
not been implemented, will be fine: who are we to contest the risk weights of the 
Basel standards and do not forget in 2004 the economy was fine, there were no signs 
of bubbles anywhere” (LB 2010).  
However, the SEC required any eligible investment banks  firstly to maintain 
tentative net capital of at least $1bn, secondly net capital of at least $500m, and last 
but not least, to notify the SEC if tentative net capital falls below $5bn, at which point 
the SEC would consider taking appropriate remedial action. In the words of the SEC, 
“this $5bn early warning requirement is based upon the staff’s experience and the 
current levels of net capital maintained by the broker-dealers most likely to apply to 
use the alternative method of computing net capital” (ibid). As will be discussed later 
on in the chapter, the de-facto tentative net capital requirement was thus $5bn. The 
SEC regarded these liquidity and capital requirements as consistent with the first 
pillar of the then proposed New Basel Capital Accord (i.e. Basel II). 
 
8.2.1 Eligibility and Supervision Requirements 
Neither the Courts, nor the US President nor Congress bestowed the SEC with the 
statutory authority necessary to establish the CSE programme on a mandatory basis. 
The CSE programme was voluntary. In return for allowing ‘very highly capitalised’ 
investment banks to align their internal risk management more closely with actual net 
capital, thereby reducing their regulatory and capital burden (or increasing their 
balance sheet with the same amount of net capital), they agreed to have their ultimate 
holding companies and affiliates, collectively defined as ‘consolidated supervised 
entities’ (CSE), become subject to SEC supervision. Previously, the SEC only 
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supervised the investment banking units based in the United States, but not the 
ultimate holding company of US investment banks, and had thus no visibility on the 
non-US investment banking activities. Supervision of those CSEs that did not have a 
principal regulator, either domestically, such as the Federal Reserve, or abroad, 
consented to (i) provide the Commission with detailed information (financial, capital 
and risk exposures etc.) about the holding company, (ii) comply with the CSE rules 
for establishing and documenting a comprehensive, group-wide risk management 
system, (iii) SEC examinations of the holding company and any affiliate as long as 
the affiliate has not principal regulator, (iii) compute and report on a monthly basis 
the group-wide capital position and computations for market, credit and operational 
risk in accordance with Basel standards.  
On issues of governance, record-keeping and risk management, the CSE 
programme required investment banks not only to rapidly adopt many of the 
quantitative elements of the Basel standard for calculating market, credit and 
operating risk, but also to put in place a wide range of Basel’s qualitative 
prerequisites. The latter included creating a narrative description of the business and 
organisation of the CSE with organisational charts, detailed accounts of the methods 
used to calculate market, credit and operational risk as well as comprehensive 
description of the risk management control system in place. 
The SEC regarded all these requirements as consistent with the second pillar, 
supervisory review of the new Basel standard (i.e. Basel II), but the Commission did 
not impose additional disclosure requirements as the third pillar of Basel II, market 
discipline, was still being negotiated and was not finalised at the time of the 
establishment of the CSE. CSEs that have a principal regulator are subject to 
significantly less SEC supervisory requirements.  
Overall, the newly established CSE programme was thus more akin to the 
Fed’s Bank Holding Company oversight, and combined elements of the Basel capital 
adequacy standard with the Exchange Act’s net capital rule. 
The SEC also provided detailed time and costing estimates for adapting the 
CSE programme requirements per investment bank. These estimates ranged from the 
time needed to compile an investment bank’s CSE application (i.e. 1’000 hours, 
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which includes 100 hours for an in-house attorney to review the application), review 
models (5’600 hours), back-test models (640 hours), estimating capital allowances 
(1’080 hours), comply with record preservation requirement (1 hour), compile 
reporting requirements (120 hours) (ibid).  
The SEC expected that the CSE programme would meet the EU criteria for 
consolidated home supervision and thus “minimise duplicative regulatory burdens on 
firms that do not have ultimate holding companies that have a principal regulator that 
are active in the EU as well as in other jurisdictions that may have similar laws” 
(ibid). The SEC price tag for US investment banks having to establish an EU sub-
holding company was $8m per annum, which could thus be avoided. Moreover, the 
Commission estimated that the quantifiable benefits of the CSE were $66m per 
annum for all five investment banks combined against quantifiable annual costs of 
$10m and one-off CSE implementation cost of $90m.  
 
8.2.2 The Supervised Investment Bank Holding Company Regime 
At the same time as they set up the CSE programme, the Commission amended the 
already existing SIBHC regime, which was created with the Gramm Leach Bliley Act 
(GLB) in 1999. The chapter examines the creation of the SIBHC regime first before 
discussing the SEC’s changes. 
On November 4
th
, 1999, after more than a decade of lively discussions in both 
the House of Representatives as well the US Senate about reforming the Glass 
Steagall Act of 1933, US Congress passed the final bill of “An Act to enhance 
competition in the financial services industry by providing a prudential framework for 
the affiliation of banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other financial 
service providers, and for other purposes”, otherwise known, after the legislators who 
helped chaperone a majority of Republicans and Democrats, as the Gramm Leach 
Bliley Act (GLB) (USA Congress 1999). US President Clinton signed the Act into 
law on November 12
th
. The GLB Act gave a de-jure basis to the de facto reality on the 
ground for two decades whereby Federal Reserve regulated Bank Holding companies 
– i.e. commercial banks – had already re-entered investment banking territory.  
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In a much-overlooked section in both the academic world and the media, 
Subtitle C, Section 231, the GLB Act created a new type of supervision, namely that 
of investment bank holding companies by the SEC on an ‘elected’, i.e. voluntary 
basis. The new regulatory regime was open to investment banks whose ultimate 
parent was not already part of a Bank Holding Company, Savings Association or 
foreign banks. The supervisory regime can be seen as a forerunner to the CSE 
programme in some respects: it required investment bank holding companies to keep 
detailed records in place – both for all affiliates and the holding company – and report 
the “financial condition, policies, systems for monitoring and controlling financial and 
operational risks, and transactions and relationships between any broker or dealer 
affiliate of the supervised investment bank holding company” (ibid). This included 
independently audited financials – balance sheet, cash flow statement and income 
statement – for the holding company. Crucially, it also gave the SEC examination 
authority over the holding company (in addition to any affiliate) which had to inform 
the Commission about the holding company’s financial and operational risks as well 
as the risk management systems in place.  
The SEC adopted an amended Supervised Investment Bank Holding Company 
regime on the 20
th
 of August 2004. The main changes to the existing rules focussed 
on bringing the SIBC more in line with the risk management, reporting and capital 
adequacy requirements as set out in the Basel standards (especially what would later 
become Basel II). However, whilst introducing Value at Risk models and Basel type 
methodologies into the SEC capital and liquidity requirements, the Commission did 
not allow for an explicit capital relief as was the case in the CSE programme. 
Unsurprisingly, the industry favoured the CSE programme and not the SIBHC 
regime. During the entire public consultation process on the proposed amendments to 
the SIBHC regime, the Commission received in total only two comment letters from 
the industry: one from the International Swaps and Derivatives Dealers Association 
(ISDA) and one from Bear Stearns Companies, Inc. Both letters provided comments 
on the proposed holding company credit and operational risk requirements only. The 
vast amount of intended rules changes received no industry feedback reflecting the 
industry’s lack of interest in the voluntary SIBHC regime. Even though the regime 
had been in place since 1999, only one investment bank ever elected to be supervised 
in this way: more than eight years after the passage of Gramm Leach Bliley, Lazard 
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Ltd. became a Supervised Investment Bank Holding Company on April 1
st
, 2008. In 
the following, the chapter traces back the reasons for enacting the CSE programme 
since the SIBHC already offered a voluntary, consolidated supervision regime. 
 
8.3 THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SERVICES ACTION PLAN AND ITS 
IMPACT ON US INVESTMENT BANKS 
 
8.3.1 The Making of an Integrated EU Market in Financial Services 
Starting in the 1970s, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) decided on a series of cases 
brought against national governments by companies that aimed at reducing the burden 
to comply with a set of overlapping, incompatible as well as additional home and host 
state standards in relation to the cross-border trade in goods and services. The 
harmonisation and/or mutual recognition of standards and reduction in technical 
barriers to trade amongst European Community (EC) member states became one of 
the core initiatives of the European Commission with the aim to achieve this in many 
areas by 1992.  
 Looking at the financial services sector, the EC and its member states adopted 
several directives, such as the Public Offers Directive and the Investment Services 
Directive (ISD) (The Council of the European Communities 1993), in order to 
harmonise the regulatory regimes at the national level and work towards building a 
single internal market. In 1993, the ISD established  what would later become known 
as the ‘EU Passport’ in financial services, namely an  
approach adopted [is] to effect only the essential harmonization 
necessary and sufficient to secure the mutual recognition of 
authorization and of prudential supervision systems, making possible 
the grant of a single authorization valid throughout the Community 
and the application of the principle of home Member State 
supervision; whereas, by virtue of mutual recognition, investment 
firms authorized in their home Member States may carry on any or all 
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of the services covered by this Directive for which they have received 
authorization throughout the Community by establishing branches or 
under the freedom to provide services (ibid). 
 
The ISD prescribed minimum standards for the passport regime, i.e. the ‘necessary’ 
and ‘sufficient’, which still allowed for enough room in structural differences and 
diversity between countries’ regulatory regimes. With the transfer and pooling of 
certain aspects of member states’ sovereignty to the EC legislature and Commission, 
the Commission was authorised to monitor member states’ implementation of and 
compliance with EC Treaties and Directives. In case of non-compliance, it could start 
enforcement proceedings in front of the ECJ, whose rulings on these and other matters 
gradually built up a corpus of case law that superseded national laws. Despite the 
ISD’s intentions and the EC’s institutional underpinnings, many financial services 
companies grew frustrated with the implementation efforts on a national level, 
especially with the mutual recognition system. As a result, the Commission kick-
started the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) in 1999, its most comprehensive 
programme to date with the goal of creating a common EC market in financial 
services. To this end, the Economic and Finance Council (ECOFIN) of the EU created 
the ‘Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities Markets’ 
under the chairmanship of Alexandre Lamfalussy in July 2000, commonly referred to 
as the ‘Lamfalussy Process’. The committee’s mandate was threefold, namely: first, to 
assess the current conditions for implementation of the regulation of the securities 
markets in the EU; second, to examine how the mechanisms for regulating these 
markets can best respond to current market developments; third, to come up with 
proposal of how to eliminate barriers and achieve greater convergence and 
cooperation in day-to-day implementation. 
The final report was published in February 2001 and made recommendations 
on twenty-one subject areas (The Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets 2001). The Lamfalussy Committee was in broad 
agreement that the current EU financial regulatory framework was “too slow, too 
rigid, complex and ill-adapted to the pace of the global financial market change”, that 
the institutional set-up of the EU creates “multiple blockages” and ambiguities and 
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that the EU “has no divine right to the benefits of an integrated financial market”, but 
has to build one in order to reap the benefits, deepen European integration and 
strengthen the Euro’s role (ibid, p.7). Without going into great detail about all the 
specific subject area recommendations and the four-level implementation approach, 
the Committee prioritised the following key elements of the FSAP and urged for its 
adoption by the end of 2003 at the latest: a single prospectus for issuers, 
modernisation of listing requirements, home country regulation of all wholesale 
market participants and a definition of an professional investor, adoption of 
international accounting standards, a single passport regime for recognised stock 
markets and a modernisation of investment rules for investment and pension funds.  
 The Lamfalussy report was a wake-up call for EU decision-makers and 
provided the necessary impetus to push to what amounted essentially in an overhaul 
of the EU’s regulatory framework for financial services creating an internal common 
market. To this end, the European Commission adopted  
1. The Market Abuse Directive in 2002; 
2. The Prospectus Directive in 2003; 
3. The Market in Financial Instruments Directive and the  
4. Transparency Directive in 2004. 
Academics see the reasons behind this journey from half-baked harmonisation efforts 
to building a coherent common market in the rise of technological advancements and 
a rapid increase in cross-border financial activity, US competition and the creation of 
the Euro together with an enlargement of the EU (Mügge 2006).  
Whilst not being part of Lamfalussy Report, the FSAP called for prudential 
supervision of financial conglomerates. With the momentum and energy that 
Lamfalussy created, the Commission started a public consultation process in 
December 2000, and proposed a new directive in April 2001 that would seek group-
wide supervision of financial conglomerates (European Commission Internal Market 
Directorate General 2000). The proposal’s main objectives were: firstly, ensure that 
conglomerates have adequate capital at the conglomerate level and avoid double 
counting of capital and regulatory arbitrage; secondly, calculate a proposal for an 
overall solvency position, and lastly, ensure proper risk management. Areas of 
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‘underlaps’ and ‘overlaps’ in regulating financial conglomerates needed addressing in 
order to eliminate inconsistencies and ensure equivalence in the treatment of 
conglomerates. The proposal sought information sharing and cooperation between 
different supervisory authorities at the national level as well as equivalence of 
treatment between the EU and non-EU financial regimes.  
Subsequently, the Mixed Technical Group on the Prudential Regulation of 
Financial Conglomerates ran two mapping exercises in order to better define what a 
financial conglomerate is, and subsequently, which financial services groups would 
fall under the proposed consolidated supervision. The proposal put forward various 
ranges and tests in order to identify which groups would fall under the category of 
being a financial conglomerate (such as, the size of the balances sheet of the smallest 
financial activity within a group exceeds €6bn). Above all, the Mixed Technical 
Group was keen to ensure that its “mapping exercises” captured all important 
financial conglomerates within the EU.  
 
8.3.2 The Crux of the Matter for US Investment Banks 
The Financial Conglomerates Directive was enacted in December 2002 and 
prescribed that a ‘coordinator’, i.e. a competent regulator, had to be appointed to be 
charge of the consolidated supervision of the financial conglomerate as a whole (The 
European Parliament and the Council of the European Union 2003). If the financial 
conglomerate had its parent holding company within the EU, then this coordinator 
was typically picked from among the host regulator(s), such as the EU regulator in the 
country where the financial conglomerate has the largest balance sheet total. In case 
conglomerates have more than one regulator, the country home to the conglomerate’s 
largest balance sheet in the most important financial sector would become the 
‘coordinator’. The ‘coordinator’ became effectively the lead conglomerate’s lead 
regulator: it became responsible for collating key information from the conglomerate, 
assess its financial situation, compliance with capital adequacy rules, risk 
concentration and intra-group transactions, assessing the financial conglomerate’s 
structure, governance and risk management and taking the lead in case of emergency 
situations. The Directive also set out clear powers and guidelines for the ‘coordinating 
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regulator’ to have coordination and information sharing arrangements with other EU 
regulators in place:  
without prejudice to their respective responsibilities as defined under 
sectoral rules, these authorities, whether or not established in the 
same Member State, shall provide one another with any information 
which is essential or relevant for the exercise of the other authorities’ 
supervisory tasks under the sectoral rules and this Directive (ibid).  
Despite the SIBHC regime, not a single US investment bank opted to be voluntarily 
subjected to consolidated SEC supervision. However, the EU’s Financial 
Conglomerates Directive was about to drastically change the regulation of investment 
banks in the US. The Directive applied to any financial services company falling 
under the definition of a financial conglomerate that was active in the European 
Union, irrespective of the geographical location of the conglomerate’s parent 
company and host regulator. In other words, the Directive established a mandatory 
regime of consolidated financial supervision in the EU. Importantly, for ‘parent 
undertakings’ outside the EU, the supervisory regime of non-EU countries had to be 
equivalent to that of the Directive with “appropriate supervisory arrangements” so as 
to achieve objectives and results similar to those pursued by the Directive. However,  
equivalent and appropriate supplementary supervisory arrangements 
can only be assumed to exist if the third-country supervisory 
authorities have agreed to cooperate with the competent authorities 
concerned on the means and objectives of exercising supplementary 
supervision of the regulated entities of a financial conglomerate 
(ibid). 
It was up to the EU’s regulators at the national level which would otherwise have 
qualified as ‘coordinators’ to determine whether or not the third-country regulatory 
regime could be deemed equivalent so as to avoid third-country financial 
conglomerates being subject to consolidated financial regulation (including capital 
adequacy) in the EU as well as their home market. Given the size and the importance 
of the City of London, the UK’s financial industry, in the EU, the UK Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) would clearly take the lead role in conducting the 
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equivalence assessments. The EU’s Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) issued 
general guidance in 2004 with respect to the equivalence of the US financial 
regulatory regimes to the EU Directive. Whilst this guidance was of a general nature, 
the EU Directive made it mandatory to take it into account for the coordinators 
assessing the equivalence. The BAC gave a short commentary on each of the US’s 
functional regulators; with respect to capital markets supervision, it noted that “the 
SEC has not, to date, undertaken comprehensive consolidated supervision, but is soon 
to introduce two new regimes that will enable the larger US broker-dealer groups to 
opt for consolidated supervision” (The European Financial Conglomerates Committee 
to EU supervisors 2004). The BAC guidance stated that the SEC supervision until the 
enactment of the EU Financial Conglomerates Directive did not qualify as offering an 
equivalent standard, but that this was about to change, in large part driven by this 
Directive.  
 
8.4 THE UNFOLDING OF THE SEC RESPONSE 
In May 2002, the Director of the SEC’s powerful Division of Market Regulation (to 
be renamed Division of Trading and Markets in 2007) Annette Nazareth, testified 
before the Committee on Financial Services of the US House of Representatives on 
‘Certain Pending Proposals by the European Commission’ (Annette Nazareth 2002). 
Ms. Nazareth explained the connection between the EU’s FSAP and the Financial 
Conglomerates Directive, which would set minimum requirements for groupwide 
supervision of financial conglomerates active in the EU. She stressed that “several 
U.S. securities firms have communicated to the Commission that they have serious 
concerns with the Proposed Directive” and “fear” that the SEC’s supervision of 
investment banks at the holding company level would not be seen as equivalent to the 
EU’s standards, thereby putting them at a competitive disadvantage to EU based 
firms, and potentially subjecting them to higher capital and risk control standards than 
EU firms (ibid). US investment banks might have to establish and capitalise EU sub-
holding companies.  
She emphasised that whilst the SEC welcomed the EU’s push as an effort to 
harmonise regulatory regimes, “to the extent ‘equivalence’ is really a means of having 
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a ‘coordinator’ in the EU evaluate the quality of our regulatory regimes, we do not 
think that approach will be productive or add to investor protection” (ibid). Nazareth 
alluded to a supervisory over-reach by the EU whilst agreeing that effective 
supervision is important for well-functioning capital markets, of which the US ones 
“are the largest and most successful in the world” (ibid). According to Nazareth, the 
SEC had “productive discussions” with EC representatives, including the issue of 
equivalence, and “firmly” believed that the SEC’s “approach to the supervision of 
securities firms is as effective as that in the Proposed Directive” (ibid). She went on to 
highlight “the remarkable success” of the Commission’s regulatory regime which had 
ensured the maximum level of financial integrity and investor protection with very 
few investment banks failing, but in case of failure (as with the then defunct 
investment bank Drexel Lambert), the investment bank was liquidated in an orderly 
fashion without any government capital injections or a negative impact on markets 
(ibid). 
During the same hearing session of the House Committee, Mr. Marc Lackritz, 
the President of the Securities Industry Association – the US investment banking’s 
lead industry association – also testified. He urged for the US Executive as well as 
Legislative to get more involved since the FSAP would create one single, integrated 
capital market by 2005 (Marc Lackritz 2002).  The SIA “strongly supports” the FSAP 
and the Lamfalussy Report, had worked closely with EU actors at both national and 
EU level, and saw the FSAP as being “in the best interests of the EU, the US, and the 
global economy”; indeed, the US securities industry would be “one of the primary 
beneficiaries of a more integrated, efficient EU capital market” (ibid). Lackritz 
stressed that “the US-EU relationship relies on common social and political goals and 
the exchange of ideas, talent and technology” (ibid). However, the SIA had “strong 
reservations” about certain provisions within the EU Financial Conglomerate’s 
Directive related to third-country supervision of financial conglomerates operating in 
the EU, but with headquarters outside the EU. In Lackritz’s words, these provisions 
were “inappropriate and should be removed”, the SIA would be “specifically 
troubled” by national EU regulators (i.e. the ‘coordinators’) undertaking equivalence 
determinations and failing to meet the equivalence criterion would force US 
investment banks to establish EU holding companies (ibid). Instead of running 
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equivalence tests, regulators should coordinate their actions more flexibly by way of 
regular meetings.  
It is important to note that, as mentioned earlier, the Financial Conglomerates 
Directives was one of many proposed directives that were part of the FSAP and 
Lamfalussy plan to create a common EU market in financial services. At the 
beginning of the proposal process for the EU’s Financial Conglomerates Directive, 
the SEC derived the merits of its regulatory regime for investment banking on the 
‘remarkably successful’ track record of US capital markets and investment banking 
performance since the 1970s, and equates this success with having established an 
effective regime of SEC regulation that ought to be equivalent to the proposed EU 
Directive. The US investment banking industry’s initial position via-a-vis the 
Directive was one of opposition: it feared that national, ‘coordinating’ regulators 
could be inconsistent and arbitrary in their equivalence assessments and that they 
might have to create EU holding companies in addition to their US parents. In other 
words, the Directive would decrease the attractiveness of doing business in the EU for 
US investment banks. Moreover, the proposed EU regulatory regime would certainly 
not entice US investment banks to move their parent headquarters from the US to the 
EU.  
Things progressed swiftly in Europe; the European Council and Commission 
came to a common position on the adoption of the Financial Conglomerates Directive 
on September 20
th
, 2002 – only four months after Nazareth’s and Lackritz’s 
testimonies. Exactly two months later, the European Parliament adopted the Directive 
on November 20
th
, 2002. Surprisingly, no other hearings that focussed on or at least 
were in large part about the EU’s Financial Conglomerates Directive were held for the 
remainder of 2002 or the whole of 2003, in front of either the Senate or the House of 
Representatives. Indeed, the SEC provided no additional public information or 
statements in relation to the Directive – neither as an organisation nor through one of 
its officers – until October 1st, 2003, when it published its agenda for an open meeting 
on October 8
th. During this open meeting, the SEC would discuss “whether to propose 
rule amendments and new rules under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that would 
establish two separate voluntary regulatory frameworks for the Commission to 
supervise broker-dealers and their affiliates on a consolidated basis” (SEC 2003). In 
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this publication, the SEC introduced the concept of a ‘consolidated supervised entity 
(CSE), and explicitly linked the consolidated supervision with capital computations 
that would be consistent with the Basel standard. In 2002 and 2003, the SEC held 
various meetings with its European counterparts during which EU officials indicated 
that the EU would go ahead with the Financial Conglomerates Directive, that the 
Directive would apply to any financial conglomerate conducting business in the EU 
and that the SEC regulation of US investment banking, including its voluntary SIBC 
regime, “would likely fail the EU’s equivalence test” (AN 2011). The SEC had thus 
been working on a proposal to create a regulatory framework that would meet the 
equivalence test of the EU.  
 
8.4.1 The UK’s FSA Response of US Investment Banking ‘Shopping Around’ 
Whilst the SEC was going full speed in drafting proposed rules that would meet the 
EU’s standard of equivalence, the FSA – the European regulator most likely to 
become the most relevant and sought-after European coordinating regulator for third 
party conglomerates – issued a consultation in October 2003 (UK Financial Services 
Authority 2003). In the consultation, the FSA argued that  
 
we believe it is unlikely to be possible in practice for us to implement 
full worldwide group supervision of third country conglomerate or 
banking/investment groups from the UK [which fail the equivalence 
test], and we shall rely on other methods. This may well require the 
establishment of a European holding company and restriction of 
exposures between the European sub-group and the worldwide group 
(‘ring-fencing’) (ibid). 
The UK’s FSA thus made it clear that investment banks with home regulators whose 
country’s regulatory regime failed the equivalence tests could not simply move its 
legal headquarters to the UK, but would have to establish a separate European holding 
company instead. Indeed, some US investment banks toyed with the idea of moving 
their legal headquarters, i.e. the place of jurisdiction of their ultimate parent holding 
companies, from the US to the UK. As a senior UK financial regulator recalls, “one or 
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two of the investment banks did say, well maybe we actually move from the US to the 
UK” as this could avoid them having to establish a holding company in the Europe 
which would tie up a lot of capital in addition to the SEC broker dealer (DH 2010). 
Their rationale was that they might be better off “being prudentially supervised in 
Europe completely, and that would be simpler and a more effective use of capital and 
they told us that they could then trade back in the US where they would not have to be 
under consolidated supervision” (ibid). As another top UK regulator pointed out “it 
was not part of our design to entice business out of NYC to London - full stop - we 
had different approaches and different historical traditions” (McC 2011). In the end, 
and as the FSA’s public consultation paper reflected, senior ranks of the FSA “did not 
give them any encouragement in moving their HQs” (DH 2010). 
 
8.4.2 The SEC’s Proposed and Final Rules   
On October 24
th
, 2003, the SEC published the proposed rules ‘Supervised Investment 
Bank Holding Companies’ (SIBHC) as well as ‘Alternative Net Capital Requirements 
for Broker-Dealers that are part of Consolidated Supervised Entities’, which set out in 
great detail, as already discussed earlier in the chapter, the CSE programme as well as 
the alternative net capital requirements (SEC 2003). The CSE programme would 
“minimise duplicative regulatory burdens” for US investment banks active in the EU 
whilst the alternative net capital requirements would bring the net capital rule more in 
line with Basel capital standards (ibid). This would give the SEC “a useful measure of 
the CSE’s financial position and allow for greater comparability of the CSE’s 
financial position to that of international securities firms and banking institutions” 
(ibid). Comments for both proposed rules were due on February4
th
, 2004.   
On the 18
th
 of December 2003, the SEC met with the SIA and representatives 
from essentially all major investment banks (Bear Stearns, Citi, Merrill Lynch, JP 
Morgan, Goldman Sachs, CSFB, Lehman Brothers, UBS and Morgan Stanley) to 
discuss the proposed rules (SEC 2004). Representatives of the Commission met 
separately with Merrill Lynch one day later. The CEO and CFO of Bear Stearns met 
with Annette Nazareth, the Director of the SEC’s Division of Market Regulation – the 
division in charge of drafting the proposed rules and coordinating the process – on 
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March 10
th
, 2004. Both meetings were the only bilateral encounters between US 
investment banks and the SEC during the comment period. 
The SEC received, in total, 20 comments on the proposed alternative net 
capital rule and the CSE programme: two from private persons (Mr. W. Hardy 
Callcott andMr. Leonhard D. Bole), seven from industry associations (CSE Steering 
Committee, Association of German Public Sector Banks, Clearing House Association, 
International Swaps and Derivatives Association, American Bankers Association, 
Institute of International Bankers, European Banking Federation), one from a US 
regulator (Office of Thrift Supervision) and ten from banks as well as investment 
banks (Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, Charles Schwab, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche 
Bank, Citigroup, JP Morgan, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and BMO Financial). 
The tenor of the investment banks’ feedback focussed on three areas: first, EU 
equivalence determination and timely implementation of CSE, second, adoption of 
Basel capital standard-esque regulation for CSE investment banks and third, VaR 
models.  
On the issue of equivalence and CSE implementation, the general counsel of 
Lehman Brothers, Joseph Polizzotto, stressed that “it is of critical importance that the 
Commission implement the Proposing Release in such a way that the CSE Rules are 
deemed to be equivalent” (Lehman Brothers 2004). Goldman’s CFO David Viniar 
urged the SEC to adopt the CSE rules asap “to permit the CSEs to implement them for 
financial years commencing on or after January 1
st
, 2005” (Goldman Sachs 2004).  
Morgan Stanley’s CFO, Stephen Crawford, along with other investment 
banks, voiced the importance of harmonising risk management and capital 
computation standards across the entire CSE – i.e. not just the broker dealer, but also 
the holding company – to establish a regulatory regime that captures how investment 
banks actually manage their risks and capitalise their business and, finally, to promote 
greater consistency with Basel II. Such a regime “must be consistent with the related 
supervisory standards that are applicable to financial institutions across international 
markets” (Morgan Stanley 2004).  
Finally, all investment banks provided in-depth technical comments on the 
alternative net capital rule: all rejected a product-based phasing in of VaR models, 
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disagreed with the risk weights on the trading book, which were deemed too high and 
thus capital intensive, and allowed investment banks to count long-term debt as 
capital.   
Comments received from commercial banks and bank holding companies 
voiced two concerns: first, being subject to and paying for a multitude of overlapping 
consolidated regulatory regimes, i.e. both the CSE and the Fed’s BHC, and second, 
being able to apply the same consistent capital standard and computation for the CSE 
as is already the case for the Federal Reserve or other banking regulators, i.e. the 
Basel standard. As John Morris, Citigroup Global Market’s CFO, commented, “the 
Proposal should be revised […] to not become subject to a new layer of 
comprehensive consolidated supervision in addition to that already exercised by the 
Fed” (Citigroup 2004). Deutsche Bank’s General Counsel Richard Walker put it more 
bluntly “the proposed rule would conflict […] and would subject bank holding 
companies and foreign banks to an unfairly burdensome system of overlapping 
consolidated supervision” (Deutsche Bank 2004). The issue of regulatory overlap was 
a concern voiced by the American Bankers Association as well as the New York 
Clearing House Association - both industry groups representing Bank Holding 
Companies and shared by the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS) which commented 
that the CSE programme had “the potential to duplicate or conflict with OTS’s 
supervisory responsibilities for Savings and Loan Holding Companies (SLHCs) that 
would also be CSEs” (Office of Thrift Supervision 2004). The OTS’s comments carry 
a certain irony, as it was lobbying at the time to become the investment banks’ 
consolidated regulator in the US, since the “Federal Reserve was regarded as the 
regulator from hell for investment banks because of extremely hands-on approach” 
(SB 2010). However, the OTS bid to become the consolidated regulator was shut 
down by the US Treasury Secretary. As a senior regulator from the UK recalls, “when 
I heard about the OTS’s bid, I asked for a call with the US Treasury Secretary: ‘is this 
serious?’ To which he responded ‘Oh God it is not. We don’t want that. We know it is 
mad and will shut it down’” (DH 2010). The OTS was widely seen in the regulatory 
community and amongst investment banks as “buffoons who did not know which way 
the sun rose” (CR 2010). 
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Industry associations representing non-US financial services groups, such as 
the European Banking Federation, the Association of German Public Sector Banks 
and the Institute of International Bankers were – ironically – worried that the 
proposed rule would take away control from non-US banks’ home country regulators 
that already provide consolidated supervision. They, too, emphasised that non-US 
regulated investment banks should be able to follow “home country Basel capital 
methodologies” (FEDERATION BANCAIRE DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE 2004). 
All three associations worked together closely on this matter and coordinated their 
responses, which is reflected in the often near-identical wording of their comment 
letters.  
The SIA’s very detailed comment letter emphasised that the CSE programme 
“fully meets the equivalence” standard in their opinion, that it provided economic 
incentives via lower capital charges, but required more rigorous, Basel type risk 
management and exposure modelling in return (Securities Industry Association 2004). 
The association welcomed the alternative net capital rule’s closer alignment to the 
Basel international capital standards, which it believed would support the 
competitiveness of US investment banks. It urged the SEC to play an active role in the 
“ongoing development of international standards for risk management and capital 
adequacy”, which accounts for the particularities of the investment banking business. 
In line with all the comments discussed before, the SIA argued for close and 
consistent alignment between broker dealer, holding company and Basel capital 
(ibid). 
Meanwhile, in July 2004, the EU’s Financial Conglomerates Committee 
issued general guidance to EU supervisors on the extent to which the financial 
regulatory regimes in the USA would meet the equivalence standards as set out in the 
Directive (European Financial Conglomerates Committee 2004). It states “the SEC 
has not, to date, undertaken comprehensive consolidated supervision but is soon to 
introduce two new regimes that will enable the larger US broker-dealer groups to opt 
for consolidated supervision” (ibid). Whilst equivalence decisions had to be taken by 
the ‘coordinating regulators’, this statement was tantamount to the SEC CSE 
programme fulfilling the EU’s consolidated supervisory standards – and indeed, this 
was subsequently confirmed. 
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The SEC issued the final rule for both the CSE programme and the SIBHC on 
August 20
th
, 2004 (SEC 2004). Immediately afterwards, all of the big US investment 
banks elected to be supervised voluntarily as part of the CSE programme. Merrill 
Lynch & Co., Inc. was the first to have its ‘election’ to be supervised as a CSE 
granted on December 23
rd
, 2004. Goldman Sachs & Co followed on March 23
rd
, 
2005, Morgan Stanley & Co on July 28
th
, 2005, Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. on 
November 9
th
, 2005 and the Bear Stearns Companies Inc. was the last one on 
November 30
th
, 2005.  
A side note on investment banks’ leverage and the net capital rule 
As the literature review demonstrated, many scholars claimed that the SEC change to 
the net capital rule allowed investment banks to increase their leverage (Helleiner 
2011), with some scholars claiming that investment banks tripled their leverage 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). As Erik Sirri, the SEC’s Director of the Division of 
Trading and Market pointed out during a speech at the National Economists Club 
about Securities Markets and Regulatory Reform, “the Commission did not eliminate 
or relax any requirements at the holding company level because previously there had 
been no requirements” (Erik Sirri 2009). He argued that  
 
The net capital rule requires a broker-dealer to undertake two 
calculations: (1) a computation of the minimum amount of net 
capital the broker-dealer must maintain; and (2) a computation of the 
actual amount of net capital held by the broker-dealer. The "12-to-1" 
restriction is part of the first computation and it was not changed by 
the 2004 amendments. The greatest changes effected by the 2004 
amendments were to the second computation of actual net capital 
(ibid). 
As a joint research paper from Tobias Adrian of the New York Fed and Hyun Song 
Shin of Princeton university shows, investment banks’ average leverage was actually 
higher at several times during 1995 and the year 2000 than during the crisis in 2008 
(Adrian and Shin 2010). This, taken together with the correct technical explanations 
of what the alternative net capital rule actually changed in conjunction with the old 
rule (as set out by Sirri), negates the conventional wisdom in the media and academia 
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that leverage reached (1) unprecedented levels in investment banks and that (2) this 
was driven by the SEC’s consolidated supervised entity programme. 
 
8.5 A POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS 
Contrary to some academics’ arguments, such as “investment banks supported and 
lobbied the US authorities first to remove Glass Steagall in 1999, move to new SEC 
rules in 2004” (Blundell-Wignall, Atkinson et al. 2008), or that the SEC “agreed to a 
request by the five large investment banks to use their own internal models, based on 
historical data to calculate “net capital” in their broker-dealer operations” (Johnson 
and Kwak 2010, p.140), it was not the US investment banking community that 
lobbied for the SEC’s CSE programme. As the case study showed, far from a Wall 
Street Treasury Complex pushing for the CSE Programme, it was the European 
process of creating a single, integrated market for capital and financial services in the 
EU that started the ball rolling. The European Union’s Financial Services Action Plan 
from 1999 set out an ambitious timetable which, thanks to the Lamfalussy Report, 
received enough impetus to bring it to fruition by 2005. The EU Financial 
Conglomerates Directive was enacted in 2002 (but needed EU national level 
ratification on a country by country basis), which put enormous pressure on US 
investment banks either to establish a separately capitalised EU holding company, 
move their headquarters across or lobby the US government and regulators to find a 
solution.  The first option was not attractive to US investment banks, as they would 
have to employ more capital and deal with additional regulatory complexity. The 
second option – moving their parent holding companies from the US to the EU – 
would have been “political suicide as Wall Street’s investment banks were seen as 
American and I am sure the Bush administration made it very clear that they would 
not accept them moving to Europe just to save a few bucks in capital” (DJ 2010). In 
addition, as the author’s elite interviews show, the top officials of the United 
Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority did not lobby for it, but discouraged it. 
Nevertheless, some US investment banks did consider moving their parent company 
across, but were rebuffed by the Financial Services Authority. This left US investment 
banks having to find a regulatory solution within the US.  
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Lacking the statutory authority to do so, the SEC had already offered a 
voluntary regime for consolidated supervision as part of the Gramm Leach Bliley Act, 
the so-called Supervised Investment Bank Holding Company (SIBHC) regime. 
However, no investment bank had signed up for SIBHC status, and the regime itself 
did not fulfil all of the EU’s criteria in order to be deemed equivalent. The SEC 
therefore had to act as well.  
Looking at it through the lens of the statutory authority hypothesis, the SEC 
was confronted to react to a regulatory request from abroad and – if it did not want to 
risk its regulatory regime being deemed as non-equivalent – was forced to respond. 
Even more troubling was the fact that its statutory authority was not only impacted by 
international, external factors beyond its reach, but it also lacked the statutory 
authority domestically to make the CSE programme obligatory. The Commission was 
thus left with two options: hope that Congress would pass new legislation that would 
give the SEC statutory authority time to enact a regime of consolidated supervision 
for investment banks; or to act itself and create a voluntary supervisory regime. The 
SEC did the latter and its CSE programme remained voluntary until its closure in 
2008. However, apart from the CSE programme being challenged in the courts (which 
it could have, but was not), the SEC was able to bring about significant regulatory 
change without legislative change. The SEC lacked statutory authority, but had the 
backing of the investment banking community, meaning that in terms of ideational 
support, it was aligned with the industry and regulators on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Moreover, the SEC could offer investment banks a ‘safe harbour’. As the US House 
Committee testimonies from 2002 reflect, the US investment banking industry was 
very sceptical about the EU’s Financial Conglomerates Directive. They feared that 
investment banks could be held to ransom as a result of unclear and non-standardised 
equivalence tests being conducted by EU supervisors.  
The broad ideational consensus amongst investment banks and policymakers 
on both sides of the Atlantic was also reflected in the SEC’s alternative net capital 
rule and its incorporation of ‘state of the art’ risk modelling and management 
methods. By allowing investment banks to use internal risk models applying VaRs, 
the SEC was aware that this would lower the deductions for market and credit risk, 
but there was the belief that the internal risk management system the CSE Programme 
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would be ‘robust’. Moreover, the SEC sought to align its net capital rule with Basel 
standards, which were seen as “the holy grail of risk management at the time” (CR 
2010). Applying the role of ideas hypothesis, the SEC clearly believed that a 
reduction in capital was acceptable because of the belief in the mathematical models 
and modern risk management techniques. This was because the concept that 
regulation by regulators and not markets was becoming  
 
increasingly unacceptable, so much so that our Division of Market 
Regulation opted for changing its name to the Division of Trading and 
Markets as otherwise you would be on the defence as soon as you 
walked into House and Senate Hearings (AN 2011). 
 
The SEC “subscribed to the free market consensus with the CSE programme, too; 
however to be on the safe side, we included the $5bn capital notification requirements 
into the programme just so that we have ‘plug’ as we had very little experience with 
VaR models and Basel” (CR 2010).  
As can be seen from the various comments received on the proposed CSE rule 
and the meetings held, the industry fulfilled once more a crucial role in providing 
expert, highly technical information to the SEC. Both hypotheses can easily be tested 
here. The comments during the consultation period reflect a degree of technical 
feedback, which the SEC not only took very seriously in its consideration for drafting 
the final rule, but also relied on in part. As the thesis has shown throughout the 
various case studies, the provision of expert information to regulators can be 
classified as industry influence. However, the feedback – both from investment banks 
as well as from non-investment banks – was simply driven by the fact of how the 
proposed rule could create unintentional, negative consequences, of which the 
Commission might not have been aware. In fact,  
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even with the largest team of SEC lawyers, the complexities 
involved in drafting the alternative net capital rule were enormous 
and we were grateful for the industry feedback since despite our 
hardest work, we overlooked certain issues which the comments 
subsequently pointed out and helped rectify (MP 2010).  
Finally and once more, the hypothesis that a revolving door between SEC and the 
industry could in some form influence regulatory decision-making is not applicable, 
as the impetus for this episode of deregulation emanated from Europe and its political 
will of closer integration. 
On September 26
th
, 2008, the then Chairman of the SEC, Mr. Christopher 
Cox, announced the end of the CSE programme. There were no investment banks left 
that were legally incorporated as CSEs. Five days prior, on the 21
st
 of September 
2008, both GS and MS received approval from the Federal Reserve to switch their 
legal entity from an investment bank to Federal Reserve regulated Bank Holding 
Companies. Eleven days earlier, Lehman Brothers Holding Inc. (LBHI) had filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in New York. The Bear Stearns Holding Company 
Inc. (TBSCI) entered into a merger agreement with J.P. Morgan Chase & Co (JPM) 
on the 16
th
 of March 2008, in which JPM rescued the faltering TBSCI with the 
support of the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve.  
The events between the establishment of the CSE programme and its demise 
are so complex that they are outside the scope of this case study. 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The research project that is this dissertation started with the author’s astonishment at 
academics’ and the media’s statements about the alleged power and secret influence 
that an ill-defined entity called Wall Street was said to have vis-à-vis its regulators, 
key policymakers and commercials banks. Whilst still working in investment banking, 
but already developing this thesis’s research proposal, the author was perplexed about 
the lack of empirical backup for some of the key texts about investment banking in 
the IPE of finance
1
. Even more surprising was the fact that despite the importance and 
power attached to Wall Street and investment banking, there was no distinct body of 
work in the IPE specifically researching this area of finance.  
 
The thesis demonstrated that investment banks are very different legal entities, 
as well as businesses, from commercial banks. Investment banks are neither deposit- 
taking nor engaged in maturity transformation. They are (were) regulated by distinct 
regulators, i.e. the Securities and Exchange Commission, and not the Federal Reserve 
(at least not until the breakdown of Wall Street in 2008), and governed by rules that 
are tailored to investment banks’ needs – and more specifically tailored to protect 
investors, not investment banks. These rules are, again, very different from those of 
commercial banks. As the case studies highlighted, the Federal Reserve focuses on 
commercial banks’ solvency, which is intimately tied up with their profitability. In 
other words, losses suffered by commercial banks will eat into banks’ equity, lower 
their capital ratios and force them either to scale back their balance sheets, i.e. to de-
lever, thereby reducing the money supply to the economy, or to raise fresh capital. By 
contrast, investment banks do not supply an economy with money, as their balance 
sheets are marked to market and they do not create money with their clients’ deposits.  
                                                        
1 As the literature review highlighted, the current scholarship in the IPE of investment banking has 
many empirical gaps. During the author’s initial literature search to develop the research proposal, he 
was particularly taken aback about the sweeping claims made by Underhill and Zhang (Underhill & 
Zhang, 2008) and Jagdish Bhagwati (Bhagwati, 1998) without providing substantial empirical backup. 
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The overwhelming majority of newspaper and academic pieces did not capture 
the complexities of these very different business models and underlying regulatory 
regimes for investment and commercial banking. The literature review has laid out the 
various gaps in the scholarship on the IPE of investment banking. The majority of 
works claiming to analyse the IPE of investment banking base their arguments on 
hearsay and/or are self-referencing. In particular, claims made about the lobby power 
of Wall Street in achieving de-regulatory outcomes, such as the repeal of Glass 
Steagall and the SEC’s Consolidated Supervised Entity Programme, are being 
presented without empirical backup and with authors mixing up commercial banks 
and investment banks.
2
 
 
Why does this matter? 
 
Failing to appreciate the differences between commercial and investment 
banks leads to inaccurate academic research, can skew public and politicians’ 
opinions (as was and still is the case about who was lobbying to repeal Glass Steagall) 
and can ultimately result in sub-optimal regulatory outcomes for investment banks 
and societies at large if legislators follow incorrect guidance. The financial crisis of 
2008 (and beyond) is a good case in point. When the financial crisis hit in 2008, it 
was not the failure of Lehman Brothers or the fire-sale of Bear Stearns that brought 
the US and world economy terrifyingly close to collapse. Whilst a detailed analysis of 
this crisis could fill the space of many PhD theses to come, it is important to note that 
Bear Stearns was highly liquid weeks before its arranged sale to JPMorgan. In the 
words of the then SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox  
 
the fate of Bear Stearns was the result of a lack of confidence, not a 
lack of capital […] specifically, even at the time of its sale on 
Sunday, Bear Stearns' capital, and its broker-dealers' capital, 
exceeded supervisory standards. Counterparty withdrawals and 
credit denials, resulting in a loss of liquidity – not inadequate 
capital – caused Bear's demise (SEC 2008). 
                                                        
2 See for example, works by Baker (Baker, 2010) or (Reinhart & Rogoff, 2009). 
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The key word in Cox’s statement is confidence. Because of a lack of confidence, Bear 
Stearns had to start selling off its balance sheet assets at prices below book, which 
then caused an avalanche in the world’s financial markets as these new, lower prices 
forced all other market participants to mark their books to these new market prices. In 
a way, a lack of trust combined with full market transparency on asset pricing set off a 
downward spiral. The ones caught in the middle of all this, and with massive 
exposures to assets with rapidly declining prices, were the world’s commercial banks 
(i.e. US commercial banks, Japanese commercial banks, all German commercial 
banks, all UK commercial banks, many German, Spanish and Italian savings banks; 
the list could go on). A deterioration of asset prices forces investment banks to 
unwind their positions in order to remain liquid, but it destroys commercial banks’ 
balance sheets and solvency position causing them to become insolvent, i.e. bankrupt. 
Ironically, then, it was the UBSs, the Credit Suisses, the RBSs, the Commerzbanks 
and the Unicredits of the world that had to be rescued or bailed out; not because of 
failings in their core commercial or retail banking business (even though the amount 
of non-performing loans started to rise), but because of their involvement in 
investment banking activities, and worse, as a result of them buying investment 
banking investment products either on their own account or with their clients’ money. 
In all instances, the financial crisis of 2007 devastated commercial or European style 
“universal” banks in much the same way: losses as a result of holding or selling 
positions whose value had to be marked down significantly, ate into banks’ core 
equity capital forcing them to de-lever rapidly or requiring government bail-outs For 
example, UBS was still increasing its presence in sub-prime mortgage backed 
securities at a time when Goldman Sachs had largely exited this market in 2007. UBS 
alone suffered the largest loss ever recorded in Swiss corporate history in 2008. 
 
One could easily blame the financial crisis of 2008 on Wall Street, on the 
repeal of Glass Steagall or on the SEC’s net capital rule change in 2004; and a number 
of journalists and academics did exactly that. However, when scratching the surface, 
the thesis has shown that the causes behind the repeal of Glass Steagall and the SEC’s 
CSE Programme are to be found in very different corners, which are sometimes 
unrelated, and sometimes diametrically opposed to Wall Street and its interests. In 
other words, in examining the political economy of the financial regulation of US 
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investment banking, this thesis provides a timely and important contribution to better 
understanding the paths and unintended consequences of regulatory decision-making 
in finance generally, the role of the judiciary in this process, the importance of 
regulators’ statutory authority, the impact of an ideational consensus and the role of 
lobbying. In doing so, the thesis unpacked all these complexities and lined them up in 
logical order so that readers and researchers can identify the thread that, for example, 
connects US Court rulings in the 1960s to the Gramm Leach Bliley Act of 1999.  
 
The dissertation set out to uncover the political economy of financial 
regulation of US investment banking. In particular, it sought to understand the factors 
behind complex episodes of de-regulation, and examine how these link up to the 
claims made about Wall Street in academia and the media. 
 
Given the absence of an established research programme in the IPE of 
investment banking, the thesis is a stepping-stone for other academics to build on and 
deepen our understanding about the political economy of investment banking: its 
actors, policy positions and regulators. The research puzzle was thus to uncover the 
political economy of financial regulation of US investment banking. The thesis picked 
its cases on the dependent variable, i.e. a key deregulatory event or reduction in 
regulation. The dissertation applied the qualitative research design of the case study 
method: a reduction in regulation can refer to a lessening in regulatory capital 
standards, less stringent reporting requirements or greater access to hitherto restricted 
financial markets. As the five case studies have shown, the process-tracing exercise 
was crucial in identifying and examining the complex chains of causalities that 
ultimately ended in a reduction in regulation. Nearly forty non-attributable interviews 
with the elites from finance, regulation and law were key in connecting the dots and 
understanding actors’ preferences.  
 
Ultimately, the dissertation’s findings and case studies have wider 
applicability for scholars of international political economy: the role of the courts and 
regulators’ statutory authority are just two aspects (or explanatory variables) that 
political economists and political scientists have not paid sufficient attention to, and 
which should feature more prominently in future research.  
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9.2 HYPOTHESES 
 
Interest group based hypotheses 
 
At the beginning of the research, the thesis set out six hypotheses to study and 
test. Of these, three were related to interest group theories: the revolving door 
hypothesis, the expert information hypothesis and the provision of information 
hypothesis. All three hypotheses have shown to have some effect as explanatory 
variables on the outcome, but were not the most critical in bringing about key de-
regulatory outcomes. The thesis demonstrated that a revolving door at the level of 
elites in Washington D.C. and New York exists – which has also been extensively 
covered in academia. Nevertheless, these revolving doors did not cause the regulators 
to be caught by the industry, but to gain first-hand market insights. At the Fed, the 
door was not quite revolving, but mostly shut. The interviewed elites, including a 
current president of one of the Federal Reserve Banks, pointed out that the Fed has 
been the most careerist regulator in the US, with little movement between the industry 
and the Fed. The trading floors of the New York Federal Reserve allow the regulator 
to gather first-hand market experience as an active counterparty; it is thus far less 
dependent on outsiders’ market knowledge.  
 
The door at the SEC was in full swing between private law practices to the 
Commission and back – interviewees across all occupations and jurisdictions saw that 
as beneficial, as it allowed the Commission to remain up-to-date with market 
developments and gain a better overall understanding of market dynamics. The same 
could be said for the CFTC where commissioners have been largely recruited from 
the industry the CFTC has been regulating; but here again, it was hard to identify an 
element of capture or corruption, at least for the cases under consideration.   
 
If Wall Street’s lobby groups set out to capture or influence regulators via a 
revolving door, then they failed spectacularly at the Federal Reserve. They also had a 
limited impact at the SEC, which never appeared as an appellant alongside the SIA or 
the ICI during the lengthy court cases concerning Glass Steagall. However, the thesis 
shows that the expert information and provision of information hypotheses are key, 
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not for capturing regulators, but for supplying them with up-to-date, often privileged 
market information that they would otherwise not have – with the exception of the 
Federal Reserve. It is important to bear in mind that regulators such as the CFTC and 
the SEC have an enormous amount of expertise in-house, but they lack the direct 
access to the trading floors as an active counter-party, and thus cannot  judge the full 
impact of their regulation a priori. This is where industry feedback plays a key role 
such that (new) regulation minimises market turbulence and unintended negative 
consequences. 
 
The judiciary 
Institutionally safeguarded from interference by the executive and legislative 
powers, the US Supreme Court cannot be lobbied, is accessible to everyone via the 
judicial system and is transparent in its hearings and judgements. The judiciary as 
regulator hypothesis was tested in three Glass Steagall case studies. The first and the 
second Glass Steagall case studies – with the period under observation starting in the 
1960s – showed that the US Supreme Court provided an interpretation of the Glass 
Steagall Act which was radically different in some respects to the conventional legal 
reading of the Act’s separation between commercial and investment banking. It was 
the decision on ICI vs. Fed (Supreme Court of the United States, 1981) that set the 
ball rolling for the repeal of Glass Steagall: firstly, it moved the separating line 
between the two industries inside the Bank Holding Company, namely between 
legally separate affiliates (i.e. subsidiaries) of the same Holding Company; secondly, 
it re-affirmed the Federal Reserve’s statutory authority to amend existing financial 
regulation, such as the Bank Holding Company Act or the Glass Steagall Act, as long 
as these amendments are “consistent with the language and legislative history” 
(Supreme Court of the United States, 1981); and thirdly, the Court provided guidance, 
but no hard limits, on the extent to which commercial banks could re-enter previously 
restricted investment banking activities, i.e. the definition was that the legally separate 
affiliate of the Bank Holding Companies was not to be “principally engaged in 
securities activities”. 
  
The court’s decision was a watershed moment and clearly surprised the Fed, 
as the elite interviews demonstrated. Because the Court provided no clear definition 
for the thresholds of when an affiliate was principally engaged in investment banking, 
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the commercial banking industry subsequently applied to re-enter investment banking, 
which would force the Federal Reserve to review their applications and ultimately 
provide and/or review a definition. In their applications, the banks had to explain their 
rationale and how they interpreted the term “principally engaged”. The Federal 
Reserve then had to use its statutory authority to interpret these applications in the 
context of the US Court’s ruling. The investment banking industry disagreed with the 
Fed’s decisions and took legal action against them. As a result, the US Supreme Court 
heard a number of cases on Glass Steagall in the 1980s which established a body of 
case law that provided an ever more detailed interpretation of the Act and Congress’s 
legislative intent.  
 
As early as 1983, the Federal Reserve ruled that Bank of America, the second 
largest Bank Holding Company by assets in the United States, could acquire Charles 
Schwab, America’s largest discount brokerage firm. By 1997, the Federal Reserve 
adopted an increase in the revenue limit in relation to the “principally engaged test” to 
25%, which meant that a Bank Holding Company could essentially acquire most 
investment banks on Wall Street and still be below this threshold. The US Supreme 
Court agreed with both of these Fed rulings. Without legislative change, the courts are 
one of the few institutions that not only police the rules of the game, but have the 
power to interpret them to the extent that these rules can take a very different meaning 
from their original intent.  
 
The blocking of the Trump administration’s proposed immigration policy (or 
better referred to as a travel ban) for seven Muslim-majority countries by US Federal 
courts serves as a very recent reminder of how independent and powerful the US 
judiciary is. 
 
The role of ideas 
The role of ideas hypothesis and its explanatory variable has been key in all 
cases, except the first Glass Steagall case study. Since the end of the 1970s, the idea 
in efficient markets that are best left as unregulated as possible has taken the US 
investment banking community as well as its regulators by storm. People’s ideas 
about the appropriate level of regulation has been a crucial factor in the Fed’s change 
of tack under Volcker to Greenspan in the 1980s, during which time market liberal 
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ideas won the upper hand so much that pro-regulation research and ideas would not 
even get elevated to the top (ML, 2010). Greenspan’s depiction in recent biographies, 
such as Mallaby’s The Man Who Knew: The Life and Times of Alan Greenspan, as a 
savvy political player at the Federal Reserve, underestimate how much libertarian and 
free market ideas guided Greenspan throughout his entire career (Mallaby 2016). In 
his own words: “can trade and standards of living continue to increase indefinitely? 
Yes. That is the gift of competitive free markets and the irreversible accumulation of 
technology” (Greenspan 2008).  
 
  At the SEC, the power of ideas clearly manifested itself in the Division of 
Market Regulation, changing its name to the Division of Markets and Trading, as one 
would otherwise “start meetings on the back foot in Washington D.C.” (CR, 2010) 
whilst at the policy level, SEC staff believed in the superiority of the Basel approach 
and its use of Value at Risk (VaR) models. It was regarded as state-of-the-art-risk 
management. Over at the CFTC, the commission, with the exception of the years 
under Chairperson Brooksley Born, was so convinced of the power of markets’ 
efficient self-regulation that Swap OTC derivatives were largely exempted from 
regulation, a fact that was later passed into a law, the Commodities Futures 
Modernisation Act of 2000 (CFMA 2000). CFMA 2000 is one of the most remarkable 
episodes in the history of US financial regulation: all American financial regulators, 
both parties in Congress and the Clinton administration agreed to make the regulation 
of OTC derivatives illegal. Backed by an ideational consensus that spanned party 
lines, lobby groups and businesses, it was one of the rare moments where a bipartisan 
majority in Washington not only unanimously agreed not to regulate, but also to 
prevent future regulation by law.  
 
Regulators’ statutory authority 
Last but not least, the statutory authority hypothesis has been a further 
important explanatory variable that has been relevant in all case studies. In the repeal 
of Glass Steagall chapters, the Federal Reserve used its statutory authority to carefully 
enact amendments to existing regulations which it believed to be within the legislative 
intent of the law. Because it acted within its statutory authority, the investment 
banking industry challenged the Fed’s rule changes in the courts, but consistently lost. 
The Fed under Greenspan made extensive use of its statutory authority in order to blur 
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and later on erase the separating line between commercial and investment banking. As 
such, it brought about significant regulatory change without Congress passing any 
new laws. In other words, it filled the vacuum of Congress’s impasse. The CFTC case 
study is a very interesting case for testing the hypothesis, as the CFTC gained 
statutory authority from Congress in 1992 for exempting OTC derivatives swaps from 
regulation during the period of observation of the case study. Before 1992, legal 
uncertainties existed as to whether forwards would be classified as futures and thus 
lose their exemption from regulation. Because the CFTC lacked the statutory 
authority to amend the regulatory regime to bring about this reduction in regulation, 
or non-regulation, it could only issue a statement saying that it would not classify 
forwards as futures. However, a court defined forwards as futures shortly after the 
release of the statement which put all forward transactions in jeopardy, as they would 
be illegal and as such unenforceable. When the CFTC gained statutory authority over 
the OTC derivatives markets regulation in 1992, it could nevertheless not make use of 
it as the Commission had pitched itself against the entire US regulatory community, 
Treasury and markets. What it shows is that for statutory authority to be effective, the 
regulator needs to act within the ideational consensus at the time, or gather at least a 
good proportion of key policymakers and opinion leaders behind its position. In case 
it lacks statutory authority, but is broadly in line with the ideational consensus, its 
regime is still open and vulnerable to legal action, as the CFTC example pre 1993 
shows. Analysing the SEC’s consolidated regimes of supervision is interesting, as 
they seem to fit a similar pattern: the SEC’s Supervised Investment Bank Holding 
Company regime from the Gramm Leach Bliley act was purely voluntary, and at the 
time not congruent with the ideational consensus of the investment banking industry, 
which did not want consolidated supervision. The tables turned with the European 
Union’s Financial Conglomerates regime. The SEC established the CSE Programme, 
also without statutory authority, but this time it was in line with the ideational 
consensus, meaning that all top investment banks signed up for it.  
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9.3 FINDINGS FROM THE CASE STUDIES 
 
Glass Steagall 
  
The repeal of Glass Steagall started in 1981 with a US Supreme Court 
interpretation about the legislative intent of Glass Steagall that became a landmark 
ruling, and set in motion a chain of events that culminated with the repeal of Glass 
Steagall, the Gramm Leach Bliley Act. This ruling was itself the accumulation of a 
near decade-long, protracted legal battle between the Investment Company Institute 
and the Federal Reserve. As was discussed earlier, the judiciary brought about 
regulatory change without legislative change. This was a rather unique situation, but 
deserves a greater audience in the IPE literature since political deadlocks in 
parliament are not unusual, and it shows one of the ways courts can and will ‘step up’ 
and fill the vacuum. Overall, then, all three Glass Steagall cases show that the repeal 
of Glass Steagall was not driven by US investment banks. On the contrary, they were 
the ones trying to uphold the separating line between commercial and investment 
banking. At the same time, commercial banks’ impetus to enter the highly profitable 
area of investment banking at a time when commercial banks’ core business – namely 
commercial and retail banking – was barely profitable was also in the interest of the 
Federal Reserve. Profitable banks are stable banks. However, the Supreme Court’s 
ruling and the Fed’s subsequent regulatory amendments with respect to section 20 
subsidiaries hollowed out the separating line to an extent that despite Glass Steagall 
still being in place, US Bank Holding Companies could legally acquire entire US 
investment banks. The Federal Reserve, especially under Alan Greenspan, used its 
statutory authority extensively to bring about regulatory change without legislative 
change. As Greenspan’s first testimony as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in front of 
Congress highlighted: he provided a schedule of things to come, i.e. if Congress did 
not manage to repeal Glass Steagall, which was the preferred route, he essentially 
would have to work towards it, yet in a piecemeal fashion. Greenspan swept the Fed, 
within months of taking office, with his ardent belief in the superiority and efficiency 
of markets. The role of ideas about the appropriate regulatory regime – i.e. market-
based regulation – plays an important role in the repeal of Glass Steagall. It provided 
Greenspan with the intellectual justification for pushing through regulatory change by 
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way of using the Federal Reserve’s statutory authority. As such, it adds a further 
dimension to the role of regulators as institutions that not only enforce the rules of the 
game, but can actually rewrite them. In sum, the repeal of Glass Steagall was a clear 
deregulatory event, however not an outcome the investment banks, but rather the 
commercial banks had pushed or wished for.  
 
 
CFTC  
 
The CFTC case study represents a somewhat extreme case of de-regulation, 
namely that of intentional non-regulation guaranteed by law. The case study 
investigated the causes that led to the passage of the Commodity Futures 
Modernisation Act of 2000 (CMFA). It is the only case study where the regulator 
received statutory authority during the period of observation through Congress’s 
passing of the Futures Trading Practises Act in 1992. The development of US swaps 
OTC derivatives was clearly very important to the CFTC, so much so that it issued its 
Swap Policy Statement in which it clarified that it would not classify certain OTC 
derivatives as futures, and thus exempt them from regulation. The CFTC tried to calm 
market fears that regulation was looming, thereby declaring many OTC instruments as 
illegal and unenforceable. Because the CFTC lacked statutory authority, it could not 
prevent the US courts from essentially ruling against its own Swap Policy Statement. 
This episode highlighted that if regulators move outside their statutory authority, they 
expose themselves to being challenged in the courts even if they are aligned with the 
ideational consensus of the market participants and other regulators. However, 
statutory authority alone is also not sufficient: the CFTC was within its statutory 
authority to issue the Concept Release, and the regulator also had authority to amend 
the relevant swaps exemptions if it so wished. The CFTC story surrounding 
Brooksley Born highlighted the sensitivities regulators have to navigate in order to 
achieve successful policy outcomes. In the case of the concept release, Born was 
warned to go about it in a softer way, but she ignored the President Working Group’s 
plea. When the release was published, she had an uphill battle in Congress, only made 
worse by her belligerent style in testimonies. In the end, the CFTC attempted to go it 
alone against the ideational consensus of the entire regulatory policy community as 
well as the industry. Despite having the authority to do so in theory, it failed in 
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practice. The fear that hundreds of billions of dollars of OTC derivatives swaps and 
forwards could be declared as on-exchange futures, coupled with people’s belief in 
leaving these markets unregulated so as to not drive them offshore and diminish their 
innovative power, sealed Born’s fate. The CFTC and Born were acting within their 
statutory authority, but outside the policy consensus. They both failed. 
 
The SEC’s net capital rule 
 
The SEC’s alternative net capital rule and Consolidated Supervised Entity 
Programme was, contrary to conventional belief amongst journalists and academics 
alike, not the result of investment banks’ successful lobbying, but the direct result of 
the European process of capital markets integration. The European Union’s Financial 
Conglomerate’s Directive required that all financial conglomerates active in the EU 
be supervised on a consolidated basis. In case of non-EU third party financial 
conglomerates, the third countries had to either offer a regime of consolidated 
supervision that was judged to be equivalent to the EU’s, or else its financial 
conglomerates would be required to establish a European Union-based and separately 
capitalised holding company. The SEC programme is an interesting case study in two 
major aspects: firstly, the SEC could not be proactive, but also could only be reactive. 
As such, the creation of the CSE programme was driven neither by US investment 
banks nor the SEC, but by European officials, who wanted not only to harmonise 
regulatory regimes across the EU member countries, but establish a single market. 
The SEC successfully achieved equivalence status with its voluntary supervisory 
regime. Whilst it had no statutory authority to require investment banks to join, it 
nevertheless achieved the signing up of all large US investment banks. Secondly, the 
alternative net capital rule led to a reduction in capital, which was seen not only by 
the SEC, but by the wider regulatory community as ‘state of the art’ given its 
incorporation of Basel standards. Again, an ideational consensus about what is the 
‘best’ capital standard was an important factor. The deregulatory factor was thus the 
alternative net capital, which led to a decrease in investment bank’s capital. This was 
seen as appropriate since the investment banks were also subject to more stringent 
reporting and were supervised on a consolidated basis. However, it was not 
investment banks pushing for this; it emanated as a side product from the process of 
European financial market integration. US investment banks were opposed to 
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consolidated supervision both in the EU as well as the US, as it meant that their 
holding companies would have to comply with much more onerous and stringent 
reporting and governance requirements, whereas previously it was only their US or 
EU affiliates that had to answer to the SEC or the local EU regulators. 
 
 
9.4 CROSS COMPARISONS, THEORY-BUILDING & FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
When comparing all these episodes of deregulation across the other cases, it 
becomes clear that the thesis’s interest group explanatory variables and hypotheses 
were the least powerful. Industry associations did have privileged access and provided 
key information to regulators, but this was only relevant at the margins. Besides, a lot 
of this information was given via public consultation periods. The same applies for 
the revolving door – the movements between the Fed and the banks it regulates were 
very limited. In the SEC, commissioners might move from the SEC to private law 
practice, but this did not translate to people receiving preferential treatment or other 
pay-offs. Overall, the thesis did not find evidence that the revolving door was of great 
importance in bringing about the specific deregulatory actions, and it found no 
evidence of individuals influencing regulatory decisions to receive personal gains 
when moving into the private sector. 
 
The role of ideas is an explanatory variable that is notoriously difficult to 
measure, especially quantitatively. However, the thesis’s process tracing through 
thousands of documents combined with elite interviews allowed the author to 
establish a detailed corpus of work that could shine light on the ideological biases of 
the key decision-makers at the time. Without being able to quantify “how much”, the 
dissertation revealed that ideas do play a key role in essentially all but one of the case 
studies: the very first case study on the beginnings of the repeal of Glass Steagall 
dates back to the 1960s, which made it difficult to interview key elites of the time and 
determine their ideational mindset. As to the other cases, semi-structured elite 
interviews together with statements made to the media and hearings in front of 
Congress are key data sources to unearth that ideas matter. Alan Greenspan’s House 
and Senate hearings and his books alone provide clear evidence in his belief in the 
superiority of the free markets; supplementing this data with interview material 
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enabled the author to establish chains of causality within which people’s ideas about 
regulation mattered. As such, ideas played an important role in these case studies, 
especially in determining the direction of regulatory change, i.e. deregulatory or not.  
 
The role of the judiciary as an actor whose interpretative rulings can mimic 
those of the legislative and cause significant regulatory change without legislative 
change is an important addition to the study of the IPE of finance, and warrants 
further analysis in other episodes where courts were asked to step in. One area that 
springs to mind is labour law. Even though dispute settlement mechanisms are a well-
researched topic in the IPE of trade, the judiciary is one of the most under-researched 
actors and aspects in political science and the wider IPE. Both the judiciary’s 
workings and the complex interplays between the courts and regulators are not well 
understood. People tend to forget that one of the key moments for the survival of the 
Euro during the financial crisis of 2007 and beyond was a decision by Germany’s 
highest court, the Federal Constitutional Court, that Germany’s participation in the 
European Stability Mechanism (which provides financial assistance to Eurozone 
member states in distress and has an approved lending capacity of EUR500bn) was 
compatible with Germany’s Basic Law. Had the court decided otherwise on 
September 12
th
 2012, it could have caused the collapse of the Euro, as many 
politicians and economists had warned. 
 
A matrix 
 
It is worth developing the concept and conditions of success of statutory 
authority a bit more and beyond the remit of the IPE of investment banking. It was 
relevant across all case studies. The thesis argues that the success or failure of 
regulatory outcomes can be depicted in a two-by-three matrix. On one of the axes, 
you have statutory authority – either as a yes or no. On the other axis, you have 
ideational consensus with three possible categories: in full alignment with ideational 
consensus, in alignment with a few key actors, no alignment. Cases where regulators 
have statutory authority and are in full alignment with the ideational consensus will 
lead to positive regulatory outcomes. The CFTC after the departure of Born is an 
example.  
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If the regulator has statutory authority, but only the support of some key 
constituents, then this can still lead to successful policy outcomes, as the case study of 
the Fed and Glass Steagall demonstrates. The Fed acted within its statutory authority, 
but was not in full alignment with all actors since the investment banking community 
was vehemently opposed, whilst commercial banks supported it. What followed was a 
piecemeal hollowing out of Glass Steagall which took more than two decades. 
 
Finally, if regulators have statutory authority, but are not at all aligned with 
the ideational policy consensus, they risk failing, as can be seen with the CFTC under 
Born. On the other side of the matrix, if regulators lack statutory authority, but amend 
rules that are in full alignment with the ideational consensus, they could be successful 
if they do not get challenged in the courts; examples here are the CFTC Swap Policy 
Statement or the SEC’s CSE Programme.  
 
However, if regulators lack statutory authority and are not in tune with the 
ideational consensus, then they will not manage to bring about their regulatory policy 
outcomes; an example here would be the SEC’s Supervised Investment Bank Holding 
Company regime. 
 
Key learnings 
 
Having researched more than five decades of investment banking regulation and the 
politics thereof, it is clear that commercial banks should not have been allowed to re-
enter investment banking. Many commercial banks used their customers’ deposits in 
order to trade and invest in investment banking markets. When the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis hit, the majority of the world’s top commercial banks had to be bailed 
out, as these banks played a key role in their respective economies and it would have 
caused a melt-down in the world’s financial system if clients had lost their assets. 
Because of the maturity transformation and the banks’ role in providing credit, and 
thereby creating money for the economy, they should simply be firewalled from being 
active in investment banking. 
 
As for the investment banks, they play a key role in financial innovation: sub-
prime mortgages and the securitisation of sub-prime mortgages are both Wall Street 
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inventions. It allowed previously under-banked and financially disadvantaged US 
citizens to gain a foothold in the US housing market (with all its benefits as well as 
pitfalls) which is vital to gain better job prospects and improve one’s credit score. 
Securitising these mortgages enabled investors to spread and disperse the risks. Both 
of these aspects in isolation were good things. However, investment banks and 
investment banking markets – in which both commercial and investment banks 
operated – needed more stringent, macro-prudential supervision by the SEC and the 
Fed. Neither of these two regulators identified sub-prime mortgages as big problem. 
Moreover, if investment banks were still owned by their partners (as was the case 
historically) who would also be fully and personally liable for any losses suffered by 
their investment bank, then we would have probably seen less risk-taking behaviour. 
Goldman Sachs was a private partnership until they went public in 1999. 
 
A final key learning is that investment banks and investment banking markets 
have become so large and intertwined with commercial banking that the liquidation of 
an investment bank, such as Lehman Brothers, caused huge shock waves around the 
globe since Lehman Brothers was essentially systemically relevant. The only remedy 
is that bigger is not better, but the opposite: regulators should be wary of large 
investment banks. Even if they are not commercial banks and a part of the economy’s 
money creation and money supply circle, their market positions can be so important 
that they end up creating huge shock waves in case of failure. Nota bene, this did not 
happen when Drexel Burnahm Lambert collapsed in 1990. 
 
Overall then, commercial banks should not be active in investment banking 
and investment bankers should be asked to participate in the bail outs their bank in 
bad times. Both of these remedies would have provided very different incentive 
structures for bankers in both fields.  
 
 
Developments since 2007 & future recommendations 
 
The thesis shed light on the various actors and events that drove de-regulatory 
decision-making – some of which were surprising – and the role of the investment 
banks within it. Whilst clearly being an important financial sector, it could not stop 
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the repeal of Glass Steagall or the establishment of the CSE Programme. As the crisis 
which started in 2007 is still unfolding in Europe, in the Italian and German banking 
system, in the overall health of the Greek economy, there is ample opportunity to 
build on this dissertation’s findings to unearth and examine further root causes of de-
regulatory decision-making and its consequences.  
 
The dissertation focussed on the IPE of financial regulation of investment 
banking, but the cases have much wider applicability: firstly, the role of the judiciary 
in regulatory decision-making and the politics of finance is poorly understood and 
requires a more substantive examination in future research. The Glass Steagall case 
studies were very clear instances where the judiciary played a key role.  
 
Likewise, lobbying in the form of financial contributions certainly impacts the 
legislative, especially in the United States. However, the inner workings of US 
financial regulators need better academic scrutiny and research, as lobbying takes a 
very different form here. Instead of money, lobbying regulators is centred around 
information. Researchers should not underestimate the negative consequences from 
information asymmetries and scenarios of imperfect information. The very fact that 
investors did not know whether OTC derivatives could be classified as on-exchange 
products in the US made them leave in droves to the European trading markets. 
Information asymmetries have been extensively studied in economics; there are still 
gaps in the IPE of finance literature.   
 
The Italian state and the EU finally agreed on a bailout of two Italian banks – 
Veneto Banca and Banca Popolare di Vicenza – for up to EUR17bn on June 26th, 
2017, nearly a decade after the sub-prime mortgage crisis began and the bank run on 
the United Kingdom’s Northern Rock bank. This sub-prime mortgage crisis led to the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers, the fire sale of Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch and 
caused Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs to change their legal structure into Bank 
Holding Companies and become Fed regulated in order to access the discount window 
and calm investors’ worries. The big, SEC regulated US investment banks, which 
could be put into liquidation without causing market havoc, have all but disappeared.  
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This is a big worry. Investment banks should, by their very structure, neither 
have access to a discount window nor have a lender of last resort. They are not 
deposit- taking institutions like commercial banks and do not need to be able to access 
central bank money for solvency or liquidity reasons. Goldman, Sachs and Morgan 
Stanley switched from being SEC regulated inter-broker dealers to bank holding 
companies, i.e. a Federal Reserve regulated commercial banks, on September 21
st
, 
2008. This move assured markets and investors that both Goldman and Morgan 
Stanley would by default remain liquid because of their access to the discount 
window. It should have been a temporary and not a permanent measure as both 
investment banks benefit from tax- payer funding and central bank liquidity, despite 
running two of the largest investment banking operations world-wide.  
 
Moreover, investment banks are inter-broker dealers, i.e. intermediaries that 
invest and trade money on behalf of their clients, but not clients’ money on behalf of 
themselves. Investment banks have been extremely entrepreneurial and innovative 
forces in financial markets which has created enormous value (as well as risks) for 
clients and societies at large – derivatives, asset backed securities, equity linked 
products are just a few of the inventions that help businesses better manage their risk 
and cash flows. However, what has happened since 2008 has been a deterioration in 
the classic business of investment banks which has undermined innovation. At the 
same time, quantitative easing combined with a low interest environment has made it 
very challenging for commercial banks to remain profitable (above their cost of 
capital). Legislative attempts for US financial regulatory reform since 2008 have 
produced the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-
Frank) which was passed in 2010. A literature research in key IPE journals on Dodd-
Frank reveals that little has been published to date. Dodd-Frank is an extremely 
complex Act encompassing elements that involve all financial regulators in the US 
and issue areas ranging from executive pay and corporate governance to credit rating 
agencies to state-based insurance reform. It goes beyond the scope of this chapter to 
examine Dodd-Frank and its consequences. However, what can be said is that we live 
in a very precarious situation where it is not clear how banks and financial markets 
will react to central banks retracting from years of quantitative easing. Neither the EU 
nor the US have taken steps to fully disentangle commercial banking from investment 
banking. It has taken European banks, especially Italian banks, ten years to recognise 
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their losses, establish bad banks and repair their balance sheets. It would be a scandal 
for the taxpayer, regulators and politicians alike if these banks were to engage in risky 
banking activities again as soon as they emerge from the last crisis. 
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